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A bstract
This dissertation is an investigation into how ambiguity should be classified for authors 
and readers of text, and how this process can be automated. Usually, authors and readers 
disambiguate ambiguity, either consciously or unconsciously. However, disambiguation 
is not always appropriate. For instance, a linguistic construction may be read differently 
by different people, with no consensus about which reading is the intended one. This 
is particularly dangerous if they do not realise that other readings are possible. Misun­
derstandings may then occur. This is particularly serious in the field of requirements 
engineering. If requirements are misunderstood, systems may be built incorrectly, and 
this can prove very costly. Our research uses natural language processing techniques to 
address ambiguity in requirements. We develop a model of ambiguity, and a method of 
applying it, which represent a novel approach to the problem described here.
Our model is based on the notion that human perception is the only valid criterion for 
judging ambiguity. If people perceive very differently how an ambiguity should be read, it 
will cause misunderstandings. Assigning a preferred reading to it is therefore unwise. In 
text, such ambiguities should be located and rewritten in a less ambiguous form; others 
need not be reformulated. We classify the former as nocuous and the latter as innocuous. 
We allow the dividing line between these two classifications to be adjustable. We term 
this the ambiguity threshold, and it represents a level of intolerance to ambiguity. A 
nocuous ambiguity can be an unacknowledged or an acknowledged ambiguity for a given 
set of readers. In the former case, they assign disparate readings to the ambiguity, but 
each is unaware that the others read it differently. In the latter case, they recognise that 
the ambiguity has more than one reading, but this fact may be unacknowledged by new 
readers.
We present an automated approach to determine whether ambiguities in text are 
nocuous or innocuous. We use heuristics to distinguish ambiguities for which there is 
a strong consensus about how they should be read. These are innocuous ambiguities. 
The remaining nocuous ambiguities can then be rewritten at a later stage. We find 
consensus opinions about ambiguities by surveying human perceptions on them. Our 
heuristics try to predict these perceptions automatically. They utilise various types of 
linguistic information: generic corpus data, morphology and lexical subcategorisations 
are the most successful. We use coordination ambiguity as the test case for this research. 
This occurs where the scope of words such as and and or is unclear.
Our research contributes to both the requirements engineering and the natural lan­
guage processing literatures. Ambiguity is known to be a serious problem in requirements 
engineering, but has rarely been dealt with effectively and thoroughly. Our approach 
is an appropriate solution, and our flexible ambiguity threshold is a particularly useful 
concept. For instance, high ambiguity intolerance can be implemented when writing 
requirements for safety-critical systems. Coordination ambiguities are widespread and 
known to cause misunderstandings, but have received comparatively little attention. Our 
heuristics show that linguistic data can be used successfully to predict preferred read­
ings of very diverse coordinations. Used in combination, these heuristics demonstrate 
that nocuous ambiguity can be distinguished from innocuous ambiguity under certain 
conditions. Employing appropriate ambiguity thresholds, accuracy representing 28% 
improvement on the baselines can be achieved.
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Title: Professor
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Preface
We have published results on distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambiguities in 
requirements at a specialist requirements engineering conference (Chantree, Nuseibeh, 
de Roeck, and Willis 2006). We have also addressed coordination ambiguities from 
an NLP perspective in a conference paper (Chantree, Kilgarriff, de Roeck, and Willis 
2005) and a book chapter (Chantree, Willis, Kilgarriff, and de Roeck 2006). Ideas we 
developed on ambiguity in natural language generation were presented in an earlier paper 
(Chantree 2004). This dissertation represents a definitive and unifying account of the 
research presented in these publications. Additionally, we have presented software we 
developed to chunk text in a manner suitable for analysing our test case ambiguities. 
This software was demonstrated at the Seventh International Conference on Text, Speech 
and Dialogue (TSD) in Brno, Czech Republic, in September 2004 (Sojka et al. 2004) 1.
1http://www.tsdconference.org/tsd2004/tsd_prog.html.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Processing ambiguous sentences and expressions is one of the most challenging tasks 
in natural language processing (NLP). Much NLP research has therefore been directed 
towards disambiguation, for example (Agarwal and Boggess 1992; Okumura and Muraki 
1994; Resnik 1999). This is usually achieved by determining the preferred reading of 
any ambiguity, and many techniques have been proposed to achieve this. However, 
such a reading may not be preferred by some readers, and indeed it may not be the 
author’s intended reading. Some ambiguities are particularly susceptible to this, and 
misunderstandings will result. Few NLP researchers have addressed this problem and 
how it might be solved. This issue is the focus of this thesis.
Our approach to ambiguity takes into account the vagaries of human perception that 
make disambiguation unwise for some linguistic constructions. We introduce a novel 
model of ambiguity to account for this. Instead of disambiguating ambiguities, we deter­
mine instead whether they are likely to lead to misunderstandings. We call ambiguities 
nocuous if this is the case. The opposite situation is when linguistic constructions are 
ambiguous in theory but in fact are generally read in the same way. We term these 
ambiguities innocuous. Misunderstandings between readers or between an author and 
readers are the result of nocuous ambiguity: in either case there is no clearly preferred
1
reading. On the other hand, an innocuous ambiguity does not result in misunderstand­
ings because it is easily disambiguated, and there is generally only one reading made of 
it: the preferred reading is therefore generally the same as the intended one. The aim of 
this research is to determine whether any given ambiguity is nocuous or innocuous.
In our model of ambiguity, an ambiguity can be nocuous for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is nocuous if it is experienced by readers as having more than one reading. We refer to 
this situation as acknowledged ambiguity. Secondly, it is nocuous if it is read differently 
by different people, but they do not recognise that other readings are possible. We 
refer to this situation as unacknowledged ambiguity. Unacknowledged ambiguity is the 
most dangerous situation as it is more liable to lead to unresolved misunderstandings. 
Acknowledged ambiguity may not be a problem as misunderstandings may get resolved 
because people are aware of their ambiguity. However, it is potentially dangerous because 
it can also lead to unacknowledged ambiguity. This happens because somebody may 
still not recognise that an ambiguity generally acknowledged to have more than one 
reading has this property. Acknowledged and unacknowledged ambiguity can only ever 
be determined for a fixed group of readers. So, an acknowledged ambiguity for any such 
group may be unacknowledged for a new reader.
We distinguish nocuous from innocuous ambiguities by first obtaining a consensus 
of human judgements about them. This is fundamental to our model of ambiguity: 
ambiguity is only realised via human perception (Wasow, Perfors, and Beaver 2003), 
and so it should be judged accordingly. We therefore survey the opinions of a group of 
human judges in order to capture the variety of possible perceptions. We use a sufficient 
number of judges to give a reliable indication of this variety.
There is a question concerning how many people must recognise an ambiguity as 
being ambiguous for us to consider it an acknowledged ambiguity. Similarly, how many 
people must assign different readings to an ambiguity for it to be considered, on balance,
an unacknowledged ambiguity? These issues will affect whether an ambiguity is nocuous 
or innocuous. We use the concept of an ambiguity threshold to establish where the 
dividing line between nocuous and innocuous ambiguity lies. This threshold represents 
a level of intolerance to ambiguity.
We then try to automatically predict whether ambiguities are nocuous or innocuous. 
(The nocuous ambiguities, once they have been detected and flagged up, can be dealt 
with at a later stage. Depending on the application, this may involve rewriting them in 
a less ambiguous form. We do not deal with this later process in this research.) The 
prediction is achieved using heuristics which we have developed and found to be effective. 
These heuristics use various types of linguistic information obtained from a corpus and 
from surface features of the text. We experiment with optimising these heuristics, and 
we combine them to obtain increased predictive power.
We use three methods of implementing our heuristics, each one using ambiguity 
thresholds in a different way. The method we term the Weighted Method uses a fixed 
ambiguity threshold that represents the idea that unacknowledged ambiguity is of more 
immediate concern than acknowledged ambiguity. The Flexible Method considers unac­
knowledged and acknowledged ambiguity to be equally indicative of nocuous ambiguity, 
but it allows for a flexible intolerance towards them. Thirdly, we employ the Unac­
knowledged Method to analyse solely unacknowledged ambiguity. This third method 
also employs a flexible intolerance to ambiguity. We use the Weighted Method to as­
certain our heuristics’ optimal effectiveness and to test the hypotheses on which they 
are founded. We use the Flexible Method to test our heuristics’ ability at distinguish­
ing nocuous from innocuous ambiguity. This method demonstrates the usefulness of 
a flexible intolerance to ambiguity. We use the Unacknowledged Method to examine 
whether unacknowledged ambiguity — the most immediately concerning type — can be 
characterised and predicted.
We use text from the field of requirements engineering (RE). This is the branch of 
software engineering concerned with specifying systems. Loosely speaking, each specifi­
cation is termed a requirement. It is a very suitable domain, as requirements must be 
as free as possible from ambiguity (Gause and Weinberg 1989). A misunderstanding of 
something written in a requirement can result in very costly mistakes: a system may 
then be built incorrectly, incurring large and unrecoverable development costs (Boehm 
1981). This may happen due to a nocuous ambiguity in the requirement. The prob­
lem of ambiguity is known to be potentially serious in RE (Berry and Kamsties 2005). 
However, there is a competing argument that sweeping disambiguation is often unnec­
essary. Many ambiguities are easily disambiguated by humans, and hence the intrusion 
of an automated disambiguation system can be unwelcome (Kamsties, Berry, and Paech 
2001). Our ambiguity threshold addresses this issue. If the consequences of ambiguity 
are likely to be serious, as in requirements for a safety-critical system, then intolerance of 
ambiguity will be high. Alternatively, it may be considered important to avoid the effort 
required to check lots of ambiguities, many of which will not lead to misunderstandings. 
Flagging up unnecessary numbers of ambiguities can be avoided by implementing a low 
intolerance of ambiguity.
We test our approach on coordination ambiguity. This is a structural (i.e. syntactic) 
ambiguity, that is both widespread and potentially dangerous. Resnik (1999) states that 
coordinations are a “pernicious source of structural ambiguity in English”. However, 
coordination ambiguity has received little attention in the NLP literature compared to 
similar types such as prepositional phrase (PP) attachment ambiguity. We attempt to 
analyse coordinations of a wide range of word and phrase types. Our research therefore 
makes a useful contribution to the literature in this regard. We focus upon a narrowly- 
defined manifestation of coordination ambiguity. However, our language model, and our 
method of applying it, are generally applicable to ambiguity.
Our individual heuristics achieve variable success in distinguishing nocuous from in­
nocuous ambiguities. In combination they achieve good performance when some appro­
priate ambiguity thresholds are implemented. It is impossible in practice for computers 
to model ambiguity exhaustively, largely because context plays such a large part when 
humans disambiguate text (Bar-Hillel 1960). Any approach such as ours therefore offers 
assistance as opposed to a total solution to the problem. In the RE community this is 
deemed to be the most appropriate approach (Ryan 1993), and also to be both feasible 
and useful (Gervasi and Nuseibeh 2000; Gervasi and Nuseibeh 2002). Ultimately, we 
envisage our approach being implemented as a wizard, operating in conjunction with a 
word processor. This would determine whether ambiguities of many types are nocuous 
or innocuous.
1.1 Introduction to Ambiguity
Here we introduce the concept of ambiguity, and the definition of it that we use for 
this research. To further explain and refine the scope of this definition, we also discuss 
concepts which are similar to ambiguity. Where appropriate, we explain why we do 
not consider these in our analysis, or why they may overlap with our understanding of 
ambiguity.
1.1.1 W hat is Am biguity?
Dictionary definitions of ambiguous can be as various as “doubtful”, “undetermined”, 
“indistinct”, “wavering”, “equivocal”, and “admitting of more than one meaning” (Simp­
son et al. 1988). The definition generally adopted in linguistics and artificial intelligence, 
and the one on which we base our own, is the last of these.
Many variations on this definition can be used, generally involving differing consid­
eration of context. For instance, in the field of RE, ambiguity can be defined as having
“multiple interpretations despite the reader’s knowledge of the RE context” (Kamsties, 
Berry, and Paech 2001). Many other definitions exist for the RE domain alone (Kamsties 
2001). Sometimes in RE the term “ambiguity” is assigned a specialised meaning whereby 
a requirements specification is ambiguous if it is non-deterministic1. This implies that 
the computer program specified by the requirements can execute in more than one way 
and still be consistent with the requirements specification.
Such is the “ambiguity of ambiguity”, that Gillon (1990) concludes that all attempts 
to formulate precise definitions and tests of ambiguity have been problematic. Our task is 
simplified somewhat as we ignore most considerations of context. Context has infinitely 
large scope and many facets, and many of these facets are either not computationally 
tractable or not knowable from the information at hand. Also, we wish to develop a 
general solution that is applicable for requirements describing many types of system. 
Ultimately, we wish it to be usable for application domains other than requirements 
engineering. It is therefore appropriate that our consideration of context is limited.
We wish to analyse how differently humans perceive ambiguity. To obtain a clear 
picture of this, we use examples of ambiguity with equal numbers of possible interpre­
tations. We therefore require that they have a discrete number of these interpretations. 
This definition distinguishes ambiguity from vagueness, for instance, where a continuum 
of interpretations exist. (Concepts such as vagueness which are similar but not identical 
to ambiguity are discussed in the next subsection). Our definition is similar to Kamsties’ 
(2001) notion of genuine ambiguity. We talk of interpretation rather than meaning, as 
the former requires an interpreter, which the latter does not. This is important for us, 
as requirements are a communication between two or more parties. We are concerned 
only with written text as this is the medium in which most requirements are formulated. 
Also, we are interested in passages of text rather than individual words or whole doc­
1 Connie Heitmeyer: personal communication
uments, as this is the unit which most usually corresponds to individual requirements. 
Therefore we formulate the following definition of ambiguity for use in our research:
A passage of text is ambiguous if it has two or more discrete interpretations
Ambiguities are most often classed as either lexical, semantic, syntactic (or struc­
tural) or pragmatic. Lexical ambiguity occurs when a word has several meanings. Se­
mantic ambiguity can be simply lexical ambiguity. Or, it can refer to the situation 
where combinations of words can have different meanings. Structural ambiguity refers 
to the situation where a sequence of words can be grammatically structured in different 
ways. This will generally yield different meanings. Pragmatic ambiguity occurs when the 
context of an expression has an influence, allowing several alternative meanings of the 
expression. Our definition of ambiguity, and our ambiguity model, could be applied to 
ambiguities of all these types. However, we look only at one particular type of ambiguity 
in order to focus our research.
1.1.2 C oncepts Akin to  A m biguity
Here we discuss concepts that are akin to ambiguity, but are not exactly the same 
as it. We do not seek to analyse these other concepts specifically in this research. 
However, some of them overlap with our concept of ambiguity, and examples of them 
will inevitably be captured together with the ambiguities we analyse. Others can be 
seen as similar to ambiguity in that they lead to similar consequences. Inconsistency 
and incompleteness are of particular interest to requirements engineers, and are often 
discussed in the literature in the same breath as ambiguity (Rupp 2000; Shull, Rus, 
and Basili 2000). We approach the others -  generality, vagueness and clarity -  from a 
linguistics standpoint. Lastly, we introduce the concepts of indefiniteness, indeterminacy 
and correctness. These subsume, or overlap with, the concepts already mentioned here, 
so we do not discuss them in depth.
Inconsistency (or Conflict)
Statements “are inconsistent if they state facts that cannot both be true, or if they 
express actions that cannot be carried out at the same time” (Kamsties 2001). Zwicky 
and Sadock (1975) contend that inconsistent statements count as ambiguities. As with 
ambiguity, undetected inconsistency is recognised as a particularly dangerous source of 
costly errors (Gervasi and Zowghi 2005). Nuseibeh, Easterbrook, and Russo (2001) state 
that problems are caused not by inconsistency per se, but by undetected inconsistency. 
These views concur with our own regarding unacknowledged ambiguity. However, we are 
concerned with text that can be read in more than one way. Inconsistency is revealed 
when a single reading causes conflicting truth conditions, so we do not look explicitly 
for it.
Incompleteness
Incompleteness refers to the omission of necessary information in a communication. This 
includes failure to provide further information needed to determine or define information 
already present in the communication (Zowghi and Gervasi 2002). Kamsties, Berry, 
and Paech (2001) make the distinction that “Incompletenesses and ambiguities can be 
distinguished by the type of required correction activity. The former require adding 
information, while the latter just require rephrasing the present information”. However, 
addition of information can disambiguate ambiguities as well as incompletenesses. We 
believe therefore that there is an overlap, and so we may well capture many of the latter 
in our quest to capture the former.
It can be argued, at least from a linguistics standpoint, that statements are never 
complete. There is always a cut-off point regarding how much specifying information is 
given. Boehm (1984) realises the difficulty this poses in requirements. However, rather 
than having to consider “all possible worlds”, requirements engineers can usually relate
their texts to real-world denotations.
Generality
“An expression is general if and only if the expression’s connotation is a genus of more 
than one species” (Gillon 1990). For instance, cousin is general with respect to gender: 
it can refer to both male and female cousins. The word kid is ambiguous between two 
senses, baby goat and baby human, whereas horse is not ambiguous between mare and 
colt but rather has a sense that subsumes both. The latter instance is another example 
of generality. General expressions can always be made more precise, if necessary, by 
adding supplementary information.
Looking from an RE perspective, Kamsties (2001) states that generality “usually 
occurs as a pragmatic ambiguity”. This means that the context of the generality, as 
opposed to the general expression itself, is the factor that determines how it is read. 
Kamsties also claims that generality is “usually used deliberately” and is “often accept­
able for a while” . This will tend to mean that generality is not a fruitful source of 
unacknowledged, and therefore nocuous, ambiguity. These factors mitigate against the 
use of generalities as the test case for our research.
Vagueness
Some researchers, for example Allen (1995), consider vagueness to be no different from 
generality. However, it may be distinguished in the following way: “In the case of a 
vague sentence, one is uncertain of its truth relative to a specified state of affairs. No 
further knowledge of the state of affairs relieves the uncertainty” (Gillon 2003). In 
philosophy it is argued that vague statements admit borderline cases (Bach 1998). For 
instance, the word tall is vague because, for example, it cannot be decided whether a 
man of 1.80m is clearly tall or clearly not tall (Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger 2003).
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This is in contrast to generality. For instance, regardless of which other factors are left 
unspecified, it is always clear whether or not somebody is your cousin. Virtually all 
statements contain vagueness, as they don’t give all the possible determining factors of 
that which they describe. It can be argued that some expressions, for example “fast” 
and “user-friendly”, are vague by nature and cannot be made precise (Kamsties 2001).
As with generality, Kamsties (2001) claims that vagueness is usually used deliberately 
and is often acceptable for a while. It will also therefore not be so fruitful a source of 
unacknowledged, and therefore nocuous, ambiguity. Also, vagueness is acknowledged to 
be more unavoidable and more a fact of fife than ambiguity. For these reasons, we believe 
that it should be tackled by a different type of research project to the one presented here.
Lack of Clarity
Clarity, as described by Walton (1996), is based on Grice’s maxims for the successful con­
duct of a conversation (Grice 1975). These maxims insist upon avoidance of hindrances 
to understanding such as obscurity, irrelevance and verbosity. Clarity is a pragmatic 
concept, generally dependent on context and on a wider consideration of text than we 
attempt. We describe it here as it conveniently brings consideration of the recipients 
of communication, as well as the originators, into focus. Clarity, and therefore also the 
lack of it, are closely related to ambiguity. However, they emphasise the idea that mis­
leading the recipients is key, and that ambiguity is only a problem when this occurs. 
This accords with our use of human perception as the criterion for judging ambiguity, 
and our view that unacknowledged ambiguity is the most dangerous source of misun­
derstandings. However, it does not capture the danger of acknowledged ambiguity: text 
which has not so far misled the recipients may also be dangerous. This is because if it 
has more than one possible interpretation, it may mislead future recipients.
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Other Concepts
Other terms exist to describe concepts similar to ambiguity. For instance, Pinkal (1995) 
uses the notion of indefiniteness (Pinkal 1995), which subsumes ambiguity and vagueness 
but not generality. Poesio states that “A sentence is ‘semantically indefinite’ if and only 
if in certain situations, despite sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts, neither true 
nor false can be clearly assigned as its truth value” (Poesio 1996). This appears to align 
with Gillon’s definition of vagueness, given above. Whichever definition of indefiniteness 
is preferred, this concept adds no information not contained in the concepts we have 
already defined. Therefore we do not discuss it further.
Indeterminacy is a term sometimes used by both linguists and those using linguistics 
in practical applications. However, it can mean different things. Gillon (2003) states 
that “the noun ‘nail’ is indeterminate with respect to the longness or shortness of the 
things in its denotation”. He claims that indeterminacy is a distinct concept as “every 
common noun is indeterminate but not every common noun is general” or, indeed, am­
biguous (Gillon 1990). However, this sounds like vagueness, according to our discussion 
of it above. Pinkal (1995) would seem to confirm this. Alternatively, indeterminacy is 
sometimes considered, for example by requirements engineers such as Kamsties (2001), 
to be the same as generality. Because of these confusions, we prefer not to consider 
indeterminacy as a separate concept.
Correctness is a term sometimes used in RE, though it is not always clearly defined. 
Zowghi and Gervasi (2002) state that it can be the “combination of consistency and 
completeness”, or it can refer to the “satisfaction of certain business goals”. In the 
former usage it subsumes concepts that we have already defined, in the latter it refers 
to aspects out of the scope of our research. Therefore we do not discuss it further.
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1.2 The Application Domain
In this section we introduce the domain in which we implement our approach to ambigu­
ity, and from which we take our examples of ambiguity. We explain what requirements 
engineering is, the problems that ambiguity causes within it, and what our response is 
to these problems.
1.2.1 D efinitions
RE, or software systems requirements engineering as it is sometimes called, can be de­
fined as the process of discovering the purpose for which a software system is intended 
(Nuseibeh and Easterbrook 2000). This involves “identifying stakeholders2 and their 
needs, documenting these in a form that is amenable to analysis, communication, and 
subsequent implementation” (Nuseibeh and Easterbrook 2000). As we are analysing 
text, we are concerned with the documents that carry this information, and refer to 
these as requirements documents3. In this thesis we make no use of common distinctions 
such as that between documents of functional and non-functional requirements. This 
because we are concerned with short passages of text, and not with the wider significance 
of the documents that contain them.
1.2.2 A m biguity in R equirem ents
As ambiguity is endemic in natural language, it is known to be a considerable problem 
for all requirements written in natural language (Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger 2003; 
Goldin and Berry 1997). Gause and Weinberg (1989) recognise the crucial position that 
ambiguity has in requirements engineering, and Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger (2003) 
suggest that unintended ambiguity is the “Achilles’ heel of software requirements spec­
2 Stakeholders are all the people who have something to gain or lose from the system.
3 Other RE practitioners, e.g. (Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger 2003), refer to such documents as 
(software)  requirements specifications. We prefer to follow those, including Jackson (1995), who reserves 
the word specifications for other usages.
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ifications”. If stakeholders interpret a requirement in different ways, this can result in 
an incorrect implementation and severe costs may be incurred. Ambiguity can be more 
intractable than other defects, such as incompleteness, and research has shown that it 
can more frequently result in misunderstandings (Kamsties 2001). Unacknowledged am­
biguity, the situation that we hope to address by locating nocuous ambiguity, is the same 
as unrecognised disambiguation. This is one of Gause’s five most important sources of 
requirements failure (Gause 2000), as reported by Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger (2003).
The problems inherent in natural language have led Hanks, Knight, and Strunk 
(2001) to state that “the way in which humans innately use language is not conducive 
to effective communication between domain experts and software engineers”. Several 
strategies have therefore been developed to help requirements engineers avoid ambiguity 
by not using everyday natural language. However, Gervasi (2000) states that natural 
language is the only language that one can confidently assume is shared among everyone 
involved in the software development process. Recently Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger 
(2003) could still observe that the great majority of documents available for requirements 
analysis were written in natural language. Ambiguity is a problem because requirements 
are usually not written by those who build and implement the systems they specify. 
As a result of outsourcing, they are increasingly written by employees from different 
cultural backgrounds. It is known to cause problems in RE when author and reader 
have differing levels of skill in the language being used (Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger 
2003). Additionally, as a result of offshoring, employees may not work in the same 
countries as the other stakeholders. Organisational differences add to the possibilities of 
misunderstanding ambiguity, making the possibility of misunderstanding requirements 
even more likely.
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1.2.3 M otivation for a Solution
Our work is driven by the desire to locate ambiguities in requirements that will lead 
to misunderstandings, and so potentially to incorrect implementations. “Ambiguity is 
characteristic of poor quality requirements, and poor quality requirements are charac­
teristic of challenged projects” (Boyd, Zowghi, and Farroukh 2005). Carrying this out 
during requirements analysis is a relatively cheap solution to the problem, as the cost of 
fixing errors at later stages of a system’s development process can be orders of magnitude 
higher (Boehm 1981). However, locating errors is nontrivial, and even requirements that 
have been checked many times can still contain defects (Gervasi and Nuseibeh 2000). We 
therefore aim to offer a technique that assists requirements engineers with this process. 
We concur with the general opinion in the RE community that a partial solution, such 
as ours, is more appropriate than one claiming to have full understanding of the ambi­
guity problem (Ryan 1993). och Dag et al. (2005) cite recent industrial experience that 
motivates the need for automated support for requirements management.
Kamsties, Berry, and Paech (2001) have considered the fact that not all ambiguities in 
RE documents need be disambiguated. Also, Mich and Garigliano (2000) have suggested 
using an ambiguity threshold to distinguish these from more dangerous ambiguities. 
However, none of these researchers develop further the idea of discriminating between 
these types of ambiguity. Kamsties, Berry, and Paech do not formulate the idea of an 
adjustable intolerance to ambiguity. Mich and Garigliano do not base their idea on 
the human perceptions which, we believe, are necessary to analysis of ambiguity. They 
provide no conclusive evidence that their way of classifying ambiguities is effective. We 
are not aware of any other RE researchers who have tried empirically locating ambiguities 
that might cause misunderstandings.
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1.3 Introduction to Coordination Ambiguity
The type of ambiguity we use as the test case for all the research in this thesis is coor­
dination ambiguity. Because coordinations are known to be dangerous (Resnik 1999), 
nocuous ambiguity should be sufficiently in evidence. We are only interested in coordi­
nation in English, and make no comparisons with research based on other languages.
Coordination occurs when two or more linguistic units of equal rank or importance 
are coordinated, i.e. are finked or yoked together (Davidson 1996). In English, many 
different types of linguistic unit can be coordinated: words, phrases, clauses, sentences, 
etc. This is frequently achieved using coordinating conjunctions, such as and and or. 
Coordination ambiguity occurs when the scope of the coordination is in doubt. This is 
the scope of the coordinating conjunction, when one is used. The doubt can arise when 
it is unclear if a modifying word or phrase modifies one of the linguistic units being 
coordinated or both of them. This is demonstrated by the following phrase:
Assumptions and dependencies that are of importance
It is unclear whether the clause that are of importance modifies (in other words attaches 
to) assumptions and dependencies or only dependencies. We concentrate solely on con­
figurations of this type, involving a single conjunction and a single modifying word or 
phrase whose attachment is ambiguous. We evolve test case criteria to ensure that the 
examples of coordination ambiguity we use are of this type.
1.4 M ethodology
The hypothesis we wish to test in this thesis is whether ambiguities that cause misun­
derstandings can be distinguished from those that do not. We test firstly whether this 
can be witnessed in the perceptions that humans have of ambiguities. Secondly we test
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whether such perceptions can be predicted automatically by the use of heuristics. We 
discuss below how we implement these two ways of validating our hypothesis.
1.4.1 V alidation U sing a N ew  M odel o f A m biguity
The first way in which we validate our hypothesis involves postulating a novel Model 
of Ambiguity. This model accounts for our views about how ambiguity comes into 
being, and how it can lead to misunderstandings. We take a pragmatic consideration of 
ambiguity. Because we are concerned with misunderstandings that result from ambiguity, 
we wish to locate ambiguities that produce them. These are what we term nocuous 
ambiguities: they are given more than one reading. People can either acknowledge that 
more than one reading is possible, or they can each assign a reading and not realise 
that different readings are being made. Alternatively, an ambiguity can always be read 
in the same way: it is an innocuous ambiguity. Although such an ambiguity may have 
a structure (i.e. syntax) that permits multiple readings, only one is actually made. 
Our Model of Ambiguity distinguishes between the structural and interpretation (i.e. 
reading) aspects. The latter aspect is solely determined by human perception. We 
wish to validate whether human perceptions do indeed result in nocuous and innocuous 
ambiguity.
We determine whether this is the case by creating a database of ambiguities and 
associated human judgements. Firstly we collect a set of examples of text containing 
ambiguities having the same number of possible readings resulting from their structure. 
(These are all coordination ambiguities and are taken from a corpus of requirements.) 
We then ask a set of human judges to give their interpretations of each ambiguity. We 
infer from these whether each ambiguity is nocuous or innocuous, applying an ambiguity 
threshold to determine this. We consider that our Model of Ambiguity is validated if 
significant quantities of both types of classification are witnessed. Using different am­
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biguity thresholds results in differing quantities of ambiguities considered nocuous and 
innocuous. Validation of our Model of Ambiguity will show that ambiguities leading to 
misunderstandings can be distinguished from those that will not. Prom an RE perspec­
tive, it will also show that we are right to think that the former are a potential problem 
in requirements.
1.4.2 V alidating U sing H euristics
The second way in which we validate our hypothesis involves automatically predicting 
human perceptions about ambiguity. We use the same dataset of ambiguities as we used 
for the first type of validation. We seek to categorise the same ambiguities as nocuous 
and innocuous as the human judges did. Proving that this can be achieved automatically 
will show the validity of our heuristics.
All our heuristics attempt to predict whether an ambiguity is likely to have a sin­
gle reading. If they predict this strongly enough, they indicate that the ambiguity is 
innocuous. It is not the same single reading that all the heuristics predict: we look for 
heuristics that predict the different readings afforded by the syntax of the examples of 
ambiguity in our dataset.
We evaluate heuristics of many different types. Some use external information in the 
form of statistical data from a generic corpus. Others use information obtainable from 
the surface features of the text containing the ambiguities. Each heuristic is developed 
from a hypothesis about a linguistic phenomenon that might signify a single reading. 
To evaluate our individual heuristics, we train them to predict a single reading (and 
therefore innocuous ambiguity) with high accuracy. Their relative efficacies can then be 
compared. This process also tests the validity of their underlying hypotheses.
Next, we combine the heuristics. We hope that they will have much greater powers of 
prediction when used in combination. This is partly reliant on them having complemen­
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tary coverage. In other words, we hope that they predict different innocuous ambiguities. 
We use two methods of combination: simple disjunction and logistic regression. We use 
the latter to determine accuracy at distinguishing innocuous from nocuous ambiguities, 
as opposed to just predicting the former. During this process, we vary the ambiguity 
threshold. This shows us the efficacy of the combined heuristics when there are different 
proportions of nocuous and innocuous ambiguities to predict. Our hypothesis is vali­
dated if our heuristics can distinguish innocuous from nocuous ambiguities effectively. It 
will show that this process can be automated. From an RE perspective, it will also show 
that a useful tool can be developed to assist authors with determining which ambiguities 
in their texts need to be addressed.
1.5 Outline of this Thesis
In Chapter 2 of this thesis we discuss previous work that either partially concurs with our 
approach to ambiguity or demonstrates how the problem has traditionally been tackled. 
This work provides the starting point for our own research, and demonstrates that we 
are filling a gap in the literature. In Chapter 3 we outline our model of ambiguity, 
which we believe represents a novel and appropriate approach to the problems presented 
by ambiguity. In Chapter 4 we present a detailed presentation of the ambiguity that 
we use as our test case, and discussion of the ways in which it can become nocuous 
or innocuous. Chapter 5 explains the process whereby we implement our model of 
ambiguity using coordination ambiguities taken from a corpus of requirements. This 
involves explaining how we obtain human judgements about these ambiguities, and then 
introducing the heuristics that we use to predict these judgements automatically. In 
Chapter 6 we present the results of our empirical study. We use a variety of statistical 
methods to prove the efficacy of our heuristics and our key idea that nocuous ambiguities 
can be distinguished from innocuous ones. Our conclusions are presented in Chapter 7;
these are followed by ideas for future work in Chapter 8.
1.6 Summary
In this chapter we have summarised this thesis in the form of an extended introduction. 
We have then discussed the concept of ambiguity, and how it is different from and 
similar to other allied concepts. We have introduced the application domain, in which we 
perform all our empirical investigations. Then we have introduced the type of ambiguity 
we use as the test case for all the research presented here. Also, we have described 
the methodology we use to validate the hypotheses which this thesis attempts to prove. 
Lastly, we have outlined the structure of this thesis.
19
Chapter 2
Previous Approaches to 
Ambiguity
Most researchers addressing the problem of ambiguity in text have sought to disam­
biguate. This is a big field, so we survey only the research focusing on the same type 
of ambiguity that we use as our test case. We then survey the smaller quantity of NLP 
research where the benefits of preserving ambiguity are considered. This is followed by 
a discussion of the ways in which ambiguity has traditionally been addressed in RE.
Then we introduce suggestions other researchers have made about classifying am­
biguity according to how dangerous it is. Some of this research has provided us with 
the motivation for our nocuous/innocuous distinction. Other research, carried out in 
parallel with our own, has arrived at ideas similar to ours, but has not investigated them 
empirically.
2.1 Disambiguation
We discuss here the research of NLP researchers who have sought to disambiguate co­
ordination ambiguity. (A full analysis of coordination ambiguity, and our focus on a
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narrowly-defined manifestation of it, is made in Chapter 4.) In English, many types of 
linguistic unit can be coordinated using the same coordinating conjunctions (Okumura 
and Muraki 1994). The literature1 reflects this diversity of possibilities and the inherent 
ambiguities. We firstly discuss research that attempts disambiguation of a wide range 
of these possibilities. We then focus on research disambiguating only coordinations of 
nouns, as these have attracted the most attention.
Note that none of the research discussed here seeks to distinguish ambiguities in the 
way that ours does. However, the results achieved show how amenable coordination am­
biguity is to computational analysis. The discussion also serves to highlight the various 
ways in which coordinations can cause ambiguity, and thereby misunderstandings.
2.1.1 D isam biguation o f W ide R ange o f Coordinations
Coordination in English can be of words of almost any part of speech, and occur at 
any level of syntactic structure (Okumura and Muraki 1994). An analysis of all such 
possibilities promises maximal practical application for real-life texts. However, only a 
few research projects have attempted to analyse a wide range of coordination structures.
Agarwal and Boggess 1992
Agarwal and Boggess (1992) present an algorithm that attempts to identify the scope of 
coordinating conjunctions in running text. They thereby hope to disambiguate the coor­
dinations in the text. For instance, they attempt to find which phrases are coordinated 
by each and in:
The mites live on the surface of the skin of the ear and canal, and feed by
1We look only at research on coordination in English. Realisation of coordination varies from language 
to language, and research on other languages would not be comparable to ours. For instance, Japanese 
requires the matching of coordinating conjunction to syntactic level, giving a lower potential for ambiguity 
(Okumura and Muraki 1994). Related work we do not consider includes Kurohashi and Nagao’s (1992) 
analysis of Japanese conjunctive structures, and Park and Cho’s (2000) disambiguation of coordinations 
in Korean.
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piercing the skin and sucking lymph, with resultant irritation, inflammation, 
exudation, and crust formation.
Though there are many syntactic possibilities, the phrases coordinated by the third 
and are probably piercing the skin and sucking lymph. The method employed to deter­
mine this matches parts of speech and case labels of the candidate phrases’ head words. 
Coordinating conjunctions and head words are located, and prepositional phrases are 
attached, using customised software. This software semi-parses a sentence and pushes 
all the chunks of words that it creates onto a stack. When a coordinating conjunction 
is found, candidate pre-conjunction phrases are popped off the stack until a match with 
the post-conjunction phrase is found.
Agarwal and Boggess test their technique on a tagged and parsed chapter of the 
Merck Veterinary Manual. They achieve an accuracy of 81.6% on this task. Their 
method is a straightforward and potentially useful way of matching candidate coor­
dinated phrases. They have also shown that pre-processing software custom-built for 
coordination disambiguation can be effective and have wide coverage. However, by their 
own admission, their technique does not extend to coordination ambiguity arising from 
modifier attachment.
Okumura and Muraki 1994
Okumura and Muraki (1994) develop a model for analysing coordinations in English. 
They use this to disambiguate coordinations as part of an English-Japanese machine 
translation system. They claim to cover all types of coordinating conjunction and co­
ordinations of many types of linguistic units. Their approach is to use the parallelism 
found in coordinations in English. They identify three levels of syntactic pattern in order 
to do this: phrase/clause, word and morphology. Let us consider the phrase:
Inspect the cockpit indicators and levers
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Cockpit will be judged to apply to the phrase indicators and levers. This is because the 
latter phrase is judged to be highly syntactically parallel. Both indicators and levers are 
concrete nouns and include the same suffix. They are also phrases containing sequences 
of identical word types — in this case, trivially, a noun matching with a noun.
Because parallelism is exhibited in many ways, coordinations of many different types 
of words and phrases can be covered. Okumura and Muraki report an accuracy of 75% 
at predicting conjunction scopes. They appear to use a dataset of 15,000 conjunctive 
sentences as their test data. No baselines are given, so it is not clear how much of 
an benefit their technique is. Application of the technique also increases processing 
efficiency considerably. However, ambiguity arising from modifier attachment will not 
be adequately addressed. This is because the reading that preserves the parallelism of 
phrase length will be preferred. In the example above, for instance, levers will always 
be judged to be modified by cockpit. In many other examples this reading will be clearly 
false.
2.1.2 D isam biguation o f C oordinations o f  N ouns
Nouns (and noun phrases) are the most commonly coordinated linguistic units. Also, 
there is more information available, for example in WordNet2, on the behaviour of nouns 
than for other types of word. Focusing on noun coordinations therefore gives the possi­
bility of more satisfactory results, and much research has concentrated on these.
Goldberg 1999
Goldberg (1999) uses unsupervised learning to determine the attachment of noun phrases 
in ambiguous coordinations of the form nounl prep noun2 coord nounS. Let us consider 
the phrase:
2 http://wordnet.princeton.edu/
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salad of lettuce and tomatoes
It is unclear whether the tomatoes are included in the salad. Goldberg considers examples 
like this to be syntactically analogous to the classic PP-attachment dilemma:
I  saw the man with the telescope
Tomatoes corresponds to with the telescope, and it can attach to salad of lettuce (saw) or 
to lettuce (the man). She accordingly adapts a PP-attachment disambiguation method, 
that of Ratnaparkhi (1998). She locates unambiguous occurrences of nounl coord nounS 
and noun2 coord nounS in a large unannotated corpus — the Wall Street Journal. (A 
chunker3 is used to locate the nouns that are head words of the coordinated phrases.) 
She then uses these, and other probabilities, to predict preferred interpretations of her 
test case coordination ambiguities.
Her system predicts with an accuracy of 72% the annotated attachments of a dataset 
drawn from the Wall Street Journal. The baseline is 64%. She suspects that these 
results are adversely affected by ineffectiveness of her chunking heuristics. Her PP- 
attachment re-implementation is a solution that might extend to attachments of words 
other than nouns. However, it does not make use of information, such as any form of 
parallelism or word similarity, that is useful specifically for coordination disambiguation. 
Goldberg’s use of coordination probability in a corpus is of interest to us as a simple 
prediction metric. Also, using a chunker to simplify text and extract head words could 
be developed into a more effective lightweight pre-processing solution.
Resnik 1999
Resnik (1999) investigates the role of number agreement, semantic similarity and noun­
noun compounding frequency in disambiguating noun coordinations. He looks specifi-
3 Chunkers group words of running text into coarse-grained units such as noun phrases and verb 
phrases. This can be done to simplify parsing or for NLP tasks not requiring full parsing. Chunking is 
discussed in depth in Section 5.2.3.
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cally at the form nounl and noun2 nounS, which can be exemplified by the sentence: 
bank and warehouse guard
This is similar to our test case, introduced in Section 1.3, in that it comprises one 
coordination and one attachment decision. NounS attaches either to both nounl and 
noun2, or just to noun2. Resnik uses three heuristics to predict the preferred attachment. 
Firstly, he hypothesises that in the former scenario nounl and noun2 are likely to 
have equal number; in the latter scenario nounl and nounS are likely to have equal 
number. Secondly, using WordNet, he determines whether nounl and noun2 have higher 
semantic similarity than nounl and nounS. He hypothesises that this will indicate the 
former scenario; the reverse will indicate the latter scenario. Thirdly, he calculates the 
selectional association (Resnik 1996) of nounl and nounS to indicate whether they can 
form a compound. This metric utilises co-occurrence frequencies from a corpus and 
semantic class membership from WordNet. Using experimentally obtained thresholds, 
high selectional association indicates the former scenario and low selectional association 
indicates the latter scenario.
Resnik combines these heuristics in various ways. He also includes strategies of de­
faulting to the most likely interpretation, backing off, and choosing the majority verdict 
of the heuristics. He achieves accuracies of between 65% and 82% for different combina­
tions of heuristics and strategies. This performance is on a hand-disambiguated dataset 
drawn from the Wall Street Journal. Resnik’s work presents several ideas of interest to 
us: his test case ambiguity is of a similar structure to ours, and he develops useful heuris­
tics for predicting preferred interpretations of it. However, it is unclear if success on the 
narrowly-defined example of noun coordination transfers to other types of coordination.
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Nakov and Hearst 2005
Nakov and Hearst (2005) try to disambiguate compound noun coordinations of the form 
nounl coord noun2 nounS. They consider only and and or as the coordinating words. 
Like Resnik (1999), they use heuristics based on noun number agreement and on co­
occurrence frequency between the nouns. They also employ heuristics based on obviously 
disambiguating elements, such as punctuation and other orthographic features. The 
following examples illustrate two of these:
buy and sell, orders 
(buy and sell) orders
Their heuristics predict that in both these examples orders applies to both buy and sell 
Also used are some heuristics from Rus, Moldovan, and Bolohan (2002). These include 
metrics based on parts of speech of words in the context, requiring a narrowly defined 
range of these.
Combining their heuristics using a majority voting strategy, Nakov and Hearst achieve 
precision of 80.61% above a baseline of 56.54%. Their dataset is a collection 428 exam­
ples from the annotated Penn Treebank. As with Resnik, being concerned only with 
nouns allows them to factor in more information than would be possible with a less nar­
rowly defined task. Also, their punctuation and orthographic heuristics provide added 
precision from what might be considered trivial disambiguation problems.
2.2 Ambiguity Preservation
Researchers in diverse fields have recognised that eliminating ambiguities may not al­
ways be necessary, or even desirable. For instance, human translators frequently preserve 
ambiguity to keep translations faithful, and some machine translation systems attempt 
to mimic this. In natural language generation, ambiguity can be preserved to avoid
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the trouble of ensuring that the input is totally unambiguous. Both these applications 
require awareness of the interpretations that an ambiguity permits. This is necessary so 
that the ambiguity can be re-presented in a new way that also permits these interpreta­
tions. In both machine translation and natural language generation, inaccuracies result 
from failing to represent all possible interpretations of the input in the output. Note, 
however, that no account is necessarily taken of whether such preserved ambiguities lead 
to misinterpretations or not.
Alternatively, the ease with which most ambiguities are understood by humans means 
that a lot of them can be ignored. These ambiguities are always interpreted in the same 
way, and so they will not lead to misunderstandings. They can therefore be preserved. 
If such ambiguities do not have to be reformulated, it is not necessary to enumerate all 
possible readings of them. If these ambiguities can be located in text, they can merely be 
forgotten about. This is exactly what we are trying to capture with respect to innocuous 
ambiguities in all contexts.
Several practical benefits accrue from preserving ambiguity. From a semantic stand­
point, preserving ambiguity limits the need for world knowledge to disambiguate (in 
language understanding) or for full specification (in language generation). From a syn­
tactic standpoint, Allen (1995) advocates the encoding of uncertainty as a means of 
improving parsing efficiency. Allowing uncertainty means that a decision can be delayed 
until further data is encountered. The backtracking required to change that decision can 
then be avoided. Encoding of uncertainty can be achieved by use of underspecification 
(Reyle 1993). To implement this, Allen outlines the use of packed representations. These 
avoid the need for encoding duplicate information by factoring as much common infor­
mation as possible from the various syntactic readings of an ambiguity. The syntactic 
alternatives are represented as local disjunctions without conversion to disjunctive nor­
mal form. Packed representations are popular in ambiguity preserving approaches, and
we refer to them in our discussions below of ambiguity preserving implementations.
We discuss below research in two fields, machine translation and natural language 
generation, where ambiguities can usefully be preserved.
2.2.1 N atural Language G eneration
Ambiguities can be preserved in natural language generation to enable the use of am­
biguous input. This is sometimes done with a view to providing one side of a machine 
translation process. Shemtov (1997) articulates the core premise that language genera­
tion is “a many to many relation, between an input representing alternative meanings 
and an output consisting of multiple renditions of these meanings”. This presumes that 
there are generally multiple meanings contained within the semantics of a single input 
(in addition to those within any output). So, due to this inevitable ambiguity, full 
disambiguation may not be a realistic or even a desirable goal. Shemtov uses packed 
representations to capture the semantic commonalities between different interpretations 
within the source semantics. These representations are then passed on to the generation 
stage of the process, thereby preserving the ambiguity. Additional sources of information 
may then be used to specify them more fully (and more efficiently). Shemtov appears 
not to have implemented his ideas empirically, so their viability cannot be ascertained.
Nitrogen (Knight and Langkilde 2000) is a natural language generation system pri­
marily intended for use in machine translation. It incorporates the capability for pre­
serving ambiguity. It uses a hybrid approach to implement this. Firstly, its knowledge 
base is shallow and its inputs are underspecified, so it over-generates considerably. Flu­
ent sentences are then extracted from the resultant parse forest by use of statistical 
information. The ambiguity preservation aspect of this process is in the finding of a 
sentence in the parse forests that represents the many possible meanings of the input. 
Knight and Langkilde claim that their system avoids the pitfalls encountered by other
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more deterministic systems. They state that it has been “very easy to adapt Nitrogen to 
perform a wide range of ambiguity preservations”. That this is possible is encouraging 
news for us in our work. Unfortunately, however, no results are presented to confirm 
these claims.
2.2.2 M achine Translation
An ambiguity can be preserved in order to ensure veracious translation from source 
language to target language. This is only possible when equivalently ambiguous phrases 
exist in both languages. For instance, in the following sentence, the prepositional phrase 
in Madrid can attach to either the verb visit or the noun phrase our ambassador:
We visit our ambassador in Madrid
It is ambiguous whether the visit takes place in Madrid, or Madrid is the ambassador’s 
current posting (regardless of where the visit takes place). This ambiguity is also ex­
pressed in the German translation:
Wir besuchen unseren Botschafter in Madrid
The ambiguity can be clarified in both English and German by rephrasing the sentences. 
But often clarification of the original meaning is not possible. It may also not be neces­
sary if, for instance, the ambassador to Madrid is in Madrid. In both cases, preserving 
the ambiguity in translation may be desirable.
However, such equivalently ambiguous phrases are not always available, especially 
with highly dissimilar languages. Ambiguity preservation therefore does not always have 
wide application in machine translation. Emele and Dorna (1998) explain the process 
of ambiguity preservation between languages, and try to overcome this lack of scope. 
They use packed representations to preserve PP-attachment ambiguities such as the ex­
ample given above. However, if the ambiguities can only partly be preserved in the
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target language, they unpack these representations only as much as necessary. Human 
translators then make the final decisions about the translations, choosing between the 
interpretations remaining in the representations. Emele and Dorna present their ambigu­
ity preservation technique as a theoretical architecture, and offer no empirical validation 
of it.
2.3 RE-Specific Approaches to Ambiguity
Ambiguity has traditionally been tackled in RE using techniques either for avoiding or 
detecting it. We are solely concerned with written requirements, so do not consider 
other types of communication involved in the requirements part of the software life­
cycle. Requirements elicitation is an example of this. Preventing ambiguities during 
such processes is also an issue, but beyond the scope of this research. Additionally, 
ambiguities can be preserved in requirements, though this has received scant attention 
compared to approaches classifying ambiguity as a defect to be avoided.
Most previous work on ambiguity in RE has focused upon detecting and disam­
biguating RE-specific ambiguities. These are defined as ambiguities arising from the RE 
context. This context is composed of the application, system and development domains. 
Analysing RE-specific ambiguities therefore pre-supposes a great deal of background 
knowledge (Kamsties, Berry, and Paech 2001). Compared to more generic linguistic 
ambiguities, such as our test case ambiguity, they are reported to account for more 
ambiguities in requirements (Kamsties 2001). But many RE researchers, for instance 
Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger (2003), also realise the danger of more generic linguistic 
ambiguities in RE.
Below we discuss some ideas from the RE literature about preserving ambiguities tem­
porarily, including parallel ideas that recommend ignoring some inconsistencies. Then 
we look at the bulk of research on ambiguity in RE, which attempts to either avoid or
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detect it.
2.3.1 Preserving A m biguity in RE
The idea of deliberate ambiguity (or intentional ambiguity) is discussed by Kamsties 
(2001). He claims that this situation can arise when a stakeholder, for example a cus­
tomer, leaves aspects of a requirement purposely ambiguous. This could be for the 
perfectly valid reason that the way the requirement is implemented is a design decision. 
It could also be for the perhaps less valid reason of “diplomacy” (Goguen 1994). In the 
former case, the customer, being interested only in the finished product, might want to 
leave that decision to other stakeholders. It would be desirable to preserve such an am­
biguity in the requirements — at least in the early-phase requirements. The ambiguity is 
then resolved at the stage of the software life-cycle when design decisions are made. This 
means that it is only temporarily preserved. However, we feel that deliberate vagueness 
(or underspecification) is much more likely than deliberate ambiguity. Gause and Wein­
berg (1989) offer the following example, containing many underspecifications that might 
be preserved until design decisions are made or further information is obtained:
Create a means for protecting a small group of human beings from the hostile
elements of their environment
Temporary ambiguity preservation is considered to be effective for other pragmatic 
reasons. Goguen (1994) observes that it facilitates the gradual evolution of requirements, 
and avoids sub-optimal prejudgement of cost trade-offs. Despite this, we are unaware of 
any empirical research determining which ambiguities are worth preserving temporarily 
in requirements. We suspect, however, that they will be more likely to be ambiguities 
of specific types rather than any which do not cause misunderstandings. We are also 
unaware of any empirical research which investigates more permanent preservation of 
ambiguities in requirements.
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A project addressing a parallel problem can also usefully be discussed. Nuseibeh, 
Easterbrook, and Russo (2001) consider the advantages of preserving inconsistency in 
requirements. As explained in Section 1.1.2, inconsistency can have implications similar 
to ambiguity. Nuseibeh et al. argue that if the cost of fixing an inconsistency outweighs 
the risk of ignoring it, then it makes no sense to fix it. It can be preferable to let 
some known inconsistencies remain in text. They present a framework within which 
inconsistencies can be detected and their cause discovered. Three handling strategies 
are then offered. These are to resolve the inconsistency, tolerate it temporarily, or ignore 
it completely. The second of these strategies corresponds to temporary preservation, as 
recommended by Goguen. The third goes one stage further, and is of more interest to 
us as it relates to our treatment of innocuous ambiguity. The framework of Nuseibeh et 
al. has been developed in various forms. However, we are unaware of any empirical work 
that tests how inconsistencies worth preserving might be distinguished from others.
2.3.2 A voiding A m biguity in RE
Ambiguity can be avoided in RE by use of formal methods, controlled languages and 
less formal reference-based approaches. All these techniques promise safe and manage­
able techniques for writing documents free from ambiguity. However, they can require 
considerable effort to learn or to use. Kamsties (2001) concluded in 2001 that many RE 
practitioners were reluctant to utilise such methods. In the same year, Mich (2001) cites 
an internal study at Trento University that surveyed “documents used for requirements 
analysis”. She reports that only 16% of these documents were couched in “structured 
natural language (e.g. templates, forms) and only 5% in formalised language”. The 
remainder still chose to use “common natural language”.
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Formal Methods
For some time, attempts have been made to use formal techniques to express require­
ments: for example, in terms of finite state machines (Whitis and Chiang 1981) and 
program description languages (Caine and Gordon 1975). This type of approach has 
been brought to prominence by the development of formal (or semi-formal) requirements 
specification languages such as Z (Spivey 1992) and UML (Rumbaugh, Jacobson, and 
Booch 1999). A primary aim of such methods is to avoid anything ambiguous being writ­
ten. However, using such languages can also be seen as a form of disambiguation. This 
is because it can force ambiguous informal specifications to be translated into unambigu­
ous but sometimes incorrect formal specifications. (Hanks, Knight, and Strunk (2001) 
have pointed out that natural language is still essential to understand the formalism of 
any formal method.) This might not become so serious a problem if all the stakeholders 
understand the formal specification language used. But, as already mentioned, this is 
not to be relied upon.
Other formalisms use non-linguistic elements to avoid ambiguity. For instance, the 
tabular specifications in the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) requirements method aim 
to specify software requirements unambiguously and concisely. They are claimed to be 
easily understood and developed by engineers (Heitmeyer, Jeffords, and Labaw 1996). 
However, a “large amount of detail” is still required to apply such formal methods, and 
this is difficult to obtain in practice without automation, which is not always available 
(Heitmeyer, Jeffords, and Labaw 1996).
Controlled Languages
A controlled language is a subset of a language with a smaller grammar and (usually) a 
smaller vocabulary. It is carefully designed, and its use is controlled, so that ambiguity is 
minimised. Ideally, this is not at the expense of reducing readability and expressiveness
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unreasonably. The linguistic control can give the added benefit of document standardisa­
tion, and can also make translation easier. Controlled languages are usually designed for 
specific applications, where exacting standards of writing must be met. Attempo Con­
trolled English (ACE) (Fuchs and Schwitter 1996), intended for writing requirements, 
imposes restrictions on grammar and style but requires users to populate the lexicon. 
CREWS (Achour 1998) is a controlled language for authoring RE scenarios. This is a 
more restrictive formalism than ACE, prescribing semantic aspects of language as well 
as syntactic aspects.
Osborne and MacNish (1996) discuss the drawbacks of controlled languages, claiming 
that they reduce the habitability of language. They may be no less irritating to use than 
a formal language, and they may force naive users to choose phrasing they do not entirely 
understand. Also, controlled languages generally omit non-linguistic formats preferable 
for representing elements such as algorithms and structural relationships. Kamsties 
(2001) finds no RE usage of them in medium- or large-scale industrial projects as at 
2001.
Style Guides, Lexicons and Other Informal Guidelines
Style guides are reference works that help authors avoid ambiguities by making them 
aware of pitfalls in the language used. They include, for instance, the guidelines suggested 
by Kovitz (1999). Common style recommendations focus on the use of ambiguous quan­
tifiers, modal verbs, passive voice and anaphora. However, Sawyer, Rayson, and Cosh 
(2005) claim that such rules will always be broken by requirements writers. This does 
not give confidence in the adoption of style guides and other aids requiring voluntary 
application. Additionally, Easterbrook et al. (1998) report that such informal techniques 
do not provide the assurance to RE practitioners that formal techniques can.
Glossaries and lexicons of domain-specific terminology are sometimes recommended,
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as for example by Hillelsohn (2004), as ways of avoiding ambiguity. However, it is gen­
erally assumed that such reference works will be of limited size. They would therefore 
only be useful for solving the most narrowly-defined RE-specific ambiguities. Such lex­
icons cannot begin to contain all possible combinations of words. They therefore will 
not adequately cover more generic linguistic ambiguities, or even unforeseen RE-specific 
ones. For this reason they will always be of only limited use.
Other, less formal, recommendations for appropriate style have been suggested. For 
instance, Kovitz (2002) suggests simply adding redundant (i.e. repeated) references to 
context in informal natural language requirements. The readers will then be able to 
disambiguate each ambiguous expression more easily. This might constitute an annoy­
ing style of writing. However, Kovitz asserts that it is an inexpensive, acceptable and 
broadly-applicable method of avoiding ambiguity.
2.3.3 D etectin g  A m biguity in R E
Ambiguity can be detected in requirements by using fit criteria, test cases and inspection 
techniques. Of these, inspection techniques offer the most established way of detecting 
ambiguity. We survey inspection technique approaches that consider ambiguity, and 
then discuss in detail one of these that tackles it with more thoroughness.
Fit Criteria and Test Cases
A fit criterion adds the conditions that must be true for a requirement to be success­
fully implemented, often adding quantification where none exists before (Robertson and 
Robertson 1999). Test (or use) cases can be used in conjunction with this. They look at 
input and output states and help refine requirements by making inferred aspects more 
concrete (Kamsties 2001).
However, Kamsties (2001) observes that fit criteria and test cases generally only
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reduce vagueness and generality. These concepts are similar to ambiguity, but arise from 
lack of specificity. Ambiguity, on the other hand, tends to arise from the possibility of 
more fundamentally differing meanings. Fit criteria and test cases will therefore not be 
sufficient for analysing ambiguity in requirements.
Inspection Techniques
Inspection techniques are known to be effective and efficient ways of reducing errors 
of various kinds in requirements (Shull, Rus, and Basili 2000). They can be used to 
search for ambiguities in completed requirements documents. They have, however, more 
often been used to detect inconsistency and incompleteness in requirements (Zowghi, 
Gervasi, and McRae 2001; Porter, Jr, and Basili 1995). Those that do address am­
biguity use checklists or other sets of manually applied heuristics (Rupp 2000; Gause 
and Weinberg 1989; Freedman and Weinberg 2000). These checklists contain questions 
that will reveal some ambiguities often encountered in requirements. They often draw 
attention to lexical, referential and discourse ambiguities. However, such techniques 
tend to be incomplete and time-consuming solutions to the problem. Kamsties, Berry, 
and Paech (2001) observe that most inspection techniques addressing ambiguity merely 
ask the question “is the requirement ambiguous?”. This is true even for well-developed 
scenario-based inspection approaches, both of the defect-based reading (Porter, Jr, and 
Basili 1995) and perspective-based reading (Shull, Rus, and Basili 2000) varieties. The 
questions posed in such approaches bring ambiguity to the readers’ attention. They may 
not, however, make the readers aware of the extent to which misinterpretations might 
occur.
Kamsties, Berry, and Paech (2001) present a study aimed at detecting ambiguity in 
requirements more thoroughly than those discussed above. They use a hybrid approach 
based on an inspection technique. They augment incomplete ambiguity checklists with
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questions about ambiguity obtained by building a formal (or semi-formal) model. The 
latter questions depend on the modelling language used. However, the model need 
not be built. There need only be awareness of the ambiguity-exposing questions that 
building it would generate. Kamsties et al. apply their technique to some complex 
requirements in which many types of ambiguity were identified by hand. They achieve 
higher detection rates than when simpler methods are used, and this improvement is 
deemed to be statistically significant. This is despite their detection rate being no 
more than 25%. Interestingly for us, they recognise that not all ambiguities need to be 
detected. However, there is no certainty that they detect those that most need to be 
detected. They conclude that their technique successfully raises awareness of ambiguity 
in RE, and successfully combines generic and model-specific approaches.
All the inspection approaches discussed here attempt detection of ambiguities. They 
do not seek to determine whether or not these ambiguities axe dangerous and need to 
be addressed. They also will not be as thorough as the most well-developed ambiguity 
avoidance techniques such as controlled languages and formal methods. In their defence, 
most researchers advocating these techniques appear to appreciate this and also the 
impossibility of achieving total awareness of ambiguity.
2.4 Evaluating Dangerousness of Ambiguity
Other researchers have remarked on the fact that some ambiguities are more likely than 
others to lead to misunderstandings. Others consider quantifying this characteristic. 
Some of these go further, suggesting thresholds for deciding when this characteristic is 
sufficiently in evidence to be noteworthy. All of these researchers have contributed to 
the starting point for our own approach.
Firstly we discuss RE research, then theoretical NLP research that considers distin­
guishing ambiguity by taking account of how dangerous it might be. Some previous NLP
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approaches with a more practical orientation are then introduced. Lastly we look briefly 
at research into quantification of the dangerousness of ambiguity in fields of research 
outside of NLP.
2.4.1 Dangerousness o f A m biguity in R E
Kamsties, Berry, and Paech (2001) survey the ways in which NLP techniques can be used 
to detect ambiguity in requirements. They point out that NLP techniques “raise more 
ambiguities than are perceived by humans”. These extraneous ambiguities will not lead 
to misunderstandings because people are generally agreed upon a single interpretation 
of them.
Other RE researchers recognise that some ambiguities are more dangerous than oth­
ers. We discuss observations they have made about the potential problem of not ac­
knowledging the existence of ambiguities in requirements. We then look at attempts 
which have been made at quantifying ambiguity in requirements.
Acknowledgement of Ambiguity in RE
Not acknowledging the presence of ambiguities in requirements has been recognised as 
a serious problem by some researchers, e.g. (Gause and Weinberg 1989; Mullery 19; 
Berry and Kamsties 2005). However, the idea has not been pursued or investigated 
empirically in the RE literature. It has generally been thought that ambiguity is best 
solved by disambiguation. The assumption is that, by performing disambiguation as 
comprehensively as possible, the problem of unacknowledgement will also disappear.
Kamsties (2001) is one researcher who has investigated the problem of unacknowl­
edgement of ambiguity in RE. He conducted a case study on the use of different formal 
and semi-formal requirements specification techniques. There were several aims of this 
exercise. The one of interest to us concerns measuring the extent to which ambiguities,
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and other “defects”, are resolved unconsciously. The participants in the task were re­
quired to develop requirements models using each of the specification techniques. The 
numbers of ambiguities — and conflicts and incompletenesses — discovered by the de­
velopment processes were noted. Also noted were the numbers of these defects that were 
unconsciously removed — i.e. disambiguated, in the case of ambiguity. Kamsties found 
that 20% of the known ambiguities were misinterpreted. This represents unacknowl­
edgement of ambiguity: the participants of the test assigned different readings to the 
experts who disambiguated the original requirements. Misinterpretation of the known 
incompletenesses was only 4%. This indicates that ambiguity is a much more dangerous 
source of misunderstanding.
Kamsties’ case study goes further. He is interested in the development of require­
ments and the many forms in which they are modelled. To this end, he is concerned with 
the repercussions of not acknowledging ambiguity. When developing the requirements 
models, 57% of the known ambiguities were correctly disambiguated but not acknowl­
edged to be ambiguities. This process contributes to the correctness of the models, but 
the original specifications still contain ambiguities which might cause misunderstand­
ings in the future. This might also be classed as unacknowledged ambiguity. However, 
the ambiguities concerned are more realistically classed as innocuous, as they are inter­
preted in the same way by the participants. Kamsties concludes, however, that this type 
of ambiguity may become a serious threat in the future.
Ambiguity Quantification in RE
The most notable attempt at quantifying ambiguity for the purposes of requirements 
analysis is made by Mich (2001). She presents ambiguity measures that address two 
types of ambiguity: lexical ambiguity and “phrase and sentence” ambiguity. For the 
former, firstly, a function of the number of possible meanings of any given word is used.
39
Each meaning is weighted according to how frequently it is found, creating a weighted 
semantic ambiguity function. Secondly, a function of the number of syntactic roles that 
a word can have is used. Each role is weighted according to how frequently it is used, 
creating a weighted syntactic ambiguity function. For the latter ambiguity type, the 
weighted semantic ambiguity function is also used, for all words in the sentence or phrase. 
Secondly, a function of the possible parsing trees of the sentence or phrase is used. Each 
parsing trees is weighted with a “penalty”, which represents the effort required to make 
the parse. Mich claims that this parsing effort equates to the effort required to interpret 
the sentence. The numbers of possible meanings of words are obtained from WordNet. 
The numbers of possible syntactic roles of a word are obtained from a large semantic net 
incorporated in the LOLITA system (Morgan et al. 1996). This system also provides 
the penalties for each parse tree.
This method of measuring ambiguity using generic resources is appealing, as little 
work needs to be done to assemble the data. Unfortunately, however, no results appear 
to be available from this study concerning its overall accuracy. The dataset is tiny, and 
it therefore cannot be judged how successful the approach might be. Also, the approach 
relies on probabilistic analysis of language usage, and not directly on human perception, 
which we believe to be the key to evaluating ambiguity.
2.4.2 Theoretical N L P Approaches to  D angerousness o f A m biguity
Here we introduce theoretical ideas from the field of linguistics which seek to evaluate 
ambiguities according to how dangerous they might be. Poesio’s notion of perceived 
ambiguity provides an interesting and relevant philosophical distinction between different 
realisations of ambiguities. Van Deemter’s Principle of Idiosyncratic Interpretation sheds 
some light on why some ambiguities are not acknowledged. Van Deemter and van Rooy 
introduce, respectively, the notions of vicious ambiguity and of what makes a sentence
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truly ambiguous. These last two ideas are largely the result of work carried out in parallel 
with our own.
Perceived Ambiguity
Poesio’s (1996) notion of perceived ambiguity is based on the idea that humans can 
“entertain more than one interpretation at a time, and they may not be able to choose 
between them”. Perceived ambiguity is also experienced in cases where multiple readings 
are intended to coexist happily, for example in the case of puns and for rhetorical effect.
Poesio distinguishes perceived ambiguity from semantic ambiguity. The latter is 
concerned with “the interpretation that the grammar assigns to a sentence”, the former 
with “the process by which interpretations are generated”. Poesio makes the further 
distinction that “semantic ambiguity has to express the truth-conditional properties of 
an expression”, but that perceived ambiguity is realised via reasoning processes con­
sisting of “defeasible inferences that are not supported by the semantics of ambiguous 
expressions”. Poesio’s philosophical distinction between language-inherent and human 
disambiguating factors is important for us: the latter are what actually cause an ambi­
guity to be misunderstood and therefore nocuous.
Principle of Idiosyncratic Interpretation
van Deemter (1998) introduces a Principle of Idiosyncratic Interpretation. Much ambi­
guity is resolved by consideration of context, but several factors, including the reader’s 
degree of competence in the language used, can affect understanding. An aspect of 
van Deemter’s Principle of Idiosyncratic Interpretation is that, in any given context oc­
currence, different human interpreters may be unaware of each other’s interpretations. 
Especially in technical domains, common sense may not always come to the rescue. 
Some readers may have niche interpretations of particular linguistic constructions, i.e.
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interpretations which are situation-specific. Especially if they are not native speakers of 
the language used, the common-sense interpretation may not occur to them. Conversely, 
those less well versed in a domain may not know the niche interpretations and may as­
sume the common-sense interpretation is the only one possible. This affects perceptions 
of ambiguity.
Vicious Ambiguity
van Deemter (2004) uses the term vicious ambiguity to refer to an ambiguity which has 
no distinct interpretation that is strongly preferred over other interpretations. He uses 
a threshold to quantify “strongly”. An ambiguity is said to be viciously ambiguous 
simpliciter4 if it has no interpretation that is strongly preferred over all other interpre­
tations. Less unequivocally, any given interpretation can be viciously ambiguous with 
respect to any other given interpretation.
Viciousness is determined using probabilities taken from corpus data. A form (i.e. a 
surface realisation) F is said to be viciously ambiguous with respect to a content (i.e. a 
meaning) C., taking into account a threshold t such that the following is true:
t -p(C\F)<p(C' \F)
The form F is said to be viciously ambiguous simpliciter if it is viciously ambiguous 
with respect to all C’. ( Van Deemter adds the stipulation that contents C and C’ must 
be “sufficiently different that the choice matters”. However, he does not fully explore 
the fact that such an assertion is very hard to make.) The notion of vicious ambiguity 
is then used for determining superoptimality, by taking into account the ambiguity of a 
contents with respect to form in addition to the reverse situation just discussed.
4i.e. absolutely ambiguous, without qualification
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“Truly Ambiguous” Sentences
van Rooy (2004) defines a notion of true ambiguity: “a sentence can be truly ambiguous 
only if there are at least two interpretations of this sentence that are optimally relevant”. 
Like vicious ambiguity, it evaluates ambiguities according to how they might be differ­
ently interpreted. However, it tends by its nature to be a much stricter definition. Also, 
optimal relevance is hard to evaluate practically.
Van Rooy considers relevance to be a measure of the utility value of any given inter­
pretation, based on Sperber and Wilson’s (1982) relevance principle. This principle (into 
which the substitutions author for speaker and reader for hearer can be made) states that: 
“The speaker tries to express the proposition which is the most relevant one possible to 
the hearer” (van Rooy 2004). Relevance, as defined for the purposes of this principle, 
depends on two factors: the processing effort needed to come to this interpretation, and 
the number of contextual implications that the interpretation gives rise to. Van Rooy’s 
interpretation of Sperber and Wilson’s prevalence of contextual implications factor is 
that it is a measure of utility. The aim of the participants in a communication is to 
maximise utility, and several assumptions are bound up in this idea. It is assumed that 
the author intends the sentence to have the interpretation that has the highest utility 
value for the reader. Conversely, the reader selects the interpretation of the sentence 
which he/she judges to be the most relevant, and assumes that this is the one intended 
by the author.
Both the aforementioned assumptions about how author and reader arrive at the 
same interpretations are at odds with Poesio and van Deemter’s claims: authors and 
readers cannot always be relied upon to behave consistently with one another. Such is 
the strictness of van Rooy’s notion that a reader needs to be torn between choosing from 
two equally likely interpretations of an ambiguity before it is considered truly ambiguous. 
This excludes situations which are less clear-cut but where misinterpretations arise, for
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instance due to differences in language competence between author and reader or other 
contextual factors.
2.4.3 Practical N LP A pproaches to  Dangerousness o f A m biguity
We introduce here some examples of research that differ from the more purely linguistic 
notions discussed previously: they are substantiated with some empirical application or 
are designed with an empirical application in mind.
Essential Ambiguity
Mich’s (2001) NLP approach to ambiguity in RE — see Section 2.4.1 — introduces the 
idea of essential ambiguity. This occurs when a sentence has incurred equal penalties 
from the LOLITA parser (Morgan et ai. 1996) on two or more parse trees. In addition 
to this, the penalties must be below a certain limit for an essential ambiguity to occur: 
penalties above this limit supposedly indicate a structural problem in the text, perhaps 
resulting from “missing or repeated parts of speech”. The fact that she sets this limit as 
high as 1000 suggests that it would be quite rare to find parses with the same number of 
penalties, or that sentences incurring few penalties might be unrealistically likely to be 
classed as essential ambiguities. Unfortunately there appears to be no empirical work to 
show how prevalent her essential ambiguities are, or how structurally deficient, rather 
than ambiguous, high-penalty sentences are.
Spurious Ambiguity
Park and Cho (2000) discuss the idea of spurious ambiguity to account for readings 
of ambiguities with “irrelevant” syntactic structures generated by their combinatory 
categorial grammar on Korean. They say that the remaining structures contribute to 
structural ambiguities. They claim that the distinction is specific to the type of grammar
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they are using. Discriminating between these two forms of ambiguity is just one of 
the techniques they use in their empirical work, and they claim to reduce the number 
of structures generated by 72.1%. Unfortunately there is no clear indication of the 
contribution to this performance by the spurious ambiguity detection module, or of the 
module’s reliability.
This concept, whereby a parse forest is thinned so that one (or several) parse trees 
representing preferred readings can be brought into focus, is also used with other systems 
without the dismissed ambiguities receiving a charactising name. For instance, hybrid 
natural language generation systems use corpus information to perform the thinning 
function by generating ranking parse trees in order of statistical likelihood and then 
dismissing the least likely (Langkilde 2000).
Semantic Indeterminacy
Lauer (1995) uses the concept of semantic indeterminacy when tackling the binary de­
cision problem of disambiguating the bracketings in noun compounds of the form nounl 
noun2 nounS. He uses this term to refer to situations where the possible bracketings of 
such ambiguities “cannot be distinguished in the context”. This would in theory be of 
interest to us, as it might imply that such ambiguities are particularly liable to be mis­
understood. However, Lauer erroneously attributes this name for the concept to Hindle 
and Rooth (1993), but appears to be using the systematic ambiguity notion referred to 
in that paper. In that case he is referring to a type of ambiguity that gives multiple 
readings all of which have approximately the same semantic content and therefore do 
not lead to misunderstandings. This is discussed below.
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Systematic Ambiguity
Hindle and Rooth (1993) introduce the concept of systematic ambiguity when attempting 
disambiguation of PP attachments. An attachment is systematically ambiguous when 
“given our understanding of the semantics, situations which make the interpretation of 
one of the attachments true always (or at least usually) also validate the interpretation 
of the other attachment”. This concept is exemplified in the following sentences, which 
give examples of systematic locative ambiguity and systematic benefactive ambiguity 
respectively:
I  am going to visit some friends in this town 
We are arranging a birthday party for John
In the former, the visit event is located in the same place as the friends; in the latter, 
John benefits from the arranging as well as the party. It therefore doesn’t matter where 
the prepositional phrase is attached.
2.4.4 A m biguity Q uantification in Other Fields
Information retrieval is a field closely related to NLP, where ambiguity is also of consid­
erable interest. For instance, Cronen-Townsend and Croft (2002) develop a clarity score 
in order to estimate the lack of ambiguity of queries with respect to the documents they 
are intended to query. This measures the relative entropy between the query language 
model and the language model of the corresponding documents. The language models 
are based simply on unigram distributions. Cronen-Townsend and Croft seek to mea­
sure ambiguity without resolving it, as we do; they do not explicitly discuss imposing a 
threshold on their clarity score, above which a query is declared to be unambiguous, but 
this could be implemented.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced several types of previous research as background to 
our work presented in this thesis. Firstly, using coordination ambiguity as an example, 
we have presented the traditional way of dealing with ambiguity, which is to eliminate it, 
followed by a more general discussion of the less frequently chosen option of preserving 
it. We then surveyed the ways in which RE researchers have approached ambiguity. In 
the following section we discussed the ideas of other researchers that have something 
in common with our own approach. This included reference to unimplemented theories 
and ideas in RE and NLP, and to NLP projects which had included some empirical 
investigation. We conclude that much previous research motivates the need for a model 
of ambiguity that evaluates how likely it is to lead to misunderstandings. However, 
none of this related research describes and implements empirically a suitable model that 
accounts for the human perceptions that cause this.
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Chapter 3
Model of Ambiguity
In this chapter we motivate and describe our model for discriminating ambiguities which 
may lead to misunderstandings from those which will not. The former are nocuous 
ambiguities; the later are innocuous ambiguities. We explain how the former, which 
is the type that concerns us, can be acknowledged and/or unacknowledged. A multi­
layer representation is used to describe the distinction that we make, and each layer 
is discussed in turn. Our model of ambiguity uses human perception as a basis for 
three important criteria: determining preferred readings of ambiguities, determining the 
dividing line between nocuous and innocuous ambiguities, and allowing disambiguation 
by hand.
We argue that our approach to ambiguity, represented by our model, is novel and well- 
motivated. Our approach shares some characteristics with others in the literature, but is 
distinctive in the several ways. Firstly, and most vitally, it incorporates the notion that 
some ambiguities are too likely to be interpreted in different ways: assigning one reading 
to them (disambiguation) is therefore unwise. Secondly, it takes a pragmatic approach 
by determining that some ambiguities need not be addressed as their interpretation is 
obvious. Thirdly, it allows for a flexible dividing line between ambiguities likely to be 
interpreted differently and those that need not be addressed. Fourthly, it uses human
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perception as it’s criteria for judging ambiguity.
3.1 Introduction
We are concerned with finding nocuous ambiguities: those which may lead to misunder­
standings and which may therefore prove costly. We are not in a position to quantify 
the cost of such mistakes in the real world, as they are rarely traced back to individual 
passages of text. Therefore we concern ourselves with finding all ambiguities that may 
lead to misunderstandings. These are ambiguities that are interpreted in different ways: 
in other words, they are given more than one reading by people. This is distinct from 
ambiguities that can be given more than one reading in theory, but where in practice 
people always assign a particular interpretation. The latter type may have more than 
one syntactic structure, but only one structure allows for a commonly used or meaningful 
interpretation.
Importantly, our approach uses only human perception to identify ambiguity. Our use 
of human perception to judge ambiguity means that we are able to determine whether 
humans recognise that an ambiguity is present: we term this situation acknowledged 
ambiguity. We can also determine when different judges have alternative interpretations 
of an ambiguity yet do not acknowledge this: we term this situation unacknowledged 
ambiguity. These factors are important when deciding if an ambiguity is likely to lead 
to misunderstandings, and is therefore nocuous.
We introduce a Model of Ambiguity that represents our way of looking at ambiguity 
and classifying it according to our stated aims. This model has a multi-tiered structure, 
shown in the diagram in Figure 3-1. The tiers are syntactic structure, interpretation 
(or nocuousness) and acknowledgement. What proportion of sentences fall into either 
of the options on any given layer is dependent on the strictness of the criteria used for 
distinguishing the options. The dividing line between what is nocuous ambiguity and
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Unacknowledged Ambiguity
Acknowledged Ambiguity
Figure 3-1: Multi-tier ambiguity representation
what is innocuous ambiguity is naturally a fundamental concern for us: we make special 
provision for this by allowing for a flexible intolerance to ambiguity that can be adjusted 
depending on how serious the implications of misunderstandings are thought to be. The 
tiers of this model are discussed in the following sections.
3.2 Single and M ultiple Structure
The structure of text, as compared to its semantics, is a much more prescriptive indi­
cation of the number of interpretations that are possible. Typically, in the literature on 
syntactic disambiguation, choosing a single syntactic structure for a sentence amounts 
to choosing a particular reading; the number of structures that can exist are finite and 
are specified by clearly defined rules of syntax. In fine with this tradition, and for the 
purposes of this thesis, we will not consider passages of text as ambiguous if they only 
have one syntactic structure. We refer to these as having single structure, and assume, 
for our purposes, that they have only one possible reading. We concentrate our search 
for nocuous ambiguities instead on examples where more than one structure is possible,
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which we refer to as having multiple structure.
3.3 Acknowledgement and Unacknowledgement
Here we present the two ways in which we consider an ambiguity to be nocuous. People 
can acknowledge it as being ambiguous, or it can go unacknowledged, and both scenarios 
can be applicable to some degree for any ambiguity. We discuss these before introducing 
nocuous ambiguity, as they are what determines whether an ambiguity is nocuous.
After introducing unacknowledged and acknowledged ambiguity, we present theories 
from psycholinguistics that support this distinction. These theories explain how both 
types of ambiguity may occur, and also, as a counter-argument to our own, how they 
may be mitigated by human thought processes and become less of a problem. Then we 
explain how the ambiguity models of other researchers, discussed in Section 2.4.2, do 
not fulfill the same function as our own. Lastly we present some arguments from our 
chosen application domain that support the significance of our research.
3.3.1 Unacknow ledged A m biguity
An ambiguity can go unnoticed. When various people think there is only one reading of 
an ambiguity, and yet the readings they ascribe are different from one another, this is 
unacknowledged ambiguity. If a suitably large number of people assign different readings 
to an ambiguity, that ambiguity can be said to be generally an unacknowledged ambi­
guity. How large the “suitably large number of people” should be is determined by how 
tolerant we are of unacknowledged ambiguity.
Unacknowledgement is the worst scenario for any nocuous ambiguity, as the ambigu­
ous passage will not get rewritten and may cause misunderstandings at any time. For 
this reason, it is the worst scenario for any ambiguity in text used for instruction, such as 
requirements. An unacknowledged ambiguity in a requirement may be carried forward
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into later stages of the software life-cycle. A system may then be built incorrectly, and 
correcting it or rewriting it may be very costly.
We present here an alarming example of unacknowledged ambiguity to show its 
potential dangers. Misunderstandings arising from mismatch of language patterns have 
been the cause of air traffic accidents and near-accidents (Jones 2003). These include 
the worst disaster in aviation history, at Tenerife in 1977, when a Dutch pilot spoke the 
following sentence:
We are now at takeoff
He is thought to have translated at to an equivalent Dutch word, and then interpreted 
in a way that was likely in Dutch but not in English. The air traffic controller made a 
different interpretation. Unfortunately, one referred to the process of taking off and the 
other to a position on the runway. It is likely that neither the air traffic controller nor 
the pilot had acknowledged that different interpretations of the sentence were possible.
3.3.2 Acknow ledged A m biguity
We say that when somebody realises that a given linguistic construction can be inter­
preted in more than one way, that construction is an acknowledged ambiguity for that 
person. When a suitably large number of people acknowledge this ambiguity, it can 
be said to be generally an acknowledged ambiguity. The number of people needed for 
this to be the case is determined by how tolerant we are of acknowledged ambiguity. 
Acknowledged ambiguity may seem much less dangerous than unacknowledged ambigu­
ity. However, for the reasons given below, we consider that it contributes to nocuous 
ambiguity.
Acknowledged ambiguity is not necessarily a problem for those who acknowledge 
it. They can try to obtain the intended reading by asking the author. If that is not 
possible, they can canvass other people’s opinions and hopefully obtain a clear verdict
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on what the preferred reading is. However, access to authors is often not possible, and 
an infinite number of opinions would be needed to be certain of the preferred reading. 
Because different readings are possible for an acknowledged ambiguity, it could easily, and 
unpredictably, be an unacknowledged ambiguity for another hitherto unknown reader.
Additionally, a reader of a linguistic construction can acknowledge an ambiguity and 
assume that it was put there intentionally by the author. The reader may then assume 
that freedom is being given about how the construction should be interpreted. But if 
the ambiguity was unintentional, this can then lead to a misunderstanding.
3.3.3 Supporting Psycholinguistic Theories
Here we present some research from the psycholinguistics community which remarks 
upon the acknowledgement and unacknowledgement of ambiguity. We do not model or 
implement any of the ideas introduced here. Investigating our model of ambiguity using 
a psycholinguistics approach would require a different type of thesis to the one presented 
here.
Psycholinguists have for some time been interested in how humans process ambiguity. 
Kess and Hoppe (1981) state that it is the unacknowledged aspect of ambiguous sentences 
which makes such process analysis noteworthy. They go on to present the debate about 
whether we generally process all possible readings of an ambiguity, and choose the one 
that then seems the most appropriate, or whether we only compute one reading for any 
given ambiguous sentence. The former scenario suggests that acknowledged ambiguity 
is the norm: consideration is made of the various possible readings of an ambiguity, 
and the reader is able to interrupt the interpretation process to acknowledge that the 
ambiguity might be too ambiguous to be reliably given a single interpretation. The latter 
scenario could quickly result in unacknowledged ambiguity, with each reader fixing on 
one interpretation — context could play a large part in focusing readers’ decisions on
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just one reading, but context can also be interpreted variously.
The potential for unacknowledged ambiguity when readers compute only one reading 
for a sentence may be mitigated by certain psychological factors. Hobbs (1983) presents 
an argument that people do not necessarily disambiguate sentences fully but are still 
able to reach an informed interpretation of them. According to this way of thinking, 
people are able to hold several different interpretations of an utterance simultaneously in 
their minds, and still understand what was meant by the sentence. They will therefore 
only unconsciously acknowledge an ambiguity.
Poesio (1996) suggests that humans make unconscious use of an underspecified lan­
guage to process highly ambiguous sentences successfully. This may account for the 
effect that Hobbs is describing. The existence of such a facility would be a contributing 
factor to reduction of acknowledged ambiguity, as well as of unacknowledged ambiguity, 
but there would be inherent dangers of bias and subjectivity as with any unconscious 
process. Processing effort, often found by measuring processing speed, has frequently 
been used to measure ambiguity (Kess and Hoppe 1981).
In a task involving completing sentence fragments, MacKay (1966) found that people 
were inclined to take more time completing ambiguous ones than unambiguous ones, 
even though they were unaware of the ambiguous status of the fragments during the 
trial. Such studies support Poesio’s notion, and would be worth pursuing in future 
work to determine how agreement between participants — and therefore the level of 
unacknowledged ambiguity — correlates with processing speed.
3.3.4 N L P Perspectives
Here we discuss the models of ambiguity, introduced in Section 2.4.2, put forward by 
other NLP researchers. They provide interesting comparisons with our research, and 
some motivation for it. However, none of them models ambiguity in the way we consider
54
to be most appropriate or provides a method of implementation.
Poesio’s (1996) notion of perceived ambiguity is similar to our notion of acknowledged 
ambiguity. The fact that people are unable to choose a reading will make them stop and 
acknowledge the ambiguity. The notion of semantic ambiguity that he posits opposite to 
perceived ambiguity contains all unacknowledged ambiguity. However, it must contain 
all acknowledged ambiguity as well, as “most, if not all, sentences are semantically 
ambiguous”. The distinction he makes is therefore not implementable in a way that is 
useful to us.
Van Deemter’s (1998) Principle of Idiosyncratic Interpretation describes unacknowl­
edged ambiguity, though not a method for quantifying it. His discussion of this concept 
gives some reasons for how unacknowledged ambiguity can come into being. His notion 
of vicious ambiguity (van Deemter 2004) is intended for determining the status of ambi­
guities on an individual basis. It is not designed to compare ambiguities. It is empirical, 
since it uses corpus data, but is not based directly on human perceptions. Van Deemter 
offers no empirical test of either these ideas.
Van Rooy’s (2004) notion of what makes a sentence truly ambiguous is of interest to 
us as it involves consideration of whether an ambiguity in the sentence is acknowledged or 
not. However, he makes assumptions that speakers and hearers have knowledge of each 
others’ understanding of language. This leads to the conclusion that unacknowledged 
ambiguity will tend not to occur. This is contrary to our hypothesis, and to the ideas of 
Poesio and van Deemter, also discussed in Section 2.4.2.
3.3.5 R E  Perspectives
Prom a requirements engineering perspective — though this will also apply in other 
domains — Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger (2003) suggest that communication is more 
reliable when it is between people who have similar language abilities. Therefore, it is
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more reliable between two people who are not well versed in the rules of the language 
being used, than it is between one who knows the rules well and one who does not. 
The reasoning is that, in the former case, both author and reader will tend to misuse 
the language in similar and commonly accepted ways, and the latter is therefore more 
likely to understand the intent of the former. This implies that ambiguities will tend 
to be correctly categorised as either innocuous or nocuous for people with an equally 
inadequate grasp of the language, even if the reasons for such categorisation are false. 
Unacknowledged ambiguity will thereby be reduced in this scenario. This reasoning may 
be valid if people write and interpret the language in ways that are more commonsensi- 
cal than the actual rules of the language. However, we are not wholly convinced by the 
hypothesis. People with different first languages may well have different language pat­
terns that they apply erroneously when writing or reading documents. This will result 
in differing readings of ambiguities, and unacknowledged ambiguity will result.
3.4 Nocuous and Innocuous Ambiguity
Here we describe how we classify ambiguities as being either nocuous or innocuous. 
This includes introduction of the theoretical linguistics distinction between performance 
and linguistic data, which bears similarity to ours. We then present perspectives from 
other researchers that motive our research. These are discussions of the approaches to 
ambiguity introduced in Section 2.4.2 and Section 2.4.3.
Nocuous ambiguities are those which are given more than one reading; innocuous 
ambiguities are those which are given only one reading. To reiterate, nocuous ambiguity 
can be acknowledged and/or unacknowledged ambiguity: it may cause misunderstand­
ings because we cannot be sure that all people will read it in the same way. Innocuous 
ambiguities will not cause misunderstandings as they are generally read in the same 
way. Referring back to Figure 3-1, both nocuous and innocuous ambiguities are multiple
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structure ambiguities. In the case of innocuous ambiguities, only one structure allows 
for a reading that is commonly used. In the case of nocuous ambiguities, both structures 
are likely. Judging the nocuousness of an ambiguity is a simple binary decision: if it is 
not nocuous it is innocuous.
3.4.1 Theoretical Linguistics Perspective
Prom a theoretical linguistics perspective, the difference between the multiple reading 
aspect of our model and the multiple structure aspect can be regarded as the difference 
between dealing with performance data as opposed to linguistic data (Abney 1996b). 
It is suggested that performance accounts for whatever the grammar does not account 
for (Abney 1996b): the former is concerned with language processing and perception 
rather than language structure. This is a useful distinction for us as we base our dis­
tinction between nocuous and innocuous ambiguity on human perception, rather than 
on prescriptive rules.
3.4.2 P erspectives from O ther Researchers
Poesio (1996) approaches the idea of needing to distinguish between ambiguities which 
are dangerous and those which are not. He states that “in general, all systems that 
engage in conversations with their users need to be able to recognise an ambiguity, to 
ask for clarifications when necessary rather than guess one possible interpretation, and to 
make their own output ambiguous”. The “when necessary” in this statement could refer 
to situations when ambiguities are nocuous, concurring with our belief that people should 
be notified of these ambiguities, and that they should not be automatically assigned an 
interpretation.
Of all previous research, van Deemter’s (2004) notion of vicious ambiguity is the 
closest to our notion of nocuous ambiguity. However, although his notion is empirical —
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it is determined using corpus data — he offers no empirical test of it. Also, it is intended 
for determining the status of ambiguities on an individual basis. This means that, while 
van Deemter is determining whether one surface form is significantly preferable over 
others, he is not providing validation of that significance by comparing it with other 
ambiguities. We, on the other hand, use human perception as our metric to determine 
nocuousness, and investigate empirically whether corpus data can be used to predict 
this successfully. Also, we evaluate how nocuous ambiguities are compared with other 
ambiguities, providing a realistic measure of their relative danger.
Spurious ambiguities, as defined by Park and Cho (2000), would be innocuous as they 
are “semantically unambiguous”. The remaining structural ambiguities may be nocuous, 
but this is in no way certain. Such a classification is therefore not a substitute for the 
one we present here.
Systematic ambiguity, as used by Hindle and Rooth (1993), will tend to result in 
disagreement about which structure is preferred. This is because all structures give the 
same interpretation. Such ambiguities are therefore nocuous according to our model. 
However, no misunderstanding will result and so their nocuousness is trivial. This is an 
interesting situation, but as it does not lead to misunderstandings it is not of concern to 
us in this thesis.
3.5 Using Human Judgements as Criteria
Our model of ambiguity relies on human decision-making, instead of any computational 
approach, in key ways. Firstly, we use human judgement to evaluate ambiguities. Sec­
ondly, we allow human intervention to specify how frequently an ambiguity must have 
multiple readings in order for it to be considered nocuous. This gives control over the 
sensitivity of discrimination — the intolerance to ambiguity — and makes this dis­
crimination adaptive to different situations. Thirdly, we assign to humans the task of
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disambiguating the nocuous ambiguities. This aspect does not form part of this disser­
tation, as our concern is to identify the ambiguities liable to cause misunderstandings. 
However, we provide motivation and justification for taking this approach.
3.5.1 Judging A m biguity
We place human perception of ambiguity at the heart of our model: it is our criterion 
for judging the ambiguity of any given linguistic construction. We take the view that 
ambiguity is always a product of the meanings that people assign to language (Wasow, 
Perfors, and Beaver 2003), and so is a fluid and subjective phenomenon. Our reliance on 
human perception as our criterion ensures that our evaluation of ambiguity is pragmatic. 
Abney (1996b) reminds us that the non-structural aspects of language include a good 
deal that is not computationally tractable. In fine with this, our policy is to obtain 
human judgements about ambiguity without eliciting the complicated reasons for these 
judgements.
We ask human judges for their interpretation of a linguistic construction. How we 
carry this out is explained in Section 5.3. Many interpretations for the same reading 
indicate that that reading is strongly preferred. Alternatively, if the judges assign differ­
ent readings to a construction, this indicates a degree of unacknowledged ambiguity. We 
also ask the judges whether or not they believe that the construction is ambiguous. Such 
judgements indicate a degree of acknowledged ambiguity. Whether the degrees of un­
acknowledged and acknowledged ambiguity are sufficient to indicate that the ambiguity 
is nocuous depends on our intolerance to unacknowledged and acknowledged ambiguity. 
This is discussed in the next section.
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3.5.2 A m biguity Intolerance
Clearly, a key issue is to decide where the dividing line between nocuous and innocuous 
ambiguity should he. This matters in two respects. Firstly, from the perspective of 
validating our model, we have choices to make about the distribution of judgements 
that will lead to an expression being deemed a nocuous or innocuous ambiguity. We 
will investigate three different ways of deciding which ranges of judgements associated 
with an expression will be associated with expressions being classified as nocuous or 
innocuous. These three methods will be described in Section 5.4. Secondly, from the 
perspective of an application detecting nocuous ambiguities, it is important to realise 
that different application areas have different tolerance levels to ambiguity. Also, for 
experimental purposes, we want to investigate how our heuristics perform at different 
tolerance levels. This we will implement in the shape of ambiguity thresholds, also 
described in Section 5.4. To our knowledge, no previous research with the same purpose 
as ours has ever been implemented such an idea.
There is a trade off between detecting as much ambiguity as possible, and minimising 
the effort used in this process. We discuss below some possible scenarios which demon­
strate why this should not be a fixed trade off for all applications, and which therefore 
motivate the need for a flexible tolerance to ambiguity.
High Intolerance
Many text communication situations might have a high intolerance to ambiguity, re­
quiring that ambiguities be passed as innocuous only if it is almost absolutely certain 
that they will not be misinterpreted. Examples of this are medical notes, instructions 
for precision instruments and other documents describing safety-critical systems. Prob­
lems arising from ambiguity are exacerbated when the language skills of the authors or 
readers of the documents are in doubt (Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger 2003), which also
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motivates the need for a high tolerance to ambiguity.
Low Intolerance
At the other extreme, a lower intolerance to ambiguity would be appropriate for doc­
uments which concern less critical matters and which are written and read by people 
who are all proficient in the language used. Ambiguity in these documents would not 
be such a danger. Firstly, any resultant misunderstandings would not have such grave 
consequences, due to the subject matter of the text; secondly, they are written and read 
by people who share the same knowledge and experience of the language. Abney (1996b) 
reminds us that NLP ambiguity detection techniques can alert the user to many more 
ambiguities than are actually perceived by humans, and similar remarks have been made 
about ambiguity detection in an RE context (Kamsties, Berry, and Paech 2001). This 
demonstrates that low ambiguity intolerance can be more appropriate than might at first 
be appreciated.
3.5.3 H um an D isam biguation
Many NLP researchers have worked to resolve ambiguities on behalf of users who wish 
to understand, generate or translate text. However, few have considered that the most 
advantageous approach to the problem is to let the computer and the human participants 
do what each one does best. Computers are good at recall and people are good at 
precision (Kilgarriff 2003b). We therefore let computers find the nocuous ambiguities, 
and let humans decide how they should be interpreted (and rewritten).
Such a hybrid approach has been used as an adjunct to automatic disambiguation 
(Yamaguchi et al. 1998), and frequently in the field of machine translation (Mitamura 
1999; Blanchon, Loken-Kim, and Morimoto 1995; Boitet and Tomokiyo 1996). In speech 
translation, it has often been considered appropriate to leave humans to disambiguate
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the residual ambiguities that automated processes cannot disambiguate, under the as­
sumption that humans can do this correctly (Seligman 1997). This may be true for most 
cases, but it does not necessarily use human intervention appropriately. Borderline cases 
may be incorrectly disambiguated by the automated process, some humans are unreliable 
judges, and a lack of adjustability of the automated disambiguation process can make 
it unsuitable for some applications. In contrast, we ask humans to disambiguate ambi­
guities which have a stated probability of being misunderstood, instead of simply those 
which we cannot disambiguate. We therefore believe that our approach offers greater 
sensitivity to human error and the flexibility needed for a wide range of applications.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter the concepts that form the basis of our approach to ambiguity have 
been discussed. The ambiguity model, which represents the conceptual architecture of 
our approach, has been introduced and explained. We have discussed each layer of 
this model. These layers relate to the structure, interpretation and acknowledgement 
of ambiguity. We have motivated and discussed our reliance on human perception as 
the criterion for judging ambiguity, and the ways in which we use human intervention 
in some aspects of our approach. As part of this, we have introduced our key idea 
of an adjustable intolerance to ambiguity that distinguishes nocuous from innocuous 
ambiguity. The work of other researchers has been referenced where it is relevant to our 
discussions. In particular, we have discussed how our model of ambiguity is different 
from those of other researchers, and we have argued it is more appropriate for a range 
of applications.
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Chapter 4
Coordination Ambiguity
In this chapter we first make a detailed analysis of the type of ambiguity we use as our 
test case. This involves discussing coordination ambiguity generally and then focusing 
on the manifestation of it that we use as our test case. Secondly, we discuss the ways in 
which this type of ambiguity can become nocuous or innocuous. Some of these ways are 
generic to all types of ambiguity, while others are specific to coordination ambiguity.
4.1 Our Test Case Ambiguity
Here we discuss coordination ambiguity and how it is manifested. We begin by intro­
ducing the general characteristics of this type of ambiguity and the terminology we use 
to describe it. Then we present the criteria we use to define the sub-type of coordination 
ambiguity that we use as our test case. This is followed by a discussion of our reasons for 
choosing coordination ambiguity. We then describe coordination ambiguity more fully 
in terms of lexical, semantic, syntactic and pragmatic factors. The discussions of these 
factors explain more fully the scope and manifestation of coordination ambiguity. It also 
indicates the aspects of it we deal with in this thesis and those that we do not.
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4.1.1 Introduction to  C oordination A m biguity
Coordination ambiguities are structural (i.e. syntactic) ambiguities in that alternative 
readings result from the different ways that sequences of words can be grammatically 
structured. Coordination ambiguity can occur whenever coordinating conjunctions are 
used. Examples of these are and, or, as well as, etc, though other methods of coordinating 
are also possible in English. We use the term coordinating conjunction in preference to 
others, such as coordinators (Quirk et al. 1985) and connectives (Langendoen 1998), 
which are preferred by some specialists but are not in such common usage. In English, 
many types of linguistic units can be coordinated: words, phrases, clauses, sentences, 
and even sub-lexical morphemes. We use the widely used term conjuncts, e.g. (Reibel 
and Schane 1969), to refer to these linguistic units. This is in preference to the rarer 
albeit more specific conjoins, favoured by grammarians (Quirk et al. 1985).
4.1.2 Our Test Case Criteria
This section is partly a reiteration of the introduction to coordination ambiguity given 
in 1.3. We explain here the criteria that we use to select comparable examples of coor­
dination ambiguity. Coordinations can be highly combinatorial in English, allowing for 
many possible syntactic structures. We therefore limit our study to detection of nocuous 
ambiguity arising from one specific type of coordination. For our test case ambiguity 
we consider only one coordination at a time. We therefore never consider more than 
two conjuncts for any example of coordination ambiguity. Our test case ambiguity also 
contains only one external modifier. This may apply to both conjuncts or just to the one 
to which it is adjacent, and may appear before or after the conjuncts.
For instance, let us consider the following phrase:
Assumptions and dependencies that are of importance
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Assumptions and dependencies are the conjuncts, and is the coordinating conjunction, 
and that are of importance is the external modifier. The type of ambiguity that concerns 
us, to the exclusion of all others, concerns whether that are of importance attaches to 
Assumptions and dependencies or just to dependencies. We refer to the former case as 
coordination-first, and to the latter case as coordination-last.
4.1.3 M otivation
Structural ambiguities are known to be often more difficult and time consuming to 
process than other ambiguities (MacKay 1966), and therefore worthy of attention. Co­
ordination ambiguity is one of the three major sources of structural ambiguity, together 
with prepositional phrase attachment and noun compounding (Nakov and Hearst 2005), 
but it has received less attention than these other two types in the NLP literature. This 
is despite of recognition that coordinations are known to be a “pernicious source of struc­
tural ambiguity in English” (Resnik 1999), and that parsing them is a very hard task 
(Kilgarriff 2003a).
To our knowledge there has been no previous empirical research on coordination am­
biguity which pursues the same goals we do, but some examples from other studies give 
further motivation for our choice of test case. For instance, in one of Hirschberg and 
Litman’s (1993) well known experiments, disambiguating cue phrases between discourse 
or sentential signifiers, conjunctions were found to be considerably more ambiguous than 
“nonconjunctions”. They report 86.3% agreement compared with 97.2% agreement, re­
spectively, between their two judges. Although their results are from one single source, 
a transcribed keynote address, they contain a comparatively large amounts of data — 
nearly half of their 953 cue phrases are coordinating conjunctions, indicating the preva­
lence of coordination ambiguity, at least in this type of corpus.
From an RE perspective, the presence of coordinations has been cited as a clear
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indication of potential ambiguity (Sawyer, Rayson, and Cosh 2005). In a discussion of 
guidelines for ambiguous writing style, Kamsties (2001) lists the coordinating conjunc­
tions and and or as two words particularly guilty of causing ambiguity. However, to our 
knowledge, coordination ambiguity has not been subjected to systematic analysis by any 
other RE researchers. As a side effect of our study into nocuous and innocuous ambigu­
ity we can therefore add to the RE literature by investigating it fully and indicating the 
situations in which it most dangerous.
Coordination has been recognised as a potential source of problems in fields outside 
the sphere of computing where ambiguity is a key issue. In the legal sector, for example, 
verdicts in murder cases have been known to hinge on the interpretation of coordinations 
(Solan 1993).
Using coordination ambiguity as a test case also gives several benefits for analysis 
in that it gives opportunities for investigating ideas about similarity and parallelism. 
We wish to make a contribution to the literature by extending the notion, suggested by 
Okumura and Muraki (1994), that parallel factors in conjuncts, particularly in English, 
are cues for preferred readings of coordination ambiguities.
4.1.4 Lexical A spect
The most widely used coordinating conjunctions that have the most versatility at coor­
dinating different types of conjuncts are the central coordinators (Quirk et al. 1985) and 
and or. The other very common coordinating conjunction, but, denotes contrast and is 
not quite a central coordinator (Quirk et al. 1985). Because of this difference, we do 
look at coordinations using but, considering them not to produce ambiguities that are 
compatible with those indicated by central coordinators. We do not consider phrasal 
coordinators, such as as well as, having approximately the same effect as central coor­
dinating conjunctions: these are not common enough to warrant the effort required to
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capture examples of each different phrasing.
Together, and and or account for approximately 3% of the words in the British 
National Corpus1 (BNC). We confine our investigations to and, or and (by extension) 
and/or.
4.1.5 Syntactic A spect
Conjuncts of all syntactic types can be coordinated in English (Okumura and Muraki 
1994). The external modifier can also be a word or phrase of almost any type, and it 
can appear before or after the coordination. We explain this further using the example 
from our dataset introduced earlier:
Assumptions and dependencies that are of importance
The external modifier that are of importance applies either to both the assumptions and 
the dependencies or to just the dependencies. We refer to the former case as coordination- 
first, and to the latter as coordination-last because of the order in which the words are 
connected2.
We concentrate only on coordinations of this type, where exactly two syntactic struc­
tures are possible. However, a third possibility can also be considered with construc­
tions such as this. In this interpretation, usually known as all-way coordination (Rus, 
Moldovan, and Bolohan 2002; Nakov and Hearst 2005), both the conjuncts and any 
modifying or attaching words are considered to be a unit which means something dis­
tinct. This is demonstrated in the following examples from Rus, Moldovan, and Bolohan 
(2002) and Nakov and Hearst (2005), respectively:
1 http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk
2Other terminology can be used, e.g. low attachment and high attachment, depending on where the 
coordinated phrase furthest from the modifier attaches in the parse tree (Goldberg 1999); and ellipsis 
and no ellipsis, depending on whether the modifier has been elided from the phrase it might form with 
the conjunct it is furthest from (Nakov and Hearst 2005). Coordinations, at least when in the form of 
named entities, can be classed as simple and coordinated depending on the status of the conjunct with 
the elided or not elided attachment (Rus, Moldovan, and Bolohan 2002). However, we feel that our 
terminology is better suited to our task.
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Health and Human Services 
Securities and Exchange Commission
We appreciate that such terms taken in their entirety refer to something specific. Nev­
ertheless, they can still be broken down structurally. The Commission deals with both 
Securities and Exchange, and so it is given a coordination-first reading. The fact that 
such a term is a commonly used idiom in fact makes this an innocuous ambiguity be­
cause it is nearly always read in this way. Rather than consider all-way coordination to 
be a separate interpretation of such an example, we allow for the fact that it is always 
read coordination-first to indicate that it is innocuous. We therefore dismiss all-way 
interpretations from our analysis.
4.1.6 Sem antic A spect
Coordination tends to link things of equal rank and importance (Quirk et al. 1985). 
Also, intuition and experience tell us it is more common to join semantically similar 
things in syntactic relationships (Jurafsky and Martin 2000). Munn (1993) expands on 
these ideas of semantic parallelism, and claims that coordinations are more similar to 
plurals than was thought by linguistics up to that time. This suggests that coordination- 
first readings will often be possible, as the processing of the coordination will take place 
early. The external modifier will then apply equally to both conjuncts. Kilgarriff (2003a) 
develops this idea by suggesting that a coordination first reading will be more likely if 
the conjuncts are distributionally similar, and argues that distributional similarity can 
be used as a substitute for semantic similarity in such analysis. This is exemplified by 
the following examples:
Old boots and shoes 
Old boots and apples
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Boots and shoes are more similar than boots and apples are. Coordination of the for­
mer pair is therefore more likely to be processed before the modifier takes effect than 
coordination of the latter pair is.
Of course, the semantics of the modifier, when seen in relation to the semantics of 
the conjuncts, will have considerable effect on how a coordination is interpreted. These 
relationships can be captured using lexical affinity models of various kinds (Terra 2004), 
or with simpler distributional analysis, e.g. (Rus, Moldovan, and Bolohan 2002; Nakov 
and Hearst 2005).
The central coordinating conjunctions and and or have a special property whereby 
one can take on the meaning of the other. NLP researchers looking at coordination have 
recognised that this to be an issue (Agarwal and Boggess 1992) (Nakov and Hearst 2005). 
Also, when negations are present together with coordinating conjunctions, application 
of De Morgan’s laws will swap the meanings of and and or. Such switches of meaning 
may influence whether an ambiguity is nocuous or innocuous. However, as our policy is 
not to capture the overall meaning of the coordinations we analyse, we do not expect 
such phenomena to be accounted for in our studies.
4 .1 .7  Pragm atic A spects
Pragmatics, in relation to our work, covers the many aspects of context that affect 
how an ambiguity is read and whether it is nocuous or innocuous. Detailed contextual 
knowledge is not available for our purposes. For instance, we cannot analyse all the 
text surrounding an ambiguity, and we cannot determine the cultural background of the 
author and intended readers of the text. These aspects are discussed in greater depth in 
Section 4.2.
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Type of Coord­
inate Compound
Example
Full Syndetons 
Partial Syndetons 
Asyndetons
Blood and sweat and tears of joy 
Blood, sweat and tears of joy 
Blood, sweat, tears of joy
Table 4.1: Classification of Multiple Coordinations
4.1.8 M ultiple C oordination
To reiterate, our test case ambiguities only include one coordination, realised using a 
central coordinating conjunction. But, single coordinations are contained within multiple 
coordinations: the latter can be seen as nested constructions of the former (Langendoen 
1998). It will be useful to us if we can obtain, from multiple coordinations, single 
coordinations conforming to our test case criteria. This will only be acceptable, however, 
if they represent a semantic subset of the original multiple coordinations. We discuss 
here the types of multiple coordination we can use in this way. We also describe the 
other types which are not suitable.
Multiple (or chained) coordinations occur, with different types of surface realisation. 
These can be classified as shown in Table 4.1, following Langendoen (1995). We consider 
that only full syndetons, incorporating a central coordinating conjunction, can produce 
coordinations conforming to our test case criteria. This is because partial syndetons and 
asyndetons use listing commas. These punctuation marks are commonly considered to 
be replacable by central coordinating conjunctions (Trask 1997). However, their usage 
differs from that of conjunctions in full syndetons (Quirk et al. 1985). They tend to 
form a fist which is more of a discrete entity than one represented by a full syndeton. It 
is therefore less likely that sub-parts of that list can be modified individually. Therefore 
we do not consider it appropriate to derive single coordinations from partial syndetons 
or asyndetons.
We consider blood of joy, sweat of joy and tears of joy to be possible semantic entities 
resulting from the full syndeton in Table 4.1. When describing our implementation in
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Section 5.2.2, we explain how we reduce chained coordinations to single coordinations 
to account for these situations.
4.2 Factors Influencing Nocuousness
Here we present a classification of the reasons why ambiguities are interpreted in differ­
ent ways, leading to them being classed as nocuous or innocuous when such interpre­
tations are not made universally. This analysis in some cases highlights the problem of 
distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambiguities, further motivating the need for an 
adjustable ambiguity threshold. In other cases it indicates how the problem is minimised 
by certain linguistic factors. We discuss firstly the difficulty of distinguishing nocuous 
from innocuous ambiguities, then how we have arrived at our method of classification. 
Then we present the classification itself.
Ambiguities may be nocuous for a multitude of reasons, which are not always easy 
to ascertain. Many of these are to do with elusive differences in meaning, and personal 
and unpredictable differences between author and reader. On the other hand, it can be 
easy to ascertain that ambiguities are innocuous when semantics and other factors often 
make only one reading likely. Therefore, the simplest way to locate nocuous ambiguities, 
or at least a subset of the ambiguities in a text that contains all the nocuous ones, is 
simply to say that they are what remains when all ambiguities judged to be innocuous 
have been removed. This is the approach we take in most of this section: most of the 
factors we describe make ambiguities innocuous, while later we look at some contextual 
factors from the standpoint that they make ambiguities nocuous.
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4.2.1 Introduction to  th e Classification o f Factors Influencing N ocu­
ousness
Talcing a sentence containing an ambiguity as the unit under consideration, the ambiguity 
may be found to be innocuous based on what is contained within that sentence, and/or 
based on reference to its context. The contents of the sentence — leaving aside the 
structure, which has been dealt with in Section 3.2 — can be said to comprise the 
semantics of the individual words and the semantics of the phrases contained within the 
sentence. The latter, where they are not a product of the former, can be said to be 
a question of idiom (Davidson 1996). The context of the sentence, loosely termed the 
pragmatics, comprises the text around the sentence and factors specific to the individual 
readers and writers. These latter factors, which we call reader-specific factors, include 
language ability, the historical time at which the text is written or read, and factors 
which are sociological or psychological in essence.
Background knowledge is the knowledge presupposed by the text, and it can apply 
to either the contents or the context of a sentence. We will consider only its effect on the 
contents, as considering its contextual effect would involve repetition and the context is 
largely unknown to us anyway in our language model. Background knowledge can be said 
to be linguistic (word-knowledge) or extra-linguistic (world-knowledge) (Navarretta 1994), 
though the two types are interrelated. We say that the former comprises knowledge about 
a word and the roles it can fulfill, while the latter is knowledge about how it tends to be 
used in the real world.
Another way of subdivided Background knowledge is into common-sense knowledge 
and domain-specific knowledge (Navarretta 1994). While one type is not necessarily more 
useful than the other for distinguishing between nocuous and innocuous ambiguities, 
using one where the other is expected can indeed result in costly misunderstandings 
(Cushing 1994). For instance, a serious accident at John Wayne Orange County Airport
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in California occurred in 1981 when the word hold was misinterpreted in the following 
dialogue:
Captain: Can we hold, ask him if we can — hold
Air Traffic Control: Air Cal nine thirty one if you can just go ahead and hold
The air traffic controller was using hold according to domain-specific technical avia­
tion parlance, meaning “stop what you are now doing and thus to go around in a landing 
situation”. The captain however had momentary lapsed into everyday American English 
usage, where hold means “continue what you are now doing and thus to land” (Cushing 
1994). Situations such as this, where speakers or writers slip from one accepted pattern 
of linguistic usage into another, is known as code switching.
Based on the discussions above, we group the factors that can make an ambiguity 
innocuous or nocuous into the, sometimes interrelated, categorisations which we present 
below. These categorisations are grouped together according to the standard ambiguity 
classification of whether they are broadly semantic, syntactic, structural or pragmatic. 
We add a prosody classification to this. We illustrate our discussion with examples of 
the type of ambiguity that we use as our test case. We wish to provide a categorisation 
of coordination ambiguity that is parallel to, though more thorough than, that provided 
by Hindle and Rooth (1993) for prepositional phrase attachment ambiguity. Some of 
the aspects of nocuousness that we present are specific to our chosen type of ambiguity. 
By concentrating on this one type we do not wish to suggest that we are covering the 
factors that influence the nocuousness of all types of ambiguity, but that by covering the 
factors that relate to one type the scale of the subject can be appreciated.
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4.2.2 Sem antic Factors
Here we discuss the semantic factors that influence whether an ambiguity is nocuous. 
In our classification these include Word-Knowledge, World-Knowledge, Idiom, Semantic 
Parallelism, and a special case that applies to coordinations — Non-Coordination.
Word-Knowledge
Knowledge about individual words, leading to innocuous ambiguity, might take the form 
of semantic certainty that the pairing of one word and another word which potentially 
modifies it could not possibly denote anything in the real world (Jurafsky and Martin 
2000). We can explain this using the phrase:
The mounted horsemen and footsoldiers
It can be argued that footsoldiers cannot, by their very nature, be mounted, and the 
phrase mounted footsoldiers would be an oxymoron. Because that interpretation is not 
acceptable, at least not in an exacting environment such as RE, the ambiguity is innocu­
ous.
Repetition of words and phrases is a clear indication of innocuous ambiguity. This 
can be demonstrated using the sentence:
We stock timber and timber products
The coordination-first interpretation contains a coordination of identical words. That 
such constructions give clearly preferred readings was considered significant enough by 
Rus, Moldovan, and Bolohan (2002) for them to implement a heuristic capturing this.
World-Knowledge
The chief reason that most ambiguities are innocuous is that readers (and authors) 
supplement the semantics contained in the ambiguous construction with their knowledge
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of the world (Ioannidis and Lashkari 1994). Because world knowledge is to a great extent 
common, this process is approximately the same for all those involved, and the same 
conclusions are therefore reached about which reading is obviously preferred over all 
others. The other readings might be highly unlikely, or semantically impossible, given 
common sense knowledge of the world.
This concept can be demonstrated using the sentence:
Today I  bought cutlery and towels for the bathroom
World-knowledge tells us that cutlery generally have no place in the bathroom, so for the 
bathroom only applies to towels and a coordination-last reading is obviously the preferred 
one.
The presence of pleonasms has a similar effect on the understanding of a sentence as 
does the repetition of words. An interpretation that repeats knowledge will be dispre- 
ferred as it is wasteful of human time and effort. It is therefore an indication of innocuous 
ambiguity, though not as clear an indication as repetition as it requires slightly more 
mental processing. This can be demonstrated using the sentence:
We carried away the immobilised wounded and corpses
Applying immobilised to corpses would be pointless and so this is a dispreferred read­
ing. Even if both readings are entertained however, pleonastic expressions do not, by 
their very nature, tend to cause misinterpretations because they are merely reiterating 
knowledge.
Idiom
Some readings of ambiguous passages of text may be perfectly acceptable, given knowl­
edge of the meaning and usage of the individual words contained within them, but are
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innocuous due to unidiomatic combination. This can be demonstrated using the sen­
tence:
Please supply us with your phone numbers and addresses
It is highly likely that phone only applies to numbers. Phone addresses could in the­
ory refer to, for instance, international dialing codes or IP addresses. But scanning the 
Internet for this phrase reveals that it is not (comparatively) a common idiomatic ex­
pression for anything in the real world. The original phrase containing the coordination 
is therefore an innocuous ambiguity.
Idiom tends to be a weaker criterion than word- or world-knowledge, which are 
more purely derived from semantics. Changing usage of language, particularly in a 
rapidly evolving field such as telecommunications, could easily make phone addresses an 
acceptable phrase at some time in the future.
Idiom can also play a positive part in establishing one out of a selection of realistic 
alternatives as the most likely one. This results in innocuous ambiguity if it is sufficiently 
likely. For instance, let us consider the sentence:
We are looking at research and development costs
Research and development is such a well-known phrase that most people would prefer 
the coordination-first reading.
More extreme and clear-cut examples of this phenomenon occur when a rare or 
unlikely word is used: such words may be used in very few contexts. This is exemplified 
by the sentence:
I  will do it with all my might and main
The word main, meaning strength, has virtually no modern usage except idiomatically 
in coordination with might. (This usage, whereby one word in a coordination is not
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found on its own, is known as Siamese twins (Fowler and Gowers 1965)). Therefore, my 
applies to both might and main, and the ambiguity is innocuous.
Non-Coordination
A special case of the idiomatic usage criterion occurs when constructions containing 
coordinating conjunctions are not in fact true coordinations. These can be detected 
because they violate Ross’s (1967) Coordinate Structure Constraint, which states that:
In a coordinate structure, no conjunct may be moved, nor may any element 
contained in a conjunct be moved out of that conjunct.
Certain constructions exist which include coordinating conjunctions but contravene the 
clauses of the coordinate structure constraint. Examples include the following two types 
of sentence:
She has gone and ruined her dress now
I ’ve got to try and find that screw which is very small
These form grammatical sentences when the coordinate structure constraint is contra­
vened, implying that they are not true coordinations:
Which dress has she gone and ruined now?
That screw which I ’ve got to try and find is very small
It can be said that the word gone in the first sentence is being used as an adverb, 
whereas try and find in the second sentence is a type of hendiadys (Fowler and Gowers 
1965) and really means try to find. Although, syntactically, there is a choice about where 
to attach the modifiers now and that screw which is very small, semantically this is not 
the case. The supposed conjuncts must be treated as a semantic unit, a coordination 
first reading is therefore preferred, and the ambiguity is innocuous.
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4.2.3 Syntactic and Structural Factors
Although we have addressed the structure of our ambiguities in our single and multiple 
structure phase, extracting only those from our corpus with a specific number of pos­
sible structures, ambiguities can be innocuous due to certain of these structures being 
dispreferred.
Several theories, which we will term syntactic preference principles, have been pro­
posed to explain why certain readings of a coordination might be preferred based purely 
on syntactic factors. These are particularly attractive strategies as they do not require 
any investigation in the complex and fine-grained semantic and discourse domains (Hin- 
dle and Rooth 1993). Two of these theories are of particular relevance to us: the late 
closure strategy and the minimal attachment. Frazier and Fodor (1978) make the point 
that the psycholinguistics literature presents abundant evidence that humans use such 
syntax-only approaches to make attachment decisions before the semantics have been 
considered. If one of the syntactic preference principles can be said to apply conclusively 
to a coordination, — the semantics do not provide contrary disambiguating evidence — 
then that coordination will be innocuous.
We first discuss the two syntactic preference principles mentioned above, preceded 
by the generally applicable immediacy principle and followed by an evaluation. Then we 
identify two other structural criteria for dispreferred readings: differing sub categorisation 
and syntactic parallelism.
Immediacy Principle
The immediacy principle (Just and Carpenter 1980) is a general principle which states 
that people decide where a word should fit in a parse tree immediately upon encountering 
it. It accounts for garden path sentences (Carroll 1999) such as the following:
The horse raced past the bam fell
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We tend to interpret this sentence incorrectly because we try to process each word as 
we encounter it without looking ahead at the remainder of the sentence. Because such 
garden path sentences are very clear examples for most readers, we use this example, 
and the different ways in which it can processed, to explain processing theories in the 
following subsections.
Late Closure Strategy
The late closure strategy states that “incoming items are preferentially analysed as a 
constitute of the phrase or clause currently being processed” (Frazier 1985). This means 
that, when a reader is processing a sentence, new words are more readily considered to 
be part of the phrase currently being processed as opposed to being part of a new phrase 
that needs to be constructed.
Clear evidence that humans do use the late closure strategy, at least some of the 
time, is provided by garden paths. The sentence introduced previously can be used to 
explain this:
The horse raced past the bam fell
We try initially to incorporate fell into the phrase currently being processed, the bam, 
which we assume to be the direct object of the sentence. However, we then realise that 
in fact fell is the main verb of the sentence and that all the words preceding it must be 
reprocessed as the subject.
The similar last antecedent rule is a principle sometimes invoked in courts of law. 
It simply states that a post-modifying clause only applies to the last antecedent (Solan 
1993). This could be interpreted as the last (and nearest) conjunct in the case of coor­
dinations.
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Minimal Attachment
Minimal attachment is a principle for syntactic processing proposed by Frazier and Fodor 
(1978). It states that, when constructing parse trees, the number of nodes, and therefore 
the branching that links them, is to be minimised. Therefore, avoiding constructing any 
new nodes is key, and high attachment of any phrase or lexical item into the phrasal rep­
resentation of a sentence is favoured. Frazier and Fodor claim that this principle is very 
generally applicable and accounts for several specific strategies that inform attachment 
decisions.
Garden path sentences can also be used to show the minimal attachment principle 
in operation:
The horse raced past the barn fell
Backtracking is required, as with the late closure strategy, but for different reasons. In 
this case, the minimal attachment readily allows attachment of fell to the topmost node 
once raced past the bam is established to attach to horse. However, the principle dictates 
that raced “is more readily interpreted as an active intransitive verb in the main clause 
than as the passive participle of a transitive verb in a relative clause modifying horse” 
(Frazier and Fodor 1978). This is because of the reduced branching in the former analysis, 
caused by high attachment of the verb raced and avoidance of creating a complex new 
node for the subject in the latter analysis.
It should noted that the minimal attachment principle, as a parsing technique, was 
originally promoted on the grounds that it was memory efficient as well as predictive. 
But Frazier (1978) has reported “experimental evidence for the operation of minimal 
attachment in a variety of different constructions” — reported by Frazier and Fodor 
(1978).
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Summary and Significance of Syntactic Preference Factors
The significance of these simple, syntax only methods has been demonstrated in several 
domains where correct interpretation of language is crucial. For instance, syntactic mis­
directions, such as may be caused by inappropriate application of the late closure strat­
egy or minimal attachment, are recognised as a problem in air traffic communications 
(Cushing 1994). In the legal domain these heuristics can conflict and cause confusion 
even when applied by learned people. The outcomes of court cases have hinged upon 
whether the judge decides that one of these heuristics should be applied. This some­
times this can result in “unintuative” judgements (Solan 1993), suggesting that a better 
understanding and synthesis of syntax-only methods would be beneficial. It can be seen 
that these principles can easily conflict with each other. Experiments, for example by 
Taraban and McClelland (1988), have shown that such syntax-only approaches are not 
a good way of predicting preferred readings of ambiguities.
Differing Subcategorisation
Some structures are awkward due to the fact that the coordination is of words which are 
dissimilar in the roles they play, even though they have the same basic part of speech. 
For instance, coordinations of words with different sub categorisations can sound unlikely, 
meaning that alternative readings which don’t require different sub categorisations of 
those words are preferred. The following sentence demonstrates this:
Type and save the data
The verb type may be either transitive or intransitive, depending on the reading. The 
exhortation to type sounds unlikely, with no object, when contrasted with the save 
operation which has the data in that role. This point can probably be best appreciated 
by realising how rarely coordinations of verbs with different sub categorisations, with
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the coordination-last reading necessarily preferred, become idiomatic. Some following 
sentences are examples that do exist:
Go and fetch your coat 
Run and catch the bus
Syntactic Parallelism
Structural (or syntactic) parallelism is known to have an effect on how sentences are 
interpreted, and it has been cited as a particular aspect of coordinations that has a 
bearing on their interpretation (Okumura and Muraki 1994) (Dubey, Sturt, and Keller 
2005).
Frazier, Munn, and Clifton (2000) perform some experiments that test whether struc­
tural parallelism has the significance that is predicted. One experiment investigates the 
role of syntactic parallelism in the processing of conjuncts with and without parallel 
internal structure. Four variations of sentences with a simple binary coordination were 
used, like the following:
a) William made friends with a talkative salesman and a foreign executive 
while waiting at the airport
b) William made friends with a salesman and a foreign executive while wait­
ing at the airport
c) William made friends with a talkative salesman and an executive from 
France while waiting at the airport
d) William made friends with a salesman and an executive from France while 
waiting at the airport
The overall conclusion of this experiment was that it is easier to read conjuncts that 
have the same internal structure than to read ones with different internal structures.
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Looking at the sentences above, it takes less time to process those of type a) than those 
of type b), and those of type d) than those of type c). This can be taken as an indication 
that the latter cases are more nocuous than the former cases: either more readings are 
being considered or they are being considered more seriously. However, the results are 
not conclusive, as syntactic parallelism was also shown to reduce the processing time 
of non-ambiguous sentences. Additionally, and perhaps surprisingly, little difference in 
assignment of modifiers — from France in the above examples — was noted between the 
conjuncts that were syntactically parallel and those that were not.
4.2 .4  Pragm atic Factors
Several factors drawn from the context of an ambiguity can have a considerable effect 
on whether it is nocuous or innocuous. Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger (2003) note that, 
in a requirements context, readers can be so unaware of correct language usage that “a 
sentence can be unambiguous from a linguistic point of view, but be ambiguous from a 
pragmatic point of view”. We identify three groupings which are useful to us in research: 
textual context, reader-specific factors and re-specific context.
Textual Context
Of course, context can play a major role in making an ambiguity innocuous. Indeed, 
some researchers, for example (King et al. 2000), seem to make the assumption that all 
humans need is sufficient context in order to disambiguate language correctly. However, 
others explicitly state that this is not realistic. For example, van Deemter’s (1998) Princi­
ple of Idiosyncratic Interpretation stresses that ambiguity is not guaranteed to disappear 
even when all linguistic and non-linguistic context is taken into account. This can be seen 
most clearly in short and isolated statements, such as the phrase “lifetime guarantee” 
found on many commercial products. This phrase has caused confusion about whether
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the guarantee is for the lifetime of the product or the lifetime of the user (Wasow, Per- 
fors, and Beaver 2003), and the nature of the product and the environment in which it 
is sold is unlikely to provide conclusive disambiguating information. Extrapolating from 
this, it is not possible to say for certain that any amount of context will give absolute 
immunity against ambiguity. We therefore adhere to van Deemter’s (1998) Principle of 
Idiosyncratic Interpretation, and take the view that there may always be differences of 
opinion regarding the interpretation of any ambiguity. With regard to context, every 
ambiguity is therefore potentially nocuous. Also, from a practical point of view, consid­
eration of large amounts of context is very difficult to accomplish computationally, and 
even humans can forget relevant information they have been told.
Reader-Specific Factors
Some factors that influence whether ambiguities are nocuous or nocuous are part of the 
context of a sentence containing an ambiguity but not part of the text that surrounds 
it. These include the language abilities and mindsets of the authors and readers of the 
texts, and the historical times at which the text is written and read. The impact of these 
factors, which are generally concerned with differences between author and reader, has 
been discussed in Section 3.3 as they are greatly responsible for non-acknowledgement 
of ambiguity.
Insufficient proficiency in the language used to write text can easily cause either 
author or reader to make a serious misjudgement, showing evidence of nocuous ambiguity. 
Indeed, even difference in dialects of the same language can cause author and reader to 
misunderstand one another. Let us consider the following example:
Stop while the red light is flashing
This could, in theory at least, be misunderstood by speakers of some dialects of English 
in which while means until.
Cushing (1994) summarises the discussions in linguistics literature about the im­
portance of individual cognitive factors and social interactive factors in communication. 
The former include mental models of the world, belief systems and so on, and all the 
judgements and expectations that flow from these. The latter are concerned with in­
teraction between communicators; they include aspects such as conventions of language 
usage, official protocols and the relative status of the communicators. Appreciation by 
author and reader of the need to make allowances for individual cognitive factors, and 
to harmonise social interactive factors, will reduce the danger of nocuous ambiguity. 
Cushing points out that the two different types of factor should also match each other 
if serious consequences are to be avoided.
4.2.5 P rosody
Prosody is an aspect of language that is more usually studied with regard to poetry and 
to speech. However, in the sense that it refers to the rhythm of language, it also has 
repercussions for written text. Rhythms in text are often the direct result of punctuation, 
but they can also occur where no punctuation is present but where readers feel that a 
natural pause is appropriate.
Schepman and Rodway (2000) examine the effect of prosodic boundaries on coor­
dination disambiguation, using a similar test case to ours. Although their work is on 
spoken language, aspects of prosody such as numbers of syllables and words can also 
affect the way written language is interpreted due to the human capacity of processing 
only a limited number of linguistic units at one time. Punctuation may also be regarded 
as an aspect of prosody, but our test case criteria allow for no punctuation marks in our 
examples of coordination.
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4.3 Summary
In this chapter we have discussed coordination ambiguity in detail and then given many 
reasons for why it can be nocuous or innocuous. We have discussed coordination ambi­
guity in general terms, and have provided motivation for choosing this type of ambiguity. 
We then focused upon the specific manifestation of it that we use as our test case. This 
discussion looked at lexical, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic and combinatorial aspects. 
We then set out many reasons why coordination ambiguity can be nocuous or innocuous, 
based on semantic, syntactic, pragmatic and prosodic criteria.
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Chapter 5
Implementation
In this chapter we describe how we implement our ideas about ambiguity analysis and 
classification. This involves describing the life cycle, from our perspective, of the ambi­
guities that we consider. We locate them in appropriate texts, ensure that they conform 
to our experimental criteria, discover whether and how humans disambiguate them, de­
termine from this whether they are nocuous or innocuous, and then try to predict this 
automatically using heuristics.
5.1 Building a Corpus of Requirements
To our knowledge, there are no existing corpora of requirements documents that we 
could use to analyse ambiguity in requirements. Taking our examples of ambiguity from 
an existing generic corpus would not be suitable for our purposes. We wish to look at 
ambiguities that are representative of those found in actual requirements, and that might 
cause actual problems. We therefore use a corpus from actual requirements documents.
We explain here the advantages we obtained from building this corpus, and how the 
documents that constitute it were selected. Then we describe how we mark up the words 
in the corpus with their parts of speech. This is necessary in order to ensure that any 
ambiguities we locate conform to our test case criteria. Then we present our corpus.
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Lastly we discuss some positive and negative aspects of our corpus and the process used 
to build it.
5.1.1 Selection o f D ocum ents
The requirements documents in our corpus are obtained from RE practitioners and 
from the public domain. Size and content matter are the most important criteria for 
determining whether we include a requirements document in our corpus. Also, we prefer 
not to select documents which predominantly use tables and other structured formats. 
These tend to contain isolated words and short, sub-sentential linguistic constructions. 
Our test case ambiguity, on the other hand, is generally found in running text.
Size
Including very small documents in our corpus would not be suitable. These are more 
likely than others to have been written as part of a trivial (or informal) specification 
exercise. On the other hand, we do not choose overly large documents. These would 
bias the corpus in favour of the terminology and writing style that they contain. Within 
these intuitively determined limits, we select documents of varying sizes.
Content
We wish the documents in our corpus to be representative of a variety of application 
domains. This will avoid bias towards any highly specialised usage of terminology only 
used in certain domains. Domain is a vital factor when considering RE-specific ambiguity 
in requirements (Kamsties, Berry, and Paech 2001). Context has a great influence on 
these, and domain-specific aspects of ambiguities are revealed in context. These aspects 
provide vital disambiguating information that is specific to what is being described. On 
the other hand, our test case ambiguity is more purely linguistic, rather than RE-specific.
Therefore, although the examples of it we capture will use language common to RE, they 
will not necessarily require overly large consideration of domain-specific context. We 
therefore use RE as our application domain, and treat all application domains described 
by requirements homogeneously.
Criteria Not Used
In the process of selecting documents, we do not consider the quality of the writing to be 
a criterion. We wish our corpus to be a reflection of actual writing used in requirements 
for non-trivial exercises. We therefore require that it includes all the ambiguities and 
errors that these requirements contain.
We do not discriminate regarding the geographical or cultural origins of the docu­
ments we consider. We prefer to capture the actual unbiased diversity of these factors. 
Organisations engaged in writing requirements in English may be located in any country. 
Also, within an organisation, the stages of the software life-cycle are sometimes distrib­
uted between groups in different locations. Requirements may therefore be written by 
people with different cultural background to the other stakeholders. This diversity in 
the requirements process may lead to ambiguity, and we wish to observe that.
5.1.2 Building and Tagging th e Corpus
To build our corpus we add requirements documents to it iteratively. Each one of these 
must be prepared to conform to the corpus format, then each word in it must be tagged 
with its part of speech. The former task is achieved using text manipulation programs 
that we have developed. These ensure that the text is properly tokenised and that each 
line of text is a sentence. Sub-sentential passages contained in titles, table entries, bullet 
points, etc, are also retained. We refer to all such passages of text as “sentences” .
When a new document is added to the corpus, each word is tagged with its part of
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Doc­
um­
ent
Application Domain System Described No.
of
Words
No.
of
Sent­
ences
% of 
corpus 
(by se­
ntence)
#1 HCI Graphics system 1,739 137 5.7
#2 HCI Appointments scheduler 1,860 100 4.1
#3 Healthcare Information system 1,583 196 8.1
#4 Software engineering Software compiler 6,492 497 20.5
#5 Governmental Voting software 5,805 547 22.6
#6 Telecommunications Mobile networking 7,036 374 15.5
#7 Software engineering Requirements validation 8,564 568 23.5
Total 33,079 2419 100
Average 4,725 345.6 14.3
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the texts in our corpus
speech. We use Brill’s (1992) rule-based tagger for this. Prior to each addition, the tagger 
is trained on the tagged text already in the corpus. Each tagging exercise creates new 
rules in the tagger, giving inferences about how unseen text should be tagged. After each 
addition, we check manually that the words have been tagged correctly. This ensures 
both that our corpus is accurately tagged and that the tagger has accurate training data 
for the next iteration. By training the tagger on our corpus, we achieve greater accuracy 
at tagging terms found commonly in requirements. This saves time in the long term.
5.1.3 T he Corpus
Table 5.1 shows the characteristics of the texts that make up our corpus. For each text, 
these characteristics include its size in terms of words and sentences, the percentage of 
the corpus that it comprises, the type of system it specifies, and the application domain 
in which this type of system is from.
The documents in our corpus describe the design of (and therefore contain require­
ments for) a wide range of systems for use in various industries. This heterogeneity gives 
us a broad perspective on the use of language in requirements documents. It goes some 
way to ensuring that our techniques do not become overfitted to a specific domain. The 
sizes of the documents in our corpus are varied, but fulfill the criteria that we stated in 
Section 5.1.1. None of them represent trivial requirements specification exercises, and
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none overly bias the corpus with their terminology.
5.1.4 Advantages and D isadvantages o f Our Corpus
In addition to being specific to RE, our custom-made corpus gives several other advan­
tages. These include coverage of up-to-date terminology and writing which demonstrates 
a realistic range of language proficiencies. These points are important as we wish to en­
sure that the techniques we develop are suitable for typical authors working in RE today. 
These advantages are significant for all types of writing, but are more than usually so for 
RE. Requirements describe projects from software and systems engineering, and these 
industries have a more fluid and rapidly evolving terminology than many others. Also, 
language proficiency is an issue as these industries often employ a multi-national work­
force, sometimes working in different countries.
Set against these advantages is the fact that building such a corpus is a fairly laborious 
and time-consuming task. This is mainly because all the words in the corpus need to 
be tokenised and accurately tagged with their parts of speech. This is done to ensure 
that we only locate ambiguities conforming to our test case criteria. Also, it allows for 
detailed analysis of the types of ambiguity that we locate. However, we use the tagging 
process to our advantage by training our tagger specifically on our corpus. This results 
in greater accuracy and analytical possibilities. The extra time spent developing the 
corpus is deemed to be worthwhile considering the sensitivity to ambiguity required in 
our domain.
5.2 Obtaining Examples of Our Test Case Ambiguity
In this section we explain how we obtain examples of our test case ambiguity from our 
corpus of requirements. (A new file is created of these, with all words still tagged with 
their parts of speech. This forms the basis of our dataset.) We first explain here our need
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to focus on a narrowly-defined type of ambiguity as our test case. We then introduce 
how we obtain examples of this type.
We wish to have as much data as possible to use on one narrowly defined problem. 
This maximises the reliability of our results by focusing our body of data on the same 
issues. It also simplifies the task of our judges — the people we ask to give their 
perceptions about our examples of ambiguity — who can repeatedly apply themselves 
to the same judging task. We therefore want our data to present ambiguities with 
a uniform number of possible syntactic interpretations. We choose to consider only 
ambiguities with exactly two possible syntactic interpretations.
To reiterate, we wish to use examples of coordination ambiguity of the form:
[ Assumptions and [ dependencies ] ] that are of importance
Each example must contain just one coordination, and there must be just one modifying 
element whose attachment is ambiguous. Prom here onwards the examples we present 
have the same typographical notation that we used to help the judges understand the 
task. The modifiers are underlined. The two possible phrases to which a modifier 
applies — representing either coordination-first or coordination-last interpretations — 
are indicated with square brackets.
There are several test case criteria that we use to ensure that the examples we obtain 
conform to this pattern. The first of these is simply that the coordinating conjunctions 
and, or or and/or are used. We must then ensure that our examples have more than 
one alternative structure — i.e. parse tree — as opposed to more than one alternative 
reading. We describe in detail the set of criteria that we have developed in order to 
perform this discrimination. Then we explain how we deal with examples that have too 
many alternative structures for our purposes. Lastly, we describe the flexible chunker 
we have developed to help locate the coordinations we use as our examples.
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No. Reason for Exclusion Example Explanation
1 One of the conjuncts 
can’t stand alone syn­
tactically
[ hot or [ cold 
1 1 water can be 
used
Only 1 syntactic reading: coordination- 
first.
2 No external modifying 
element
[ Dogs and [ bats 
] ] carry rabies
Coordination-last readings result in co­
ordination of dissimilar types of phrase 
(&  possible ungrammaticality): must be 
coordination-first.
3 Premodification, and 
2nd conjunct beginning 
with determiner
1 ate areen T \ 
beans ] and the 
sausages ]
A modifier cannot premodify a determiner 
(except if the former is a predeterminer, 
e.g. all, both, half): coordination-last.
4 Premodification, and 
2nd conjunct begins 
with pronoun
1 like tall \ 1 women 
] and her over 
there ]
A modifier cannot usually premodify a 
pronoun: coordination-last.
5 Coordinated nouns have 
different number and 
followed by present 
tense verb
1 wear [ boots and 
[ a raincoat ] ] that 
are waterproof
Subject of 3rd person plural verb must be 
plural: can only be coordination-first.
6 Bracketings, and other 
types of parenthetical 
punctuation indicating 
an interruption
1 like qreen T \ 
beans ] (and 
sausages)]
Such punctuation devices signify asides, 
which are not affected by external mod­
ifiers: coordination-last (Borderline cases 
exist however).
7 Commas indicating end 
of a phrase or list item
Trade. T r unions 
] and disputes ] 
were discussed
A supposed modifier shown instead to be a 
discrete item: must be coordination-first; 
(Other comma usages less clear though).
8 Acronyms that abbrevi­
ate preceding words
natural lanquaae 
processinq T 
[ (NLP) ] and 
synthesis ]
Words before conjunction clearly con­
stitute a semantic unit: can only be 
coordination-last.
9 Capitalisation of words 
preceding conjunction
Adaptive
Frequency T f 
Modelling ] and 
transmission ]
Modifier is clearly part of a name and 
therefore part of a semantic unit: must 
be coordination-last.
10a Hyphens indicating 
compound words
[ Self-motivation 
and [ -orientation 
11 workshop
Hyphen prefixing 2nd conjunct indicates 
it forms a compound with 1st part of 1st 
conjunct: must be coordination-first.
10b 35 [ bottle- or [ 
breast-feeding ] ] 
of babies
Hyphen suffixing 1st conjunct indicates 
that it forms a compound with 1st part of 
1st conjunct: must be coordination-first.
11 Phrases with head 
words with dissimilar 
parts of speech are 
coordinated
Dnyanesh is most 
famouslv \ T a 
bowler ] and very 
quick ]
A modifier can be syntactically adjacent 
to words of different parts of speech, but 
the similarity of these words cannot easily 
be compared.
12 A coordinated head 
word is a company or 
proprietary name
W e evaluated [ 
Acme Widgets 
and [ Jones Tap­
pets 11 products
Must be kept anonymous. Substituting 
proper names with dummy words would 
introduce false data and skew the results 
with repeated use.
Table 5.2: Criteria Used to Eliminate Coordinations from the Dataset
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5.2.1 E lim inating Single Structure Cases
We discard any test case examples we have located in our corpus that have only one 
possible structure. The criteria we have developed to do this are explained below. Ex­
amples of these criteria, and explanations of those examples, are presented in Table 5.2. 
We established these criteria to distinguish between the structure and interpretation 
levels of our model of ambiguity. Not all of them were required when we processed the 
sentences located in our corpus.
Some of the criteria described here are near the borderline between distinguishing 
ambiguities on the grounds of structure and on the grounds of perception. Indeed, some 
of the structural criteria we present here have been used as disambiguation heuristics, 
for instance by Nakov and Hearst (2005) as discussed in 2.1.2. Employing such criteria 
as heuristics might increase our ability at locating innocuous ambiguities, as they would 
locate ambiguities that are nearly always given one particular reading. However, our 
concern is nocuous ambiguity, so we prefer to ignore as many such ambiguities as possible 
on the grounds that their structure is obvious. In this way, the ambiguities that we 
consider contain a higher concentration of nocuous ambiguities. Because of this, we may 
sacrifice performance when we come to distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambiguity 
using heuristics. However, it enables us to focus more on the differences of human 
perception that make an ambiguity nocuous.
Syntactic Criteria
Criteria 1 to 5 are essentially syntactic in nature, and their validity can be demonstrated 
by looking at a well-developed set of grammar rules. These criteria are, with very few 
exceptions, clear indicators of single structure cases.
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Punctuation Criteria
Punctuation plays a significant part in determining the structure of written language. 
The two criteria we present here cover the most common ways in which punctuation can 
indicate single structure in our sentences. Full stops, colons and bullet points all signify 
the end of sentences in our corpus, so we do not require criteria to take account of them.
Criterion 6 covers several forms of parenthetical punctuation: dashes, parentheses 
and bracketings of all types. These generally indicate that an aside is being made. 
They tend to be discrete semantic units and so modification does not tend to cross the 
boundary represented by a parenthetical symbol. This is shown in the following sentence:
The car was [ washed — and [ polished ] ] vigorously — before the race
In such cases, parenthetical punctuation demands coordination-last interpretations, 
indicating single structure. However, counter examples exist, particularly when the 
modifier is outside the parenthetical insertion. The following sentences indicate that 
coordination-first interpretations are perfectly possible:
The green [ [ hills ] — and valleys — J of my native land
He had the reputation of being a true [ [ gentleman ] (and scholar) ]
Criterion 7 reflects the fact that commas can often, but not always, be clear indicators 
of syntactic structure. We follow Trask’s (1997) classification of comma usage into four 
categories. Some indicate single structure coordination ambiguity, while others are not 
so clear.
• Listing commas list items. This can be demonstrated by adapting the example 
from Table 4.1 on page 70:
Blood, sweat and tears
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This usage signifies that a supposed modifier, in this case Blood, is in fact another 
conjunct. Criterion 2 is thereby infringed, signifying single structure.
• Joining commas join sentences or clauses together. They must be followed by 
either and, or, but, yet, or while, such as in the following sentence:
I  said goodbye, and the train departed.
Therefore there tends to be no external modifier, and criterion 2 is infringed. 
Counter examples are possible, for instance when a sentence adverb is a modifier:
Allegedly [ [ the story is true ] , and it cost him his career. ]
Except in these exceptions, joining commas signify single structure.
• Gapping commas indicate elision of certain words; for instance the word was in:
Gavaskar was probably [ [ the greatest Indian batsman ] and Chandrasekhar, the 
worst. ]
The (uncommon) gapping comma generally appears to enforce a coordination-first 
reading. We consider therefore that gapping commas signify single structure.
• Bracketing commas signify asides and other parenthetical insertions. They behave 
similarly to the punctuation considered in criterion 6. To understand this, brack­
eting commas can be substituted for the parenthetical symbols in our discussion 
of that criterion. Similarly, bracketing commas sometimes demand a coordination- 
last interpretation, signifying single structure, but by no means always.
Punctuation, taken as a whole, is a useful, though not foolproof, indicator of single 
structure.
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Orthographic Criteria
Orthography is concerned with spelling, punctuation, capitalisation and the symbols 
that can be used in a language. Our orthographic criteria are concerned with capitali­
sation, and with miscellaneous non-aiphabetic symbols which clarify understanding but 
which are not actually classed as punctuation marks. Our capitalisation criteria, 8 and 
9, can be understood by reference to the concept of named entities. These are semantic 
units representing organisations, people, places, and so forth, which often involve capi­
talisation. Aside from these, most symbols do not affect interpretation of coordination 
ambiguities. We believe that hyphens operating as infixes are the only miscellaneous 
symbols which require our attention. This usage is covered by criterion 10.
Criterion 8 is based on the convention that bracketed and entirely capitalised “words” 
are generally acronyms which refer to an immediately preceding named entity. If the 
post-modifying “modifier” is the acronym and the named entity it abbreviates is the 
conjunct immediately preceding it, they will be structurally conjoined to each other. 
The only possible structure is the one that gives a coordination-last reading. This is 
illustrated in the example from Table 4.1, where natural language processing naturally 
attaches only to NLP:
We perform natural language processing [ [ (NLP) ] and synthesis ]
Criterion 9 is based on the convention that words with initial capital letters generally 
refer to named entities. If both the “modifier” and the conjunct nearest to it have initial 
capital letters, then together they usually form a named entity. (Capitalisation in titles 
and at the beginning of sentences can, of course, confuse the issue.) This is indicated by 
the example from Table 4.1:
...accomplished using Adaptive Frequency [ [ Modelling ] and transmission ]
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Criterion 10 covers cases where hyphens are used to indicate compounded words. 
Coordinations can be made of such words. Two conjuncts may be hyphenated compound 
words, with the common element elided from one of them. This is shown in the example 
from Table 4.1, where feeding is the common element but it has been elided from the 
first conjunct:
Is [ bottle- or [ breast-feeding ] ] of babies preferable?
The lexical unit bottle- cannot stand alone. Because of the (otherwise unexplainable) 
dangling hyphen, only a coordination-first interpretation is possible, indicating single 
structure.
Pragmatic Criteria
We reluctantly use some criteria to eliminate coordinations from our dataset for prag­
matic reasons, rather than because they signify single structure coordinations. Because 
our heuristics largely use notions of similarity to form their predictions, it must be pos­
sible to make comparisons between the important words in the coordinations.
Criterion 11 eliminates coordinations of phrases which have head words with dissim­
ilar parts of speech. Such coordinations are possible with some parts of speech. These 
constructions are never particularly common, but the example from Table 5.2 shows they 
can both exist and be ambiguous:
Dnyanesh is most famously [ [  a bowler ] and very quick in the field ]
We are forced to implement this as, for instance, a noun and an adjective like bowler and 
quick cannot be directly compared. Indirect, for example semantic, comparison may be 
made, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Criterion 12 exists because we cannot ask for people’s perceptions about ambiguities 
involving proprietary names: some of the requirements documents in our corpus were
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given to us in confidence. We could replace these names with generic nouns, as is 
sometimes done in information retrieval. But usage of generic nouns in this way has at 
least two unwelcome effects. Firstly, choosing a noun to represent the proprietary name 
introduces one person’s judgement, which may be unreliable. Secondly, repeated use of 
the same generic nouns begin to make an unrealistically large contribution to the data, 
which will then bias the results.
5.2.2 A ccounting for M ultiple C oordination A m biguity
We use only examples of coordination ambiguity with two possible structures. The 
majority of multiple structure coordination ambiguities that we locate in our corpus 
have only two possible structures. However, it is sometimes possible to obtain examples 
of coordination ambiguity with two structures from those with more than two. This 
involves duplicating the original sentence and simplifying each new version to reduce 
the number of possible structures. This can only be done, however, when no important 
disambiguating information is lost from the original. There are two types of multiple 
coordination ambiguity from which we can obtain examples conforming to our test case 
criteria. These are due to either multiple modifiers or multiple coordinators.
Multiple Modifiers
When more than one modifier is present together with the coordination, this can result 
in a coordination with more possible structures than we require. Let us consider the 
phrase:
Design Review and Checking System
Design could apply to both Review and Checking System (which might be procedures 
implemented by an organisation), and System can be modified by Review and Checking 
(which might be its functions). (Note that in this example while it is required to include
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the modifier Checking in the former scenario, as this word is nested within the coordina­
tion, we can omit Design when considering the latter scenario. This is because Design 
is a modifier that occurs outside the coordination, it is not vital for understanding the 
phrase, and it might cause the judges some confusion.)
Our solution to this scenario is to include multiple variations of the sentence in our 
dataset. The following two sentences are created from the original one to represent the 
two alternative coordination ambiguities:
Design [ [ Review ] and Checking System ]
[ Review and [ Checking J ] System
Note that the coordination-last readings of these phrases are actually the same read­
ing: both indicate that Design Review and Checking System are discrete semantic units. 
The original phrase has three possible syntactic structures which can now be analysed 
as two instances of two structures.
Multiple Coordinators
We can use instances of multiple coordination where it is realised by full syndetons, as 
explained in Section 4.1.8. An external modifier must also be present, such that none 
of our criteria for eliminating single structure cases are infringed. We use the example 
from Table 4.1 on page 70 to illustrate our way of using multiple coordinations:
Sweat and blood and tears of joy
Ideally, we would like to discover which of the three conjuncts — Sweat, blood and tears 
— can be modified with of joy. So we create the following two phrases from the original:
blood and tears of joy 
Sweat and tears of joy
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The former of these is simply a semantic possibility in the original. The latter captures, 
in the form of our test case ambiguity, the possibility of the furthest conjunct from the 
modifier being modified.
5.2.3 F lexible Chunker
We need to accurately locate examples of coordination ambiguity that conform to our 
test case criteria in our corpus. This can be slow and painstaking if done by hand. We 
therefore designed and developed our own text manipulation software to assist with this 
task. We term this a flexible chunker: it has the output of a chunker, but the flexibility 
of a non-deterministic parser.
Firstly we explain what chunking is and why it might be suitable for our work. 
Secondly we discuss some other implementations of chunking for the purpose of analysing 
coordinations. Then we explain the workings of our chunker, and conclude by evaluating 
its performance and its potential. We believe that our software goes considerably beyond 
the scope and specification of the earlier implementations of the idea. However, our 
implementation revealed some of the difficulties inherent in the task we were addressing. 
This meant that our software was not able to fully realise our aims. For this reason we 
describe some aspects of our chunker in theoretical terms only.
Chunking
Chunkers group words of running text into chunks. These can be noun phrases, verb 
phrases and other such coarse-grained units. Although originally intended to capture 
prosodic structure (Abney 1995), chunkers have been increasingly used as a preprocess­
ing step for parsing (Sang and Buchholz 2000). Traditionally, chunkers have not coped 
well with coordinations, and generally avoid processing them (Abney 1996a) (Sang and 
Buchholz 2000). However, to address coordination ambiguity, the conjuncts of any co­
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ordination must be discerned somehow. A parser must of course make choices at these 
junctures. However, it would be useful to avoid the complications of full parsing when 
focusing only on one linguistic construction. A chunker might therefore provide a quicker 
and simpler solution. Also, coordinations have the special characteristic of parallelism 
between the phrases that are its conjuncts (Okumura and Muraki 1994). A chunker has 
the advantage that it readily assembles phrases, and can be built so that it looks for this 
parallelism.
Previous Use of Chunkers for Coordinations
Despite the aforementioned reluctance of many chunker designers to address coordina­
tions, we are not the first to realise that it might be useful. Goldberg (1999) uses a 
“simple chunker” to obtain training data containing coordination ambiguities. This op­
erates on tagged text, and uses “two small regular expressions” to return the head words 
of noun and quantifier phrases. However, it is not explained what these expressions are 
nor how they achieve this. It is also not clear how efficient the chunker is at this task. 
Agarwal and Boggess (1992) use a custom-built “semi-parser” to prepare their text for 
coordination analysis. This may be a chunker in all but name. This includes conjunct 
identification and prepositional phrase attachment amongst its capabilities. However, 
Agarwal and Boggess do not describe the capabilities or coverage of their software.
Our Chunker
Our chunker is designed to operate on the text of our corpus, tagged using Brill’s (1992) 
tagset. As with other chunkers it groups words together into phrases. However, rather 
than being purely deterministic, it can output several alternative sequences of chunks. 
Each sequence represents an alternative reading of the coordination ambiguity being 
addressed. The output, taken as a whole, is analogous to a forest of parse trees produced
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by a parser with some underspecification in its grammar. It is this aspect which makes 
the chunker flexible: it allows for the many different possible combinations of words 
that can be coordinated. This facility helps us identify examples of coordination having 
only one syntactic structure, which can then be eliminated from our dataset. (It can 
also, in theory at least, identify coordination ambiguities having too many syntactic 
structures.) It simultaneously ensures that the words we are considering as the triggers 
for coordination ambiguity — and, or and and/or — are present in the sentences.
To process sentences containing coordinations, our chunker has both basic and ad­
vanced features. The former conglomerate words into basic phrases. The latter produce 
the different possible syntactic structures, and their constituent phrases, of the sentences 
using these basic phrases. Both sets of features mainly use the part of speech tags of 
words to decide how the phrases should be formed. The chunker appends new tags to all 
the phrases it creates. These new tags constitute a small tagset of our own formulation, 
as is common practice with other chunkers (Abney 1996a) (Sang and Buchholz 2000).
Conglomeration of words into basic phrases starts by locating the most likely head 
word of each phrase. This is done by using a prioritised order of word types that are 
likely to be heads. The process of finding suitable head words is iterative: candidate 
heads are selected in order of decreasing priority. We then look for pre-modifying and 
post-modifying words that can be joined to each head word. When it is considered 
whether a word can modify a head word, it is judged according to a bag of tags criterion. 
This means that it must have a tag from the set of tags representing the types of word 
that can modify the head word. (A set of these tags is maintained for each word type 
that can be a head word.) For example, an adjective can pre-modify a noun, an adverb 
can pre- or post-modify a verb or pre-modify an adjective, a possessive inflection can 
post-modify a noun phrase, and so on. This procedure is also performed iteratively. 
Each phrase is built up around the head word until no more suitable pre-modifying and
post-modifying words can be found. The conglomeration process halts when all words 
are accounted for.
The advanced features of our chunker iteratively conglomerate the phrases formed 
by the basic features into ever larger units. This requires some basic functions akin to 
parsing. These include finding verb phrases for subject, finding objects for verb phrases, 
applying prepositional phrases to verb phrases and noun phrases, compounding nouns, 
and so on. This is where coordination also becomes an issue. The goal of this exercise is 
to generate all the possible structures for any given coordination. This demonstrates the 
number of permutations of conjuncts and attendant modifying phrases. Coordinations 
with only one syntactic structure can then be discarded and those with exactly two 
structures can be included in the dataset. Those with more than two can be discarded 
or evolved into several sentences containing just two structures. A side effect of this 
process is the capturing of the head words of the conjuncts and modifying phrases. This 
information can be used to categorise and analyse the coordination alternatives.
Performance and Evaluation
Our flexible chunker does not output perfect results. The work with the advanced 
features in particular proved to be more difficult than anticipated. We therefore simply 
use the chunker to weed out some sentences which are not of interest to us. We do 
not use the advanced features to their full extent. This ensures that we do not exclude 
sentences that we wish to include in our dataset. This is at the expense of including 
some sentences that fail the criteria and which we have to eliminate later by hand. We 
checked that using the chunker in this way gives the results we anticipated. We chunked 
a section of the corpus and then carefully examined it by hand.
The basic aspects of our chunker perform well. The prioritised head word selection 
and bag of tags techniques are simple but effective. Our chunker appears to be unusual
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(for one operating on English) in that it allows post- as well as pre-modification of head 
words (Sang and Buchholz 2000). We believe that this is a useful and viable approach. 
Developing this software has also given us insights into the fecundity of coordinations as 
a source of ambiguity in real fife contexts.
5.3 Obtaining Human Judgements about Am biguity
Here we explain how we use ambiguity questionnaires to obtain human judgements on 
the examples of coordination ambiguity we have taken from our corpus. This involves 
simplifying the sentences where appropriate. We then present them in the form of 
questionnaires to a group of human judges. After describing these procedures, we explain 
in detail the characteristics of this group of judges. This detail is important: our model 
of ambiguity requires that we look closely at the formation of human perceptions.
5.3.1 Preparing E xam ple Sentences
It is important that judging the coordination ambiguity examples is not too onerous a 
task. The judges are unpaid volunteers with little available time. They should be able 
to complete the questionnaires without more effort than is essential for treating the task 
seriously. We therefore endeavour to present the examples of ambiguity in a form which 
fulfills this wish.
If the sentences are very long, we simplify or elide parts of them which are clearly not 
essential to their interpretation. We omit preambles and trailing clauses for the same 
reasons. This procedure is also used for hiding proprietary names, where these are not 
head words and therefore not semantically required for our analysis. Such alterations 
are indicated graphically using conventional typographic notation: substitution is repre­
sented by parentheses, elision by a series of dots. The first fines in the following examples 
show the text as found in the corpus, the second ones show how it is presented in the
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questionnaires:
1(a): In order to plan the possible upscaling of the system, it will be made 
highly scalable by making it easy to switch from a 2-tier client/server solution 
to a 3-tier distributed solution with the use of a middleware like [Proprietary 
Name] Transaction Server to take care of business rules and transactions
1(b): Take care of business [ [rules ] and transactions ]
2(a): The [Proprietary Name] will be implemented and executed on the 32-bit 
[Proprietary Name] platform
2(b): ( I t  ) will be [ implemented and [ executed ] ] on th e   platform
These representations of the original sentences, resulting from the aforementioned 
procedures, axe those used in the ambiguity questionnaires.
5.3.2 T he Questionnaires
The sentences, prepared as described earlier, are presented in the form of questionnaires 
to our group of judges. The judges are asked to give their opinion about how each 
ambiguity should be read. We formulated the instructions for this task during the 
course of our pilot study. For any given example, such as:
( I t  ) will be [ implemented and [ executed ] ] on th e   vlatform
the judges are asked which of the following three options they think applies to the 
coordination:
• It is interpreted coordination-first
• It is interpreted coordination-last
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• It is ambiguous so that it might lead to misunderstanding
In the last case, the coordination is then classed as an acknowledged ambiguity for that 
judge. We refer to the first two cases as the non-ambiguous judgements. Allowing the 
third “ambiguous” choice is used in other ambiguity studies, for instance by Hirschberg 
and Litman (1993) when determining whether coordinating conjunctions act as discourse 
or sentential cue phrases. The full set of instructions that we present to the judges is 
given, verbatim, in Appendix A.
We made sure that the judges were not given other information of any of the following 
types which might influence their opinions:
• The judgements and comments of other judges about any particular ambiguity
• What we, the researchers, thought the judgements should be
• The overall popularity of each of the three judgement options
In addition, we gave no indication of the context from the original text of the examples.
5.3.3 Selecting th e Judges
The people who judge our ambiguities must be suitably familiar with the problem of 
ambiguity in English. Also, familiarity with the terminology used in requirements will 
be an advantage. We must use a sufficient number of them to give confidence in the 
patterns of perception that we capture in our data. We do not use the same judges for 
each batch of ambiguities that we present in our questionnaires. However, we do use the 
same number of them each time. They are taken from a pool of judges that conform to 
our criteria.
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Profile of The Judges
The judges are all working in academia, and have specialist knowledge of computing and 
other systems-related activities. As a group they are therefore well qualified to judge 
ambiguity in requirements. (Additionally, some have expertise in requirements engineer­
ing and some are also trained linguists.) Their ages range from twenties to forties, their 
academic status ranges from postgraduate to professor, and they originate from various 
countries. All are fluent speakers of English, though some are non-native speakers. They 
therefore bring skills to the task that in line with those of many requirements engineers 
(and other stakeholders who read requirements).
Sample Size
The sample size for this task is the number of people who act as our judges. We need 
to choose a suitable number. RE is sensitive to ambiguity, and so using many judges is 
desirable to capture nuances of human perception (Berry, Kamsties, and Krieger 2003). 
However it is also expensive in terms of effort, so we aim to reach a compromise.
One problem that can be encountered in any data collection process is noise. In terms 
of human judgements, this is constituted by judgements resulting from judges displaying 
lack of due care and attention. We term these rogue judgements. They are not the same 
as genuine differences in opinion, which result in the nocuous ambiguity that we wish 
to model. Rogue judgements can have a particularly large influence when intolerance 
of ambiguity is high. In that situation, one judgement that does not agree with the 
majority viewpoint might classify a clearly innocuous ambiguity as marginally nocuous. 
If this judgement was not a genuine and considered perception of that ambiguity, then 
it has a unwarranted influence on the classification of the ambiguity. Choosing a sample 
size large enough to minimise the effect of noise is a recognised technique (Keren 1992), 
and one which we follow.
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We look for a sample size that establishes an acceptable basic level of confidence in 
our data. This basic level of confidence is the lower-bound achieved if the judges give 
informed — i.e. better than random — judgements. We find this lower-bound using 
the standard statistical method of postulating, and trying to reject, a null hypothesis 
(Umarji 1962). This hypothesis says that there is no substantial evidence that the 
judgements are informed; the alternative hypothesis says that there is. We wish to 
determine the possibility that agreement between the majority of the judges is due to 
uninformed decision making. For us, rejecting the null hypothesis would demonstrate 
that this possibility is acceptably small. We wish to determine how many judges we 
should use, given that a number of them are likely to give rogue judgements, so we can 
reject the null hypothesis. Achieving this for any combination of a given number of 
judges will prove that we have a basic level of confidence for that sample size.
For this particular exercise we wish to analyse only the non-ambiguous judgements, 
i.e. judgements of coordination-first and coordination-last. This is because the third 
choice, acknowledgement of ambiguity, can be considered as akin to a don’t know op­
tion. It is therefore an answer to a different question than the coordination-first or 
coordination-last question (Fowler 2001). Removing the “ambiguity” option reduces the 
problem to one of binary decision making.
Our confidence that the judgements are informed is the probability that the null 
hypothesis is rejected. In other words it is the probability of proving the null hypothesis 
subtracted from 1. Let N  be the number of experts giving judgements and M  be the 
number of them giving a rogue judgement. The probability of proving the null hypothesis 
is the probability of finding M  or fewer rogue judgements from any of the N  judges. 
Using standard probability theory, our confidence that the judgements are informed is 
therefore calculated to be:
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No. of Number of Rogue Judgements
Experts 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 50.00 0 . 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 75.00 25.00 0 . 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 87.50 50.00 12.50 0 . 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4 93.75 68.75 31.25 6.25 0 . 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 96.88 81.25 50.00 18.75 3.13 0 . 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
6 98.44 89.06 65.63 34.38 10.94 1.56 0 . 0 0 N/A N/A
7 99.22 93.75 77.34 50.00 2 2 . 6 6 6.25 0.78 0 . 0 0 N/A
8 99.61 96.48 85.55 63.67 36.33 14.45 3.52 0.39 0 . 0 0
9 99.80 98.05 91.02 74.61 50.00 25.39 8.98 1.95 0 . 2 0
1 0 99.90 98.93 94.53 82.81 62.30 37.70 17.19 5.47 1.07
1 1 99.95 99.41 96.73 88.67 72.56 50.00 27.44 11.33 3.27
1 2 99.98 99.68 98.07 92.70 80.62 61.28 38.72 19.38 7.30
13 99.99 99.83 98.88 95.39 8 6 . 6 6 70.95 50.00 29.05 13.34
14 99.99 99.91 99.35 97.13 91.02 78.80 60.47 39.53 2 1 . 2 0
15 1 0 0 . 0 0 99.95 99.63 98.24 94.08 84.91 69.64 50.00 30.36
16 1 0 0 . 0 0 99.97 99.79 98.94 96.16 89.49 77.28 59.82 40.18
17 1 0 0 . 0 0 99.99 99.88 99.36 97.55 92.83 83.38 68.55 50.00
18 1 0 0 . 0 0 99.99 99.93 99.62 98.46 95.19 8 8 . 1 1 75.97 59.27
19 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 99.96 99.78 99.04 96.82 91.65 82.04 67.62
2 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 99.98 99.87 99.41 97.93 94.23 86.84 74.83
Table 5.3: Confidence levels with varying numbers of rogue judgements
277" is the product of all the (no better than random) 50% success rates for all the judges. 
The binomial coefficient (^) is the number of ways to choose exactly m  out of N, and 
these are summed for all possible values of m  to account for all possible numbers of rogue 
judgements. The final figure is subtracted from 1 to give the likelihood of rejecting the 
null hypothesis. The binomial coefficients are calculated as:
N \  _  N\ 
m )  m\(N — m)\
Table 5.3 shows confidence levels for sample sizes from one to twenty. The numbers 
of these judges giving rogue judgements range from zero to eight. Initial investigations
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carried out in a pilot study1 suggested that approximately a third of all judgements 
would be an acknowledgement of ambiguity. Therefore, to account for these, we wish to 
choose from Table 5.3 a sample size that is one and a half times the sample size that 
best fits our purpose. In our pilot study there were very seldom more than two judges at 
any time who appeared to give a rogue judgement, so we let M  = 2. As is common with 
such exercises we use a confidence level of 95% (Umarji 1962). Table 5.3 shows that a 
minimum of eleven experts would provide this lower-bound level of confidence. We then 
add in the projected acknowledged ambiguity judgements, i.e. we multiply by one and 
a half. Seventeen is then the minimum suitable number of judges, so this is the sample 
size that we use.
5.4 Distinguishing Nocuous from Innocuous Ambiguity
As a result of our ambiguity questionnaires, we have seventeen judgements on each ambi­
guity in our dataset; these judgements can be either “coordination-first”, “coordination- 
last” or “ambiguous”. This situation is represented spatially in Figure 5-1: it equates to 
a three-dimensional vector space diagram. The three sides of the triangle represent the 
three types of judgement, which can be given in varying degrees for any given ambiguity. 
The point where the dotted lines within the triangle intersect represents a point in the 
space where any given ambiguity in our dataset lies. The lengths of each dotted line 
from the intersection to the solid line boundary of the triangle represents the proportion 
of judgements represented by that boundary. These lengths can be in any proportion 
relative to each other, but will always equal the same number.
Now we need to determine, from this situation, whether any given ambiguity is
1This asked judges similar questions about PP-attachment ambiguities using several surveys of dif­
ferent sizes. It is true that PP-attachment ambiguities are not necessarily perceived as being equally 
ambiguous as coordination ambiguities. However, we are unaware of any comparable coordination am­
biguity study that we could use to give this information.
I l l
Acknowledged Ambiguities
Figure 5-1: Spatial Representation of the Judgements given on an Ambiguity
nocuous or innocuous. There are several ways in which this can be done. The use of 
ambiguity thresholds is important in two of our methods, so we begin by introducing 
these thresholds. We then explain the three methods that we use in this research to 
distinguish ambiguities that may be dangerous from those which are not.
We present a weighted method of distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambiguity. 
We have used this successfully when implementing our model in a tool for RE practition­
ers (Chantree, Nuseibeh, de Roeck, and Willis 2006). In this method, unacknowledged 
ambiguity is generally considered to be more important than acknowledgement ambi­
guity as a component of nocuous ambiguity. This is done as unacknowledgement of 
ambiguity is ultimately what makes ambiguity nocuous in our model. No separately 
controllable threshold is allowed. However, the method of determining nocuousness does 
represent a threshold in its own right.
We then present a flexible method of distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambi­
guity. Here, unacknowledgement and acknowledgement of ambiguity are considered to
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be of equal importance. Whether or not they result in nocuous ambiguity is determined 
by use of ambiguity thresholds. This implements our desire to have a flexible tolerance 
to ambiguity. For example, this flexibility allows a high ambiguity threshold to be set 
for applications in safety-critical domains. Conversely, less critical applications might 
require a lower ambiguity threshold.
Thirdly, we analyse solely unacknowledged ambiguities. These may be more immedi­
ately dangerous than other, acknowledged, nocuous ambiguities: they have actually been 
found to be understood differently by different people. We wish to determine whether 
unacknowledged ambiguity can be characterised successfully by a model, and how this 
compares to our model of nocuous ambiguity.
There are other ways of analysing ambiguity that accord with our stated aims. The 
flexible method implements the core premise of nocuous ambiguity, that the phenomenon 
of having multiple readings is the defining criterion. Unacknowledged and acknowledged 
ambiguity are therefore considered to be of equal importance. Similarly, the method 
focusing solely on unacknowledged ambiguities is a pure representation of that phenom­
enon. We would not therefore wish to omit analysis of our data by either of these 
methods. The weighted method, however, is open to discussion. The criteria for what 
makes an ambiguity acknowledged or unacknowledged represent thresholds. To some ex­
tent these thresholds are intuitive, making an independent estimate of the level of danger 
inherent in each of the two phenomena that make an ambiguity nocuous. They have, 
however, been approved as suitable for purpose by colleagues working in requirements 
engineering.
5.4.1 A m biguity Thresholds
We use ambiguity thresholds to reflect our notion of a degree of tolerance to ambiguity, 
for the following reasons. Firstly, not all ambiguities can be disambiguated reliably. Sec­
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ondly, we intend that in any system implementing our method, users can be given control 
over the degree of tolerance to nocuous ambiguity. As such, the ambiguity threshold rep­
resents the minimum certainty required for an ambiguity to be considered innocuous. 
The higher the ambiguity threshold is, the more intolerant we are of ambiguity. We ex­
plain below how different ambiguity thresholds are set and used. The effects they have on 
the classification of an ambiguity are explained for each of the methods of distinguishing 
ambiguity that we use.
Users of any system incorporating our approach to ambiguity must decide which level 
of ambiguity intolerance is appropriate to the task at hand. They would then set the 
ambiguity threshold to a level representing that intolerance. All ambiguities found in 
their texts would then be judged by that criterion. Alternatively, a particular ambiguity 
threshold could be implemented as a policy decision by an organisation, or an individual 
author creating text. For instance, high intolerance to ambiguity would be required 
when creating documents describing a safety-critical system. An organisation would 
then implement a high ambiguity threshold to avoid any disastrous misunderstandings. 
Alternatively, an individual might have limited time to write informal specifications — 
which perhaps will be thoroughly discussed before they are acted upon. Intolerance of 
ambiguity would in this case be lower. A lower ambiguity threshold would then be set, 
ensuring that the documents were created quickly.
Ambiguity thresholds are important in our empirical studies. We test our heuristics 
against a range of them, thereby evaluating their performance at different tolerances to 
ambiguity. This we will explain in Chapter 6 .
Our ambiguity threshold determines whether an ambiguity it is nocuous or innocu­
ous: it is a binary decision. Other classification schemes are possible. For instance, 
Oberlander and Nowson (2006) demonstrate how classifications representing differing 
levels of certainty can be used in sentiment analysis. They discuss the advantages of
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For sentences (1.. .  i . . .  n)
CFi =  No. of Coordination First Judgements on Sentence i 
CLi =  No. of Coordination Last Judgements on Sentence i 
QUA{ = Quotient Unacknowledged Ambiguity for Sentence i 
=  ( =  0 if  CFj + CL, =  0 )
Ai =  No. of Ambiguous Judgements on Sentence i 
AAi\ Sentence i is judged to contain Acknowledged Ambiguity 
IFF ( At > CFi ) AND ( A{ > CLi )
For sentences (1.. .  j  . ..  n)
UAf. Sentence i is judged to contain Unacknowledged Ambiguity
IFF ( QUA. > £ ^ 1„QC,Aj )
Sentence i is Judged to contain Nocuous Ambiguity 
_______ IFF AAj OR UAj__________________________________
Table 5.4: Weighted Method for Determining Nocuous Ambiguity
various ways of classifying the strength of textual indicators for any given sentiment. 
These classifications include simply “high” and “low”, having a intermediate “medium” 
classification, and interposing “relatively high” and “relatively low” between these. We 
could use any of these schemes, substituting “nocuous” and “innocuous” for “high” and 
“low”. However, our use of an ambiguity threshold replaces the flexibility of having the 
choice of one of these schemes. The threshold allows the classification of nocuous ambi­
guity to be as “relative” as required. All that is required for our approach is that the 
threshold is set judiciously and that that decision is respected. Oberlander and Nowson 
state that their consideration of increasingly fine-grained classification schemes is sim­
ply intended to gradually approximate continuous rating. We start from the position of 
continuous rating, giving us greater flexibility.
5.4.2 W eighted M ethod
This method states that a coordination ambiguity is nocuous if it is an acknowledged 
ambiguity or if it is an unacknowledged ambiguity. However, these two components are 
calculated in a way that tends to give more importance to the latter. A coordination am­
biguity is said to be acknowledged if (and only if) it is judged ambiguous at least as often 
as it is judged coordination-first and at least as often as it is judged coordination-last.
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Majority Non-Ambiguous Judgements
(Consensus Judgement)
Minority 
Non-Ambiguous Judgments 
(Unacknowledged Component)
Judgements 
Acknowledging Ambiguity 
'(Acknowledged Component)
JudgementsDisagreeing^AnthConsensus
Figure 5-2: Assessment of Judgements using the Flexible Method
A coordination ambiguity is said to be unacknowledged if (and only if) it contains above 
average unacknowledged ambiguity. This average can be calculated over any number of 
ambiguities that one wishes to survey. Unacknowledged ambiguity is calculated solely 
on the numbers of non-ambiguous judgements, i.e. coordination-first and coordination- 
last; the acknowledged judgements are all ignored. These criteria for what makes an 
ambiguity classed as acknowledged or unacknowledged by this method represent fixed 
thresholds.
Determining nocuous ambiguity using the Weighted Method is explained mathemat­
ically in Table 5.4. Worked examples are given in Section 6 . 2  to demonstrate the use of 
the weighted method.
5.4.3 F lexib le M ethod
When looking at judgements, the consensus judgement can be said to be the major­
ity non-ambiguous judgement: in our case, coordination-first or coordination-last. All 
judgements that dissent from this consensus viewpoint can then be conflated together. 
Therefore, judging a coordination to be ambiguous is considered equally important as
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Majority Non-Ambiguous Judgements
(Consensus Judgement)
Minority 
Non-Ambiguous Judgements 
(Unacknowledged Component)
Judgements 
Acknowledging Ambiguity 
(Acknowledged Component)
Judgements Disagreeing 
with Consensi
Figure 5-3: Assessment of Judgements using the Unacknowledged Method
judging it to have the minority non-ambiguous reading. The former represent the ac­
knowledged ambiguity component; the latter represent the unacknowledged ambiguity 
component. This reduces the three possibilities to two, either agreeing with the consen­
sus judgement or disagreeing with it, as shown in Figure 5-2. Whether there are enough 
of the latter to classify an ambiguity as nocuous is determined by the ambiguity thresh­
old. The certainty of the consensus judgement (or percentage agreement (Gale, Church, 
and Yarowsky 1992)) is simply the percentage of the judgements that agree with it.
We demonstrate here the effect of ambiguity thresholds when used in the Flexible 
Method. Let us say that a coordination has been judged by 65% of the judges to be 
coordination-first and by the remainder to be either coordination-last or ambiguous. 
65% is therefore the certainty. Then, if the ambiguity threshold is set at 60%, the 
consensus judgement for that coordination will be considered to be coordination-first. It 
will therefore be classified as innocuous. If, on the other hand, the ambiguity threshold 
is set at 70%, the coordination will be classified as nocuous.
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5.4.4 Purely  U nacknow ledged M ethod
In this method, ambiguities are determined to be dangerous purely in terms of unac­
knowledgement. All judgements acknowledging ambiguity are simply ignored. Only 
the minority non-ambiguous judgements — the unacknowledged ambiguity component 
of the dissenting judgements — count towards categorising an ambiguity as dangerous. 
This is shown in Figure 5-3. The degree of unacknowledgement is the number of mi­
nority non-ambiguous judgements divided by all the non-ambiguous judgements. We do 
not use the term nocuous here, as we have stated that acknowledged ambiguity is an 
important factor in that definition. Instead we talk of distinguishing innocuous from 
unacknowledged ambiguity. We use ambiguity thresholds, as per the Flexible Method. 
These thresholds represent different intolerances to unacknowledgement, and determine 
whether an ambiguity is judged to be innocuous or unacknowledged.
We demonstrate here the effect of ambiguity thresholds when used to categorise levels 
of unacknowledged ambiguity. Let us say that a coordination has been judged by 65% of 
the judges to be coordination-first, by 20% of them to be coordination-last and by 15% 
to be ambiguous. The degree of unacknowledgement is therefore 20/85 =  23.5%, and the 
certainty is 76.5%. If the ambiguity threshold is set at 70%, the consensus judgement 
for that coordination will be considered to be coordination-first. It will therefore be 
classified as innocuous. If, on the other hand, the ambiguity threshold is set at 80%, the 
coordination will be classified as an unacknowledged ambiguity.
5.5 Tools
Here we present the tools we use to create many of our predictions about ambiguity. 
The heuristics we have developed to make these predictions are presented in Section 5.6. 
The aspects of the tools which we present here are used generically by several of these
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heuristics. The tools are a generic corpus and a statistical package that extracts word 
distribution information from that corpus. The package we use is the Sketch Engine 
(Kilgarriff et al. 2004); the generic corpus we use is the BNC. We introduce these tools, 
after discussing some motivation for using such an approach.
Using word statistical distribution information obtained from a corpus to predict 
preferred readings of structural ambiguities has become a recognised technique in recent 
years. For instance, McLauchlan (2004) and Calvo, Gelbukh, and Kilgarriff (2005) use 
word distribution, presented via a thesaurus, to predict prepositional phrase attachment. 
Collocations and n-grams are frequently used to predict preferred readings of many types 
of structural ambiguities, for instance by Nakov and Hearst (2005) and Rus, Moldovan, 
and Bolohan (2002). In his adaption of bidirectional optimality theory, van Deemter 
(2004) incorporates corpus-based probabilities to judge which ambiguities are vicious 
ambiguities.
Our use of statistical corpus-based NLP techniques is in line with some current think­
ing in RE. For instance, Sawyer, Rayson, and Cosh (2005) believe that such techniques 
have now reached a level of maturity to be useful in RE support tools for early phase 
RE. Their work recognises how critical ambiguity can be in the early stages of formulat­
ing requirements. They advocate several uses of statistical distribution information for 
addressing this problem.
5.5.1 Sketch Engine
The Sketch Engine is a software package which produces statistical information about 
the distribution of words in a corpus. It accepts input of lemmatised nouns, verbs and 
adjectives. We use two of the key facilities offered by Sketch Engine. The first of these is 
a word sketch facility giving information about the frequency with which words are found 
collocated with each other. The second is a thesaurus giving distributional similarity
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between words.
Word Sketch Facility
The word sketch facility generates lists of word collocations. Each collocation corre­
sponds to a syntactic relationship, such as modification by adjective or prepositional 
phrase. Relationships at a syntactically higher level are also represented, such as those 
between verbs and their subjects and objects. Sketch Engine finds the correct colloca­
tions for a word by use of grammatical patterns (Kilgarriff et al. 2004). This is aided 
by working on a tagged and annotated corpus. Head words of conjuncts can therefore 
be found with more certainty than by looking at an arbitrary window of text around a 
word.
When a lemmatised word is input, a sketch of that word is generated. This sketch 
consists simply of the fists of word collocations. The salience score is given for each 
word in each fist. Salience is calculated from the frequency which the fisted word is 
found collocated in the corpus with the word that was input, and the overall frequencies 
of both words in the corpus: it is “estimated as the product of Mutual Information 
and log frequency” (Kilgarriff and Tugwell 2001). This salience statistic is well-founded 
and avoids the common bias towards overly rare words (Kilgarriff et al. 2004). As an 
example, let us consider a generated fist of nouns that are the objects of the verb kick. 
The words ball, penalty, heel and habit are the words with the highest frequency of 
collocations in this syntactic relationship. Ball is found 108 times as the object of kick 
in the BNC, and has a salience of 40.79. Penalty is found 63 times, but has a salience 
only slightly lower at 37.68.
Parameters for minimum frequency, minimum salience and maximum number of 
words in a fist can be entered. We use a minimum frequency of one and a minimum 
salience of zero throughout, to ensure we get results even for unusual words.
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Thesaurus
The Sketch Engine’s thesaurus measures similarity between any pair of words accord­
ing to the number of corpus contexts they share. In this regard it is a distributional 
thesaurus in the tradition of Sparck-Jones (1986) and Grefenstette (1994). The distrib­
utional similarity that such a thesaurus measures has many useful properties for NLP 
research. It can be calculated quickly on any corpus that has been tagged appropriately. 
This means that it is easily used for texts from any domain. Kilgarriff (2003a) points out 
the advantages that it has over semantic similarity. Thesauruses claiming to capture the 
latter concept often fail to agree with one another, due to the well-known difficulty of 
analysing meaning. They also often introduce unwanted ambiguity by way of their hier­
archical structures or their clustering of words together. Distributional thesauruses, on 
the other hand, avoid such issues by not requiring these error-prone conceptualisations. 
A recent study at disambiguating attachment ambiguities indicates that distributional 
thesauruses perform at least as well semantic thesauruses (Calvo, Gelbukh, and Kilgarriff 
2005).
The Sketch Engine’s thesaurus calculates distributional similarity in the following 
manner. The corpus is parsed, and all triples comprising a grammatical relation and two 
collocates (eg (object, drink, wine) or (modifier, wine, red)), are identified. Contexts are 
shared where the relation and one collocate remain the same. So, (object, drink, wine) 
and (object, drink, beer) count towards the similarity between wine and beer. Shared 
collocates are weighted according to the product of their mutual information, and the 
similarity score is the sum of these weights across all shared collocates. This similarity 
score is the one developed by Lin (1998), based on dependency triples.
121
5.5.2 B ritish  N ational Corpus
The BNC is a modern, largely text-based, corpus containing over 100 million words 
of British English, containing more than 700,000 distinct words (Sawyer, Rayson, and 
Cosh 2005). It is generic, collated from a variety of sources, including some that share 
specialist terminology with our chosen domain. These two factors make information 
obtained from the corpus more robust, in that a large amount of linguistic variation is 
accounted for. The BNC is also synchronic: the non-fiction documents in the BNC are 
from a defined period, 1975 -  1995. Coverage from this time period means that a higher 
proportion of computing documents are represented than would be true for coverage 
from an earlier period.
It theory, the fact that the BNC is mainly British English might present a few 
problems. It is to be expected that most requirements documents are written using 
American spelling. However, the spelling differences between British and American 
English are minor and predictable. Our policy is to look up both spellings of any word 
in the Sketch Engine, and use the version of English that generates the highest scores.
In theory it would be possible to use a specialised corpus of requirements or of docu­
ments relating to computer science and systems engineering. These might provide better 
coverage of the specialised words and expressions on which we require data. However, 
such a corpus would need to be very large to avoid sparseness even with common non­
specialised words. It would also need to be accurately tagged so that statistical data can 
be obtained from it. We are not aware of any sufficiently large and publicly available 
corpora conforming to these criteria.
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5.6 The Heuristics
Here we present the heuristics that we use to predict the human judgements about 
ambiguity that we have gathered. We then briefly discuss other candidate heuristics 
that were not part of our empirical study. Details of the performance of each heuristic 
we use in our empirical study will be given in Chapter 6 .
Most of our successful heuristics use word distribution information obtained from a 
generic corpus, the BNC, using the Sketch Engine. Most of the other heuristics base 
their predictions on information contained within the tagged text itself. When using the 
Sketch Engine, our heuristics use rankings rather than scores, wherever this is appropri­
ate. In similar work, other researchers have considered rankings can be more appropriate. 
For instance, McLauchlan (2004) has found this when using thesauruses to disambiguate 
prepositional phrase attachment ambiguities.
5.6.1 C oordination M atching
This heuristic makes predictions about the preferred interpretations of coordinations by 
looking for the incidence of those coordinations in a generic corpus.
Hypothesis
Our hypothesis here is that if a coordination in our dataset is found commonly in lan­
guage, then that coordination is likely to be a syntactic unit and a coordination-first 
reading is therefore likely. We determine whether it is common in language by finding 
out if it occurs a significant number of times in a generic corpus. The following sentence 
can be used to illustrate this:
I  always eat fish and chips on Friday
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The coordination fish and chips occurs commonly in English. We hypothesise that the 
coordination process will take place first, and the attachment of on Friday will happen 
later. If the phrase fish and chips is found frequently enough, the ambiguity will be 
innocuous.
It is generally not productive to look in a corpus for the exact sequence of words, as 
sparseness will quickly become a problem. Therefore it is preferable to consider just the 
head words of the conjuncts in our coordination examples. We look in the corpus for all 
coordinations of these, ignoring any modifying words that might be interpolated.
Implementation
Sketch Engine’s word sketch facility provides lists of head words of phrases that are 
coordinated with and or or. Using these fists, we search the BNC for the coordinations 
in our dataset. For each coordination, each head word is looked up in turn. The ranking 
of the second head word with the first head word may not be the same as the ranking of 
the first head word with the second head word. This is partly because different words 
simply have different numbers of other words that they are found coordinated with. It 
is also partly because of factors affecting the salience scores. There can be a significant 
difference between the two rankings. The following sentence illustrates this:
The whole kit and kaboodle
Kaboodle is ranked 19th of all the words that are coordinated with kit, but kit is 
the top ranked (and only) word coordinated with kaboodle. (The salience scores are 
10.42 and 9.59 respectively). We want to represent the fact that expressions such as kit 
and kaboodle are firmly established, and we do not wish to discriminate against unusual 
words. Therefore we choose the higher of the two rankings to be the result of the 
coordination match heuristic.
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The word sketch lists do not distinguish between head words coordinated with and 
and those coordinated with or: they lump them all together. (And/or is not considered 
at all). We can test whether the coordinating conjunction used is predictive of whether 
an ambiguity is nocuous or innocuous. If this is found not to be the case, then not 
discriminating coordinations based on the coordinating conjunction they use may be 
acceptable for our task. This is discussed in Section 5.6.8, as one of our unsuccessful 
(lexical) heuristics.
5.6.2 D istributional Sim ilarity
This heuristic predicts the preferred interpretation of coordination ambiguities by look­
ing at the distributional similarity between the head words of the conjuncts of those 
coordinations.
Hypothesis
As explained in 5.5.1, distributional similarity is a measure of the similarity of words 
based on shared context. We measure this between the head words of the conjuncts of 
the coordinations in our dataset. We hypothesise that if the two head words display 
strong distributional similarity, then the conjuncts are likely to be a syntactic unit. This 
hypothesis, based on the idea that thesaurally close words axe often found in conjunction, 
has been suggested by Kilgarriff (2003a)2. In such a case, a coordination-first reading 
is preferred: the conjuncts form a syntactic unit, so the process of coordinating them 
occurs before the attachment of the modifier. If the preference is indicated strongly 
enough, the ambiguity will be innocuous. For example, let us consider the two following 
phrases:
old [ [ boots ] and shoes ]
2Kurohashi and Nagao (1992) and Resnik (1999) have also remarked upon this. However, they prefer 
to consider semantic similarity rather than distributional similarity as the appropriate measure.
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old [ [ boots ] and apples ].
The former more naturally has a coordination-first reading and the latter a coordination- 
last reading. This may be understood experimentally by considering situations in which 
the modifier would be applied to both conjuncts simultaneously. These can be imagined 
for the first phrase but not for the second. Distributional similarity measures reflect this 
fact by determining that boots and shoes, but not boots and apples, occur in the same 
contexts.
In addition to the advantages of distributional similarity already mentioned, it may 
have special suitability for analysing coordinations. For instance, words having opposite 
meaning, such as good and bad, are frequently coordinated:
This system has very [ [ good ] and bad ] aspects
It seems likely that opposites such as these will often be found in the same contexts. For 
this example, it will be the same things that receive qualitative modifications good and 
bad. A distributional thesaurus will therefore indicate that such words have similarity. 
A semantic thesaurus will, however, not indicate this. If any coordinations of opposites 
are found to be read coordination-first, then distributional similarity may be the better 
similarity measure for our purposes. There are words in our dataset, like input and 
output, which have some opposite aspects. These are very strongly perceived to be read 
coordination-first by our judges.
Implementation
For each coordination, the lemmatised head words of the conjuncts are looked up in turn 
in the Sketch Engine’s thesaurus. The thesaurus generates a ranked list of the words 
with which the entered word has distributional similarity. If the other head word is found 
in that list, its ranking is noted. For any given coordination, we may obtain different
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results depending upon which head word we look up. This is similar to the situation 
with the Coordination Matching heuristic, and for the same reasons we use the higher 
of the two rankings as the result of the heuristic.
5.6.3 C ollocation Frequency
This heuristic predicts the preferred interpretations of coordination ambiguities by using 
a generic corpus to determine how frequently each of the head words of conjuncts are 
modified by the modifier. This heuristic differs from the other successful heuristics based 
on word distribution information in that it predicts coordination-last readings.
Hypothesis
We hypothesise that if a modifier is much more frequently collocated in the corpus with 
the coordinated head word that it is nearest to, than it is with the further head word, 
then it is more likely to form a syntactic unit with only the nearest head word. This 
implies that a coordination-last reading is the most likely. This can be demonstrated 
using the following example from our dataset:
[ Reliability and [ security ] J considerations
If security considerations are found much more often in the corpus than reliability con­
siderations, then we say that a coordination-last reading is indicated. If this indication 
is strong enough, the ambiguity is innocuous.
Note, however, that the possibility of finding collocations for many examples of co­
ordination ambiguity will be small due to combinatorial factors. This is illustrated in 
the following example from our dataset:
Facilitate the [ scheduling and [ performing ] J of works
127
No collocations axe found. It could be that there is low likelihood of ever finding works 
associated with either scheduling or performing. However, it is probably more likely 
because the preposition of must be considered as well. The possibility of finding the 
phrase of works as a modifying collocation is much less likely.
Nakov and Hearst (2005) and Rus, Moldovan, and Bolohan (2002) had some success 
using collocation frequencies in tasks similar to ours. However, they have a much more 
narrowly defined dataset containing only noun coordinations. Prom an RE perspective, 
Maarek and Berry (1989) have used lexical affinities to find abstractions in requirements 
documents. The way they use lexical affinities is very similar to our use of collocation 
frequencies. They do, however, permit a longer distance between words with lexical 
affinity than we do between words with collocation frequency.
Implementation
Using the word sketch facility’s collocation fists, we find the frequencies in the BNC with 
which the modifier in each sentence is collocated with each of the conjuncts’ head words. 
There are collocation fists for most relationships that a word can have with a modifier. 
These include situations where the modifier is an adjective, noun, particle, predicate, 
possessive, adverb, the head word of all types of prepositional phrases, and others.
Although the modifier is often adjacent to the conjunct head word, there can be other 
words interposed between the two. The Sketch Engine’s grammatical patterns should 
account for this, and enable a non-adjacent modifier to be considered as a collocation. 
For any word sketch, the Sketch Engine provides a concordance of the actual sentences 
it has located containing the input word. Upon inspection of this concordance, non- 
adjacent modifiers are found with encouraging regularity.
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5.6.4 M orphology
This heuristic attempts to capture the morphology of the head words of the conjuncts 
of coordination ambiguities. It uses this to predict how these ambiguities should be 
interpreted.
Hypothesis
The inflectional morphology of English consists largely of suffixes. These include -ed to 
indicate past tense, -ing to indicate a progressive action, -s to indicate a plural, and so 
on. The derivational morphology of English is more complex, but suffixes are also very 
common. For instance, -ation creates a noun from a verb, -able creates an adjective 
from a verb and -ise (or -ize) makes a verb from a noun.
For these reasons it makes sense to compare trailing characters of the head words of 
conjuncts, as a first step to exploring how morphology might predict preferred readings 
of coordinations. If the two head words have the same specified number of trailing 
characters, then they are likely to be morphologically similar.
We hypothesise that if the head words of conjuncts end with the same characters then 
a coordination-first reading is preferred. This is because similarities in inflection will be 
captured. Words that are similar in this way will be more likely to form a syntactic unit. 
This theory follows on from Okumura and Muraki’s (1994) notion of using syntactic 
parallelism as a method of disambiguating coordinations. The idea can be seen in the 
following sentence taken from our dataset:
It will be [ implemented and [ executed ] ] on th e   vlatform
Intuitively, if the morphology of the head word furthest from the modifier (implemented) 
were different, for example if it were implementable, then a coordination-first interpre­
tation would be a less natural.
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The morphology of English is simple compared to that of many other languages. 
The results of this heuristic might therefore be dramatically different depending on 
the language used. However, the principle of syntactic parallelism might be considered 
applicable to all human language.
Implementation
To implement our morphology hypothesis, we simply attempt to match an equal number 
of trailing characters from the head words of the conjuncts. A minimum of one character 
is used, which may capture morphology such as plural endings, though it will more likely 
capture noise. A maximum of 6 letters is used, since the possibility of capturing English 
morphology becomes vanishingly small with consideration of any greater number.
5.6.5 Phrase Length D ifference
This heuristic captures the lengths of the conjuncts of a coordination, in terms of num­
bers of words. It attempts to predict preferred readings of coordination ambiguities by 
comparing these.
Hypothesis
Schepman and Rodway (2000) examine the effect of prosodic boundaries on coordination 
disambiguation, using a similar test case to ours. Although their work is on spoken 
language, aspects of prosody such as numbers of syllables and words can also affect 
the way written language is interpreted. This might be due to the human capacity of 
processing only a limited number of linguistic units at one time. Also in support of this 
is the idea that sentences are read in chunks. The initial purpose of chunking was to 
model prosodic structure (Abney 1995). It aims to give a representation of how words 
are actually grouped together in a reader’s mind. It is therefore a suitable model for
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thinking about the natural boundaries that occur in language.
We apply these ideas to the lengths of conjuncts in coordinations. Coordinating 
conjunctions, broadly speaking, yoke things of equal “status” (Jurafsky and Martin 
2000). We hypothesise that when processing the structure of the sentence, readers will be 
more inclined to consider chunks of the same length to be equal in status. We hypothesise 
that if the conjuncts of a coordination are equal in length, then a coordination-first 
reading will be the most likely. Conversely, increasing disparity between their lengths 
will indicate increasing likelihood of a coordination-last reading.
Implementation
To test this hypothesis we simply count and compare the numbers of words in the 
conjuncts. No account is made of numbers of syllables or characters. (If English used 
compounding more frequently, resulting in more diverse word lengths, then this might 
be an preferable strategy.) Also, no account is made of which conjunct is the longer. 
The result returned by the heuristic is the number of words of the longer conjunct minus 
the number of words of the shorter one.
5.6.6 N oun N um ber A greem ent
This heuristic uses number agreement between nouns to predict how coordination ambi­
guities should be interpreted. It requires that the head words of conjuncts are nouns. Its 
coverage overlaps with the morphology heuristic, as noun number is usually indicated by 
suffixes, but it is more specific. It is an investigation into Resnik’s (1999) claims about 
the importance of number agreement when determining how noun coordinations should 
be read. Coordinations of nouns generally make up the great majority of coordinations, 
and this is also the case for our dataset.
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Hypothesis
Resnik devises heuristics for disambiguating constructions that are coordinations of 
nouns and also have only nouns as their modifier — in other words of the form nounl 
coord noun2 nounS. He can therefore compare noun number between all three of these 
nouns. This allows the use of rules that clearly indicate preferred bracketings, as demon­
strated in the following examples:
Several [ business and university ] arouvs
Several businesses and [ university J grows
We do not have such a narrowly defined dataset. We have sufficient noun coordinations 
to warrant a noun number heuristic, but not sufficient of these have a noun modifier 
to warrant implementation of Resnik’s heuristics. Also, Resnik’s examples appear to 
contain elements that would contravene our single structure criteria.
We therefore look simply at number agreement between the head words of the con­
juncts of a coordination. A noun coordination can be of two singular nouns, two plurals, 
or one of each. The first two situations represent noun number agreement, the third sit­
uation represents lack of agreement. Adapting Resnik’s example, the following sentence 
indicates why noun number agreement of conjuncts alone may be a weaker indicator of 
preferred readings:
We are targeting [ businesses and [ universities ] ] in this town
However, number agreement is still a measure of similarity. As with distributional 
similarity, we wish to discover if this is a useful predictor of coordination-first readings 
— and if lack of it predicts coordination-last readings. If such predictions are found 
to be sufficiently strong for an ambiguity, then this will indicate that the ambiguity is 
innocuous.
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Implementation
To test whether noun number plays a part in the interpretation of coordination ambigu­
ities, we manually determine whether the head word of each conjunct of nouns is single 
or plural. When evaluating this heuristic, we consider its performance to be only on the 
sentences in the dataset that are noun coordinations.
5.6.7 M ass/C ount
This heuristic captures whether coordinated nouns are mass or count, and uses this 
information to determine how the coordination containing them should be read. I t’s 
coverage overlaps to some extent with the Noun Number heuristic — and to a lesser 
extent with the Morphology heuristic. This is because true mass nouns are always 
singular, and that fact will generally be captured by those heuristics. However, they will 
not capture many differences between singular nouns, such as whether they are mass or 
count.
Hypothesis
The distinction between mass and count is one obvious type of noun subcategorisa­
tion in English. Coordinations of words with different subcategorisations can sound 
incongruous or unlikely, implying that alternative readings which assign identical sub­
categorisations to those words are generally preferred. Plenty of counterexamples exist, 
but the mass/count distinction may be a particularly significant indication of preferred 
readings of ambiguities, as shown in following sentence:
I  drink [ water and [ a pint ] ] at lunchtime
We hypothesise that coordinations of nouns that are either definitely both mass or 
definitely both count — a situation we term unequivocal agreement — will be more 
likely to be read coordination-first. Where there is the possibility that one or both of
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the nouns can be either mass or count — a situation we term equivocal agreement — we 
predict that the indication will be weaker. If either type of agreement is found to make 
sufficiently strong prediction for an ambiguity, then this will indicate that the ambiguity 
is innocuous.
Implementation
We determine manually whether each head word of a noun coordination is mass, count or 
either. When evaluating this heuristic, we consider its performance only on the sentences 
in the dataset that are noun coordinations.
5.6.8 O ther Candidate H euristics
We evaluated several other heuristics to see if they could predict coordination-first or 
coordination-last interpretations, and therefore innocuous ambiguity. These looked rea­
sonable in theory, but most did not demonstrate predictive power in our experiments. 
The semantic similarity heuristic is the exception, in that we replaced it with another 
heuristic.
Semantic Similarity
The only other heuristic with which we achieved limited success in preliminary studies 
(Chantree, Nuseibeh, de Roeck, and Willis 2005) used a simple metric of semantic sim­
ilarity. This was based on the closeness of the coordinated head words to their lowest 
common ancestor in hierarchies of WordNet hypernyms. Similar use of semantic similar­
ity has been used with some success for disambiguating coordinations (Resnik 1999). We 
achieved weak prediction of coordination-first interpretations. Kilgarriff (2003a) claims 
that distributional similarity is for many NLP tasks preferable to, and substitutable for, 
semantic similarity. We have therefore preferred to develop our heuristic based on the
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former notion in preference to, and in place of, a heuristic based on the latter notion. 
O rthography
Several aspects of word appearance suggest themselves as indicators of preferred readings 
of coordination ambiguities. The orthography heuristic that held most promise for us 
was based on named entity recognition. We hypothesised that if the two head words of 
the conjuncts begin with a capital letter, but the modifier does not, then a coordination- 
first reading is preferred. This is because capitalisation of the first letters of a group 
of words indicates they they are a named entity and therefore form a syntactic unit. 
(Note that this would not be the same as the second orthographic criterion discussed in 
Section 5.2.1. The situation is less clear-cut: it is always possible that each conjunct is 
a named entity and the uncapitalised modifier attaches to just one of them.)
This hypothesis is demonstrated in the following phrase from our dataset:
more sovhisticated [ [ Capacity ] and Coverage ]
If the head word furthest from the modifier does not begin with a capital letter, then 
the sentence is not so clearly interpreted coordination-first. However, there were not 
sufficient examples such as this in our dataset to test whether this heuristic is an effective 
predictor.
Lexical H euristics
We tested several lexically-based heuristics, but none appeared to have significant power 
at predicting preferred readings of coordination ambiguities. In our dataset, neither the 
part of speech of the modifier nor the part of speech of the head words indicated preferred 
interpretations.
The same was true of the actual word used as a coordinating conjunction: and and 
or displayed similar prediction characteristics. (This has significance for the validity of
135
Heuristic
Results
Designation in Dataset
innocuous nocuous total
predict 
-i predict
True Positives (TP) False Positives (FP) 
False Negatives (FN) True Negatives (TN)
(W)
(X)
total (Y) (Z) (T)
Table 5.5: Contingency matrix for deriving evaluation measures
our Coordination Matching heuristic. When generating the lists used by this heuristic, 
Sketch Engine does not distinguish between coordinations using and and those using or. 
An and in the dataset may therefore be mismatched with an or in the lists, and vice 
versa. However, the similar prediction characteristics we have found between and and 
or implies that this may not be a problem. Which coordinating conjunction is used in 
a sentence may have little effect on the results of our Coordination Matching heuristic.)
5.7 Evaluation
Here we present the measures and statistics that we use to evaluate the performance 
and validity of our techniques. Our gold standard in all cases is human perception of 
ambiguity. First we present the statistics which we use to evaluate individual heuristics. 
These, along with the use of cut-offs, demonstrate how innocuous ambiguity can be 
optimally determined. We then introduce ROC curves, which we use to test the overall 
validity of each heuristic as a diagnostic test. Then we present the methods we use to 
combine our heuristics’ predictions. Firstly we use a simple disjunction method that 
demonstrates transparently how effective the heuristics are in combination. Secondly, 
we use a more advanced statistical model using all the heuristics’ data simultaneously. 
The advantages and disadvantages of alternative methods are also discussed.
5.7.1 Perform ance M easures for th e Individual H euristics
We evaluate and optimise the performance of our individual heuristics using measures 
of precision, recall, fallout and accuracy. We combine precision and recall using an f-
136
measure evaluation. These calculations are commonly used in information retrieval and 
statistical NLP (Manning and Schiitze 1999). We use these measures when implementing 
the Weighted Method. We use the Weighted Method to demonstrate the individual 
performance of each heuristic and how this can be maximised. We also use recall and 
fallout to create ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curves. The ROC curves give an 
overall appreciation of how effective the heuristics are as diagnostic tests of innocuous 
ambiguity. In doing this they also test the validity of the hypotheses on which the 
heuristics are founded. We use accuracy when implementing the Flexible Method and 
the Purely Unacknowledged Method.
All the measures discussed here are ultimately derived using the contingency matrix 
in Table 5.5. The individual heuristics are evaluated on their ability to predict innocuous 
ambiguities. This is because the heuristics naturally predict innocuous ambiguities: they 
attempt to predict that an ambiguity has a single reading. We wish to determine how 
successful they are at this. Of the measures we present here, accuracy is the only one that 
indicates more than ability at predicting innocuous ambiguity: it also factors in ability 
at predicting nocuous ambiguity. For this reason it is not used to evaluate the individual 
heuristics. We use it, however, to evaluate them in combination, as this demonstrates 
the overall efficacy of our technique.
Basic Measures
Precision for a heuristic is the proportion of its predictions of innocuous ambiguity that 
are correct. Recall for a heuristic is the proportion of innocuous ambiguities that it 
predicts. Fallout for a heuristic is the proportion of nocuous ambiguities that it wrongly 
predicts to be innocuous. Accuracy for a heuristic is the proportion of all the predictions 
it makes (both innocuous and nocuous) that are correct. In other words, using the 
abbreviations used in Table 5.5:
137
Precision = True Positives T PwTrue Positives +  False Positives
Recall = True Positives TP~Y~True Positives +  False Negatives
Fallout — False Positives FPZFalse Positives +  True Negatives
Accuracy = True Positives +  True Negatives T P  + T N  
TTotal Number of Examples
Precision is much more important to us than recall: we wish each heuristic to indicate 
reliably how any given coordination should be read. We do not wish it to make a lot 
of suggestions which may be questionable, thereby inspiring doubt. Also, the heuristics’ 
predictive powers can be combined by using the heuristics as a suite of techniques. Good 
recall may thereby be achieved if the heuristics have complementary coverage of the data. 
Many coordinations will then be disambiguated with good precision. Fallout is useful for 
evaluating collateral damage: in our case, coordinations that are judged to be innocuous 
when in fact they are nocuous. This is the most dangerous scenario, and wish to avoid 
this as far as possible. We use fallout, together with recall, to create ROC curves.
F-Measure
However, high precision with trivial recall would render our techniques rather pointless. 
We therefore employ measures to combine the two, but with precision prioritised. We 
use the commonly-used weighted f-measure statistic (van Rijsbergen 1979) to combine 
precision and recall:
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_ , ,  (1 + P2) * Precision * Recall
F-MeaSUIe =  p .  Precision +  Recall
A weighting of (3 = 1 will give equal weight to precision and recall; a weighting of j3 =
0.5 is commonly used, for example (Ishioka 2003), to ensure that true positives are not 
obtained at the expense of also obtaining too many false positives. We use a weighting of 
/3 = 0.25, even more strongly in favour of precision. In line with our policy of achieving 
high precision and complementary recall, we aim to maximise the f-measure for all our 
heuristics.
Cut-Offs
We employ a cut-off when evaluating each individual heuristic in order to maximise its 
performance. Results up to and including the cut-off are considered to predict innocuous 
ambiguity; those beyond the cut-off are considered to predict nocuous ambiguity. This 
means that innocuous ambiguity is predicted by results either no smaller or no greater 
than the cut-off, depending on the heuristic. The cut-offs are found experimentally for 
each heuristic. The optimal cut-off chosen for any heuristic is the one that optimises the 
weighted f-measure statistic.
ROC Curves
ROC curves are the evaluation measure of choice in some fields of engineering (Manning 
and Schiitze 1999). They are also commonly used for evaluating diagnostics in medicine 
(Zhou, McClish, and Obuchowski 2002). They measure how good a diagnostic test 
is, representing the trade-off between the sensitivity (represented by recall) and the 
specificity (represented by fallout) of that test. A good diagnostic test is one that has 
small fallout and high recall rates across a range of cut-off values. A bad diagnostic test
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is one where the only cut-offs that give low fallout cannot produce high recall, and vice 
versa.
We measure how effective a heuristic is as a diagnostic of innocuous ambiguity by 
measuring the area under the ROC curve. Fallout is plotted on the x-axis and recall on 
the y-axis. The larger this area, the better the heuristic is as a diagnostic. The baseline 
of a ROC curve graph is a straight line representing equal trade-off between sensitivity 
and specificity — running from the bottom left corner to the top right corner. The 
baseline of a ROC curve graph is therefore always 50%. The closer the ROC curve is to 
the baseline, the worse the heuristic is as a diagnostic of innocuous ambiguity — little 
better than flipping a coin.
We produce ROC curves using all the cut-offs that we use for evaluating our heuris­
tics. The area under each curve therefore measures the overall effectiveness of a heuristic 
at predicting innocuous ambiguity, without any attempt at tuning it in order to max­
imise performance. This measurement also validates (or not) the hypothesis underlying 
the heuristic. It is for this reason that we use ROC curves to demonstrate prediction 
of innocuous ambiguity. The hypotheses underlying the heuristics assert that a certain 
reading of an ambiguity is the preferred one if certain criteria are fulfilled. The heuristics 
naturally predict innocuous ambiguity as a result of this. We therefore use measurements 
of recall and fallout based only on prediction of innocuous ambiguity. (Using accuracy, 
factoring in prediction of nocuous ambiguity, would make the validation of the hypothe­
ses less clear.)
These are the most important conclusions we take from our ROC graphs, but they 
are not the whole story. A heuristic may still be useful, even though its ROC curve 
demonstrates indifferent power as a diagnostic test. ROC curves also demonstrate the 
variability of a heuristic’s performance around the baseline. By using a heuristic opti­
mally, we hope it will perform at the point where its ROC curve is highest above the
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baseline. Such optimisation is achieved using the cut-offs, or the regression modelling 
introduced in the next section.
5.7.2 Statistics to  Com bine H euristics
The predictive powers of our heuristics can be combined in various ways. These include 
machine learning, straightforward combinatorial approaches and statistical models. We 
first explain briefly our reasons for not using the first of these in this research, then we 
describe the two techniques we have used: a simple disjunction approach and logistic 
regression.
Machine learning algorithms can be used to combine predictions. This idea has 
attracted the attention of requirements engineers for a decade or so (Spanoudakis, d’Avila 
Garcez, and Zisman 2003). However, the number of features that we can muster —
i.e. the number of heuristics — is much less than the minimum normally considered 
appropriate (Forman 2003). We experimented with machine learning algorithms, such 
as lazy learning (Daelemans et al. 2003) and decision tree (Quinlan 1992), but decided 
that they were not best suited to our task.
Combination Using Disjunction
In this method we simply say that the combined heuristics are considered to predict 
innocuous ambiguity if any one of the individual heuristics gives a positive result.This 
increases the recall of our combined heuristics, if they have complementary coverage. We 
hypothesise that it will be partly true that each heuristic measures something different. 
However, there is bound to be some overlap. For instance, the difference in the frequency 
ratios captured by the collocation frequency heuristic is to some extent a measure of 
distributional dissimilarity.
Note that we cannot use conjunction rather than disjunction to combine our heuris­
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tics. This would require saying instead that the combined heuristics predict innocuous 
ambiguity only if all of them give a positive result. This is because some heuristics pre­
dict coordination-first readings and others predict coordination-last readings, and they 
would be negating each other in such an arrangement.
Logistic Regression
The other method we use to combine and optimise our heuristics’ predictive power is 
linear logistic regression. We use this method when implementing the Flexible Method, 
to determine our combined heuristics’ power at discriminating between nocuous and in­
nocuous ambiguity. We also use it similarly when evaluating unacknowledged ambiguity. 
Logistic regression is a statistic often offered by machine learning packages. It is the most 
suitable metric for us as it can be used to model a dependent variable that is dichoto- 
mous and independent variables that are of various types. The dependent variable in 
our case is the human judgement of nocuousness: the consensus of our judges opinions, 
taking the ambiguity threshold into account, as to whether an ambiguity is considered 
nocuous. The independent variables are the heuristics. Instead of using cut-off points 
we put the actual results returned by the heuristics into these variables. These variables 
can be continuous (Coordination Matching, Distributional Similarity and Collocation 
Frequency) or categorical (Morphology, Phrase-length, Mass/Count and Noun-Number) 
— the last named variable is also dichotomous.
The aim of this approach is to fit the linear logistic regression model to our data. 
The form of the model for our seven heuristics is:
In ^ = ct + PiXi +  P2X 2 +  {$3X 3 +  P4 X 4 +  P5X 5 +  PqXq +  P7X 7 
p is the probability of there being a consensus of our human judges saying that the
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ambiguity is innocuous. The X n values are the results returned by each of the heuristics 
(the independent variables). The /3n values are the coefficients that, along with the 
intersect a , balance the equation.
We utilise the LogitBoost algorithm (Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani 2000) to 
fit the model to the data. This algorithm operates iteratively, automatically selecting 
independent variables and only including those that improve the performance of the 
model on unseen cases. We use LogitBoost to find the maximum likelihood linear logistic 
model, using least squares regression and operating in a forward stage-wise manner 
(Landwehr, Hall, and Frank 2003).
This procedure is implemented using the WEKA machine learning algorithms de­
veloped at University of Waikato ( http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/) (Witten and Frank 
2005).
5.8 Avoiding Bias and Inappropriateness
We focus here on two ways in which we can ensure that the results we obtain are 
appropriate and not misleading. Firstly, it is important that we minimise any data- 
specific bias in our results. Succeeding at this will show that our heuristics can be 
applied to unseen data as well as to our dataset. Secondly, we also wish to ensure that 
we use appropriate ambiguity thresholds, when these are implemented.
We explain the cross-validation process we use to avoid bias and overfitting in our re­
sults. We discuss this mainly in relation to implementation using the Weighted Method. 
We use this method to demonstrate the performance of the individual heuristics and 
their underlying hypotheses. The other methods modelled using the WEKA machine 
learning package, have a less transparent process. Then we discuss the choice of ap­
propriate ambiguity thresholds. This includes a discussion of how they might be used 
appropriately to optimise results.
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5.8.1 Cross-Validation
We employ ten-fold cross-validation to ensure that any statistics obtained from our data 
are not unduly biased. This technique avoids the problem of generating statistics that 
are specific to a certain view of the dataset. This problem can result in overfitting, 
whereby the statistics are trained to perform well for a particular dataset but not for 
unseen data. Ten-fold cross-validation is recognised as an accurate and efficient method 
for datasets of sizes such as ours (Weiss and Kulikowski 1991). Our Weighted Method 
requires that we perform ten-fold cross-validation manually. We describe below how 
we perform this cross-validation, in conjunction with optimisation of the cut-offs. For 
the Flexible and Unacknowledged Methods, we use the ten-fold cross-validation facility 
offered by the WEKA machine learning package. This process is automatic, so we do 
not discuss it here.
When using the Weighted Method, our dataset is first randomly sorted. This re­
moves bias caused by the order in which the sentences were collected. Then it is split 
into ten equal parts. Nine of the parts are concatenated to form the training set. This 
is used to find the optimal cut-off for each heuristic. These cut-offs are found experi­
mentally. The heuristics are then run on the heldout tenth part, known as the test set, 
using those optimal cut-offs. This procedure is carried out ten times, using a different 
heldout part each time and concatenating the other nine parts to form a new training 
set. The performances on all the ten different heldout parts are then averaged to give 
the performances of the heuristics.
Some researchers prefer to use three datasets, in what the machine learning commu­
nity often refers to as a training and validation set approach (Mitchell 1997). (It is also 
used in neural network methods (Ripley 1996); the terminology, however, can sometimes 
be used differently in different disciplines). In addition to training and test sets, a vali­
dation set is used. Like the training set, this is set of seen data. This extra set generally
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acts as a method of tuning the parameters that have been chosen as a result of using the 
training set. This technique adds another guard against overfitting and can be a way 
of increasing the reliability statistical data. In the work presented here, we could have 
presented analysis of our process of selecting heuristics, followed by analysis of how we 
optimised them. Training and validation sets could have been used respectively to do 
this — with the test set still providing the statistics on unseen data. However, we did 
not utilise a third dataset for two reasons. Firstly, we do not have a large dataset, and 
it is known that the validation set should be large enough to provide a suitable sample 
(Mitchell 1997). Secondly, by using the same set of data for both training and validation 
purposes, we can evaluate the interaction between the heuristics when they are used in 
combination. This would not be possible if different heuristics were used on the different 
sets.
5.8.2 Appropriate A m biguity Thresholds
In deciding which combination of judgements make an ambiguity nocuous or nocuous, 
certain ambiguity thresholds should not be used, even if they appear to allow for good 
performance by the heuristics. For instance, with a threshold of 50%, no consensus 
among the judges is required for determining either nocuous or innocuous ambiguity. It 
seems to us that a minimum level of certainty should be higher than this. The upper 
limit of the ambiguity threshold is harder to judge. Using an ambiguity threshold of 80% 
will allow for three of our seventeen judges giving minority verdicts. This is arguably an 
acceptable accommodation of overly-cautious judgements and rogue judgements.
Implementing ambiguity thresholds as a policy decision, as recommended in Sec­
tion 5.4.1, is not the only way of using them appropriately. They can be used to optimise 
performance. Users might prefer to set an ambiguity threshold that gives the best pos­
sible performance from our heuristics. This would then require that authors and readers
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are persuaded to check ambiguities with a diligence that bore this in mind. To optimise 
overall performance, a different ambiguity threshold can be set for each heuristic and 
for each iteration of the cross-validation exercise. Using this approach, we have achieved 
good performance from heuristics similar to those presented here (Chantree, Willis, Kil- 
garriff, and de Roeck 2006). However, this method does not best implement and test the 
model of ambiguity presented in this thesis. Therefore we do not present results based 
on this use of ambiguity thresholds.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter we have described how we implement the ideas contained in our language 
model. This has involved building a specialist corpus from which we can extract real- 
world ambiguities of the same type and structure for use as our test data. We have then 
described how judgements on these ambiguities were obtained by asking the opinions of 
a carefully selected group of people. We then described the different methods that we use 
to distinguish nocuous from innocuous ambiguities. This included the key concept of the 
ambiguity threshold, which establishes the dividing line between the two classifications. 
Next, we introduced the heuristics used to predict the judgements in our dataset. This 
involved describing the tools they use, the ways they are evaluated, and the methods 
used to ensure that their results are appropriate and unbiased.
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Chapter 6
Empirical Study
This empirical study was conducted in order to test two main hypotheses. The first 
is that nocuous ambiguity exists to a significant extent when human judgements are 
considered. The second is that the distinction between nocuous and innocuous ambiguity 
can be predicted automatically using heuristics. We first describe the dataset that we 
created in order to test our hypotheses. Then we present the results of our heuristics 
on this dataset. The results, and our discussion of them, are presented for each of the 
three methods we use for determining nocuous ambiguity. The results of the Weighted 
Method are given first. This section is also used to present the general efficacy of each 
heuristic. This is followed by results using the Flexible Method, then those when only 
unacknowledged ambiguity is considered.
6.1 The D ataset
Our dataset is composed of sentences containing coordination ambiguities that conform 
to our test case criteria, together with judgements on them regarding their interpretation. 
Here we discuss the characteristics of the sentences we use from the corpus and the 
distribution of the judgements on these sentences.
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Head
Word
% of 
Total
Example from Questionnaires
Noun
Verb
Adjective
85.5
13.8
0.7
Communication and performance reauirements 
Proceed to enter and verifv the data 
It is verv common and ubiquitous
Table 6.1: Breakdown of sentences by head word type (head words are underlined)
Modi­
fier
% of 
Total
Example from Questionnaires
Noun 46.4 ( It ) targeted the project and election managers
Adjective 23.2 .... define architectural components and connectors
Prep 15.9 Facilitate the scheduling and performing of works
Verb 5.8 capacity and network resources required
Adverb 4.4 ( It ) might be automatically rejected or flagged
Relative Clause 2.2 Assumptions and dependencies that are of importance
Number 0.7 zero mean values and standard deviation
Other 1.4 increased by the lack of funding and local resources
Table 6.2: Breakdown of sentences by modifier type (modifiers are underlined)
6.1.1 T he A m biguity Questionnaires
We located a total of 639 sentences containing and, or or and/or in our RE corpus, some 
of which contained more than one instance of these words. From these we extracted 138 
sentences. Each one of these contains one multiple structure coordination ambiguity 
conforming to our test case criteria, as set out in Section 4.1.2. A breakdown of these 
sentences by the part of speech of the head words of the conjuncts is given in Table 6.1. 
A breakdown by the part of speech of the external modifier is given in Table 6.2.
The sentences were divided up into four separate questionnaires, formulated as de­
scribed in Section 5.3.2. These questionnaires were shown to seventeen judges, who were 
selected as described in Section 5.3.3. The 138 sentences are presented in Appendix B; 
the instructions are presented in Appendix A.
6.1.2 T he Judgem ents
A breakdown of the judgements on the sentences is given in Table 6.3. Less than 1% 
of judgements were absent or spoiled, and these omissions were spread across sentences
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Judgement No. of Judgements Percentage of Total
Coordination Last 583 24.851
Coordination First 951 40.537
Ambiguous 791 33.717
(Missing or Spoiled) 21 0.895
Total 2346 100
Table 6.3: Breakdown of the judgements in the dataset
and judges. We ignore these as they represent such a small percentage. We use totals of 
all the other judgements as the base figures for all our calculations. The average number 
of judgements for each sentence is 16.845.
6.2 Predictions Using W eighted M ethod
Here we present the results of our heuristics when using the Weighted Method to dis­
tinguish nocuous from innocuous ambiguity. We use this method to demonstrate the 
performance and characteristics of the individual heuristics. To reiterate, we use this 
method to demonstrate how our heuristics predict innocuous ambiguity. This is what 
they predict naturally. We therefore wish to see how they can do it most effectively, 
so we can judge the hypotheses that they implement. It is useful to use this method 
for this purpose, as it gives total control over the optimisation of the heuristics. We 
can therefore explain how and when they can achieve optimal performance. Also, this 
method is not complicated by the added variable of flexible ambiguity thresholds.
All the baselines used for this method are obtained by assuming that all ambiguities 
are innocuous. This gives a precision baseline of 54.3% and a f-measure baseline of 
55.8%. The recall baseline is 100%, as all innocuous ambiguities have predicted. Only 
the precision baseline is plotted on the graphs for the individual heuristics: the f-measure 
baseline is very close to it, and plotting it would make the graphs hard to read.
For each heuristic, we present performance over a range of cut-offs. A cut-off is a 
ranking (or other measure) which is the highest (or lowest) point at which a heuristic is
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considered to predict innocuous ambiguity. The results for the individual heuristics are 
calculated prior to cross-validation. This is done because we wish to compare perfor­
mance between different cut-offs, and view the prediction trends across these ranges. We 
cannot claim therefore that these results are necessarily valid for unseen data, but we 
hope to gain insight into the heuristics’ behaviour in this way. We present worked exam­
ples of four heuristics found to be effective using the Weighted Method. These examples 
illustrate how the judgements on a sentence create acknowledged and unacknowledged 
ambiguity and how a heuristic predicts this. All calculations using the Weighted Method 
require knowledge of the average unacknowledged ambiguity over all the sentences in our 
dataset. This is calculated as described in Table 5.4 on page 115, and is 15.3%.
Then we provide ROC curves to show the overall effectiveness of each individual 
heuristic as a predictor. As explained in Section 5.7, the area under a ROC curve 
represents the power of a heuristic as a diagnostic test without any training. It is to 
be hoped that this area exceeds 50% of the graph, which is the baseline for all ROC 
curve graphs. In this exercise the area under the curve demonstrates a heuristic’s power 
at predicting innocuous coordination ambiguity. It therefore tests the validity of the 
hypothesis underlying a heuristic. A ROC curve showing indifferent power as a diagnostic 
test does not necessarily prove that the heuristic is worthless, however. The variability 
of the heuristic’s performance around a baseline is also significant. By using a heuristic 
optimally, we hope to use it at the point where its ROC curve is highest above the 
baseline.
We then combine the heuristics found to be effective using the Weighted Method. 
Results for these both before and after application of cross-validation are presented. This 
is followed by a discussion of these results.
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6.2.1 C oordination M atching
Here we present the results achieved by the Coordination Matching heuristic on our 
dataset. This heuristic was introduced in Section 5.6.1. We present a worked example 
of its effectiveness when nocuous ambiguity has been determined using the Weighted 
Method. We then evaluate the heuristic and the hypothesis underlying it.
Example
We obtain the rankings of matching coordinations obtained from the BNC by Sketch 
Engine. For this heuristic, we evaluate cut-offs for these rankings in multiples of 5. We 
use the following sentence from our dataset to illustrate this heuristic:
Security and Privacy Requirements
Of the 17 judges, 4 judged this sentence to be ambiguous, 12 judged it to be coordination- 
first and 1 judged it to be coordination-last. As the number of ambiguous judgements 
is not larger than the numbers of either of the other two types of judgement, this co­
ordination is not an acknowledged ambiguity. The quotient unacknowledged ambiguity, 
calculated as described in Table 5.4 on page 115, is 1/13 =  7.7%. This is below the 
average unacknowledged ambiguity (15.3%), so this sentence is not an unacknowledged 
ambiguity. Neither of the criteria for being nocuous have been fulfilled, so this ambiguity 
is innocuous.
Privacy is the 19th highest match for Security, and Security is the 8th highest match 
for Privacy. Following our decision to not penalise coordinations involving unusual words 
(see Section 5.6.1), 8 is the result returned by this heuristic on this coordination. Our 
result is within all the ranking cut-offs except 5. The heuristic therefore yields a positive 
result for all the cut-offs except 5. For this requirement, this heuristic gives a true 
positive result for all our cut-offs above 5.
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Innocuous Ambiguity
Figure 6-1: Coordination Matching Heuristic
Results
The results that we obtained using our Coordination Matching heuristic on our dataset 
axe shown in Figure 6-1. As can be seen, precision in excess of 20 percentage points is 
achieved above the baseline of 54.3%. F-measure in excess of 15 percentage points above 
the f-measure baseline 55.8% and a maximum recall of 40% are achieved. Recall steadily 
increases as coordinations of increasingly lower rank from the BNC are considered to 
indicate innocuous ambiguity. However, precision decreases after more than the top 
20 are considered. Precision is highest when only the top 5 ranked matches from the 
BNC indicate innocuous ambiguity. But it is very seldom that the head words of any 
coordination in our dataset are found so frequently as a coordination in the BNC. This 
is indicated by the low recall at that cut-off.
When implementing cross-validation, different cut-offs maximise the f-measure for 
different folds of the process. A maximum of 25 matches is optimal for 7 of the iterations 
and a maximum of 20 matches is optimal for the other 3.
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Figure 6-2: Coordination Matching heuristic ROC curve
Evaluation
The performance of this heuristic indicates that it is a useful and consistent predictor of 
innocuous ambiguity. If the f-measure was less strongly weighted in favour of precision, 
it might indicate better performance at higher cut-offs. However, the precision would 
be somewhat compromised. We require that precision be prioritised in order to inspire 
confidence in the heuristic.
The ROC curve for this heuristic is shown in Figure 6-2. The area under the ROC 
curve is 62.2%; the baseline is 50%. The predictive power of this heuristic is therefore
12.2 percentage points better than that of a test with no ability at predicting innocuous 
ambiguity. This goes some way to proving the hypothesis upon which the Coordination 
Matching heuristic is based. Namely, it demonstrates that if a coordination in our 
dataset is found a significant number of times in a generic corpus then it is more likely 
to be a syntactic unit. A coordination-first reading is therefore likely. If this likelihood 
is sufficiently strong, the ambiguity will be innocuous.
The ROC curve is always above the baseline. This indicates that the heuristic is
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consistently a good predictor of innocuous ambiguity over the cut-offs we have considered.
6.2.2 D istributional Sim ilarity
Here we present the results achieved on our dataset by the Distributional Similarity 
heuristic. This heuristic was introduced in Section 5.6.2. We present a worked example 
of its effectiveness when nocuous ambiguity is determined using the Weighted Method. 
We then evaluate the heuristic and the hypothesis underlying it.
Example
We obtain the rankings of the distributional similarity of words from the Sketch Engine’s 
thesaurus. Experimentation has shown us that the predictive power of distributional 
similarity decreases in a log-linear manner the more matches are considered. We therefore 
consider the logs of the numbers of matches obtained from Sketch Engine’s thesaurus 
as cut-off points. We evaluate these cut-offs in multiples of 0.5. We use the following 
sentence from our dataset to illustrate this heuristic:
Definition of electrical characteristics and interfaces
Of the 17 judges, 9 judged this sentence to be ambiguous, 4 judged it to be coordination- 
first and 4 judged it to be coordination-last. As 9 is greater than 4, this sentence is an 
acknowledged ambiguity. The percentage unacknowledged ambiguity is 4/8 =  50%. This 
is greater than the average unacknowledged ambiguity (15.3%), so the sentence is also 
an unacknowledged ambiguity. On both counts this ambiguity is nocuous.
No matches between characteristic and interface are found in the thesaurus. The 
Distributional Similarity heuristic therefore predicts that the coordination ambiguity in 
this sentence is never innocuous. This heuristic therefore predicts correctly that the 
coordination ambiguity in this sentence is not innocuous, regardless of what cut-off is 
used.
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Figure 6-3: Distributional Similarity heuristic results at different cut-offs 
Results
The results we obtained using the Distributional Similarity heuristic on our dataset are 
shown in Figure 6-3. At its highest, precision in excess of 20 percentage points above the 
54.3% baseline is achieved. This is when the distributional similarity between the two 
head words has to be in the top 10 ranked matches to be considered a positive result. 
An f-measure score of almost 9 percentage points above the 55.8% baseline is achieved 
at this cut-off. However, recall reaches only 20% here. Precision tails off markedly after 
more than the topmost rankings are considered, though some predictive power is still in 
evidence. Recall increases considerably when very low-ranked distributional similarity 
rankings are considered also indicative of innocuous ambiguity. The precision at these 
levels becomes unconvincing.
When implementing cross-validation, the f-measure is always maximised with a max­
imum of 10 matches. This is therefore the cut-off we will use for all the iterations in the 
cross-validation exercise.
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
155
100
 R O C curve
CD o uo
<D
o ' 40
 Baseline
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Fallout (% )
Figure 6-4: Distributional Similarity heuristic ROC curve
Evaluation
These results indicate that this heuristic can be an effective predictor of innocuous 
ambiguity. This is when the distributional similarity between the head words is very 
high compared with the distributional similarities that they have with other words.
The ROC curve for this heuristic is shown in Figure 6-4. The area under the ROC 
curve is 59.4%. Again the baseline for the ROC curve is 50%, so the predictive power of 
this heuristic is 9.4 percentage points better than that of a test with no ability at predict­
ing innocuous ambiguity. This indicates that, without training or tuning, distributional 
similarity is a weaker diagnostic test than coordination matching. It still, however, goes 
some way to proving the hypothesis upon which the Distributional Similarity heuristic 
is based, namely that if the conjuncts’ head words display strong distributional similar­
ity, then the conjuncts are likely to be a syntactic unit. A coordination-first reading is 
therefore likely. If this likelihood is sufficiently strong, the ambiguity will be innocuous.
The ROC curve is always above the baseline. This indicates that the heuristic is 
consistently a good predictor of innocuous ambiguity over the cut-offs we have considered.
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6.2.3 C ollocation Frequency
Here we present the results achieved by the Collocation Frequency heuristic on our 
dataset. This heuristic was introduced in Section 5.6.3. We present a worked example 
of its effectiveness when nocuous ambiguity has been determined using the Weighted 
Method. We then evaluate the heuristic and the hypothesis underlying it.
Example
We obtain the frequencies with which the modifiers are collocated with the head words 
using the Sketch Engine’s word sketch facility. We then calculate the collocation fre­
quency ratio from these, and evaluate cut-offs for this ratio in multiples of 5. The 
collocation frequency ratio is the frequency with which the modifier is found collocated 
with the head word it is nearest to divided by the frequency with which it is found 
collocated with the further head word. We use the following example from our dataset 
to illustrate this heuristic:
Project manager and designer
Of the 17 judges, 5 acknowledged this coordination as being ambiguous, 4 judged it to 
be coordination-first and 8 judged it to be coordination-last. As 5 is less than 8, it is not 
an acknowledged ambiguity. However, 4/12 =  33%, which is greater than the average 
unacknowledged ambiguity (15.3%). So this coordination is a nocuous ambiguity.
Project has a collocation frequency of 29.55 with manager in the BNC, but it has 
no collocations there with designer. This heuristic therefore always predicts that the 
coordination ambiguity in this sentence is innocuous. This is regardless of whatever 
cut-off is used. This heuristic therefore always falsely predicts that the coordination 
ambiguity in this sentence is innocuous.
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Figure 6-5: Collocation Frequency heuristic
Results
The results we obtained on our dataset using the Collocation Frequency heuristic are 
shown in Figure 6-5. As can be seen, the heuristic performs similarly for a range of the 
collocation frequency ratios shown here. The precision over this range is more than 6 
percentage points above the 54.3% baseline. F-measure of 3 percentage points above 
the 55.8% baseline and recall of 18.7% are achieved here. At lower minimum ratios, 
the likelihood of finding the nearer head word collocated with the modifier is not many 
times more than the likelihood of finding the further head word collocated with it. Both 
head words are readily modified by the modifier. The precision here, at ratios 2 and 
3, indicates that such low minimum ratios are less conclusive indicators of innocuous 
ambiguity. Recall, however, is considerably better here than at higher minimum ratios. 
At the other extreme, very high ratios capture cases where collocations between the 
further head word and the modifier are very infrequent or non-existent. Such cases are 
rare, and the poor precision here may be due to sparseness.
When implementing cross-validation, the f-measure is always maximised when a min­
imum ratio of between 4 and 7 (inclusive) is used. We use 4 as the cut-off for all the
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Figure 6-6: Collocation Frequency heuristic ROC curve
iterations of the cross-validation exercise.
Evaluation
The performance of this heuristic is modest. It is not so convincing a predictor of innocu­
ous ambiguity. This may be partly due to the fact that collocation frequencies are not 
easily measurable for some types of coordination in our dataset. This has been explained 
in Section 5.6.3 on page 127. However, this is the only heuristic that successfully predicts 
coordination-last readings. It is therefore a vital contribution to our overall ability at 
predicting innocuous ambiguity.
The ROC curve for this heuristic is shown in Figure 6-6. The area under the ROC 
curve is 56.0%, the baseline being 50%. The predictive power of this heuristic is therefore 
6 percentage points better than that of a test with no ability at predicting innocuous am­
biguity. This indicates that, without training or tuning, collocation frequency is weaker 
than both coordination matching and distributional similarity as a diagnostic test for 
innocuous coordination ambiguity. However, this still indicates that the hypothesis upon
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which the Collocation Frequency heuristic is based has some validity. It demonstrates 
that if a modifier is much more frequently collocated in the corpus with the coordinated 
head word that it is nearest to, than it is with the further head word, then it is more 
likely to form a syntactic unit with only the nearest head word. This implies that a 
coordination-last reading is the most likely. If that likelihood is sufficiently strong, the 
ambiguity will be innocuous.
The ROC curve is always above the baseline. This indicates that the heuristic is 
consistently a good predictor, albeit not a strong one, of innocuous ambiguity over the 
cut-offs we have considered.
The performance of the Collocation Frequency heuristic raises a question concerning 
the potential overlap of our heuristics. The fact that recall is highest at very low mini­
mum ratios, the cut-off of 2, has an important implication for us. At these low ratios, 
many pairs of head words for which the heuristic gives a positive result are collocated 
with the modifier in not greatly dissimilar frequencies. This represents a degree of distri­
butional similarity between those headwords. This is because the modifier is an aspect 
of the context of the head words. At even lower ratios, even stronger distributional 
similarity would be captured. The metric, based on only one form of modification, is 
however much weaker than that used by a distributional thesaurus. Nevertheless, we 
would not consider using such low ratios for this heuristic. The heuristic would then be 
in danger of measuring something completely different.
6.2.4 M orphology
Here we present the results achieved by the Morphology heuristic on our dataset. This 
heuristic was introduced in Section 5.6.4. We present a worked example of its effective­
ness when nocuous ambiguity has been determined using the Weighted Method. We 
then evaluate the heuristic and the hypothesis underlying it.
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Example
We attempt to match the trailing characters of the conjuncts’ head words in order 
to compare their morphology. As the cut-offs for this heuristic, we use integer values 
representing the numbers of trailing letters of the head words. We use the following 
example from our dataset to illustrate this heuristic:
It cannot function with the proper installation and configuration
Of the 17 judges, 2 judged this sentence to be ambiguous, 13 judged it to be coordination- 
first, nobody judged it to be coordination-last and 2 people entered no response. As 13 
is greater than 2, it is not an acknowledged ambiguity. Also, as 0/13 =  0, it is not an 
unacknowledged ambiguity. On neither count is this ambiguity nocuous.
The trailing characters of installation match those of configuration up to a maximum 
of 5. The heuristic therefore predicts innocuous ambiguity for this sentence up to a cut­
off of 5. The heuristic therefore correctly predicts that the coordination ambiguity in 
this sentence is innocuous, for all cut-offs up to 5.
Results
The results that we obtained using the Morphology heuristic on our dataset are shown 
in Figure 6-7. As can be seen, maximum precision is achieved at a cut-off of 5. Here 
it is more than 45 percentage points above the 54.3% baseline, though recall is only 
2.7% here. More useful recall is achieved when only 1 or 2 matching trailing characters 
are considered indicative of innocuous ambiguity. However, precision is worse than the 
baseline here. F-measure, even using our weighting in favour of precision, at no point 
exceeds its 55.8% baseline. As anticipated, no similarities between trailing characters is 
captured when more than 5 axe considered.
When implementing cross-validation, f-measure is maximised when 5 is the cut-off
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for 9 of the iterations in the cross validation exercise; 3 is the cut-off for the remaining 
one.
Evaluation
The performance of this heuristic shows that it has only limited power at predicting 
innocuous ambiguity. It can be a reliable indicator though. This happens when similar 
morphology has been captured with some certainty: when comparatively large numbers 
of trailing characters match. Data is sparse when this is the case, however. The fact 
that no predictions are made when still more trailing letters are considered confirms 
the assumptions made in our analysis of English morphology. The fact that the f- 
measure metric we use never exceeds the baseline is disappointing. However, this does 
not necessarily prove that the heuristic is of no use to us. The high precision obtainable 
may be a useful contribution when this heuristic is used in combination with others.
The ROC curve for this heuristic is shown in Figure 6-8. The area under the ROC 
curve is 49.6%. This is actually slightly less than the 50% baseline. This indicates 
that, without training or tuning, morphology is not a valid diagnostic test for innocuous
1 2 3 4 5 6
-♦-P recision  
-■-R ecall 
-x -F  Measure
Baseline
Precision
Minimum No. of Matching Trailing Characters 
Considered to Predict Innocuous Ambiguity
Figure 6-7: Morphology heuristic
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Figure 6-8: Morphology heuristic ROC curve
coordination ambiguity. We have not validated the hypothesis made for this heuristic. 
Namely, we have not proven that similarity between the morphology of the conjuncts’ 
head words indicates that they form a syntactic unit. We can neither therefore infer that 
this indicates innocuous ambiguity.
However, part of the ROC curve is above the baseline. This confirms that the heuris­
tic can be an effective predictor in some circumstances.
6.2.5 Phrase Length
Here we present the results achieved by the Phrase Length heuristic on our dataset. This 
heuristic was presented in Section 5.6.5. We evaluate its efficacy as a prediction metric 
and the hypothesis underlying it.
Results
In our dataset the difference in the lengths of the conjuncts ranges from 0 to 2. We 
do not consider 0, as this indicates the inverse of our hypothesis that differences in 
phrase length indicate innocuous ambiguity. There are therefore too few cut-off points
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Figure 6-9: Phrase length heuristic ROC curve
to warrant a graph of the performance of this heuristic. At the cut-off of 2, there are 
two true positives and no false positives. This gives maximum precision but negligible 
recall and low f-measure. At the cut-off of 1, precision of 57.1% and recall of 21.3% 
are achieved. The precision is 2.8 percentage points above the baseline of 54.3%. The 
f-measure at this point is 52.0%. This is 3.8 percentage points below the baseline of 
55.8%.
Evaluation
The performance of this heuristic gives no certainty that it can contribute to the pre­
dictive power of our combined heuristics, but might have some validity when lengths of 
conjuncts differ by more than a single word.
The ROC curve for this heuristic is shown in Figure 6-9. The area under the ROC 
curve is 49.2%, 0.8 percentage points below the 50% baseline. This indicates that, 
without training or tuning, phrase length difference is not a valid diagnostic test for 
innocuous ambiguity in coordinations. We have not validated the hypothesis made for 
this heuristic. We have not shown that numbers of words in a coordination’s conjuncts
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affects how that coordination is read. We can therefore not infer that this indicates 
innocuous ambiguity.
However, part of the ROC curve is above the baseline. This indicates that this 
heuristic may be an effective predictor in some circumstances.
6.2.6 N oun N um ber
Here we present the results achieved by the Noun Number heuristic on our dataset. This 
heuristic was presented in Section 5.6.6. We then evaluate its efficacy as a prediction 
metric and the hypothesis underlying it.
Results
We only have one cut-off point for this heuristic. This is agreement between the number 
of the nouns that are head words of the conjuncts. We do not therefore present a graph 
of this heuristic’s performance. At the agreement cut-off, precision of 54.0%, recall of 
85.7% is achieved. This precision is 0.3 percentage points below the baseline. F-measure 
of 55.2% is achieved, which is 0.6 percentage points below the baseline.
Evaluation
The performance of this heuristic gives no indication that it can predict innocuous am­
biguity. The ROC curve for this heuristic is shown in Figure 6-10. The area under the 
ROC curve is 51.0%. This gives only 1 percentage point over a test with no predictive 
power. This suggests that the noun number agreement we have captured is not a re­
liable diagnostic test for innocuous ambiguity in coordinations. We have not therefore 
been able to validate the hypothesis upon which this heuristic based. Namely, we have 
been unable to show that noun number agreement between the head words of conjuncts 
indicates that they should be read coordination first. We cannot say therefore that
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Figure 6-10: Noun number heuristic ROC curve
innocuous ambiguity can be predicted in this way. In the same way, have not been 
able to substantiate our interpretation of Resnik’s (1999) claim that noun number is an 
“important” indicator of preferred readings of coordinations.
The ROC curve shows no significant deviation from the baseline. We cannot conclude 
that this heuristic can be trained to be a useful predictor.
6.2.7 M ass/C ount
Here we present the results achieved by the Mass/Count heuristic on our dataset. This 
heuristic was presented in Section 5.6.7. We then evaluate its efficacy as a prediction 
metric and the hypothesis underlying it.
Results
We only have two cut-off points for this heuristic: unequivocal agreement and equivocal 
agreement. The former refers to the situation where the head words of the conjuncts are 
either definitely both mass or definitely both count. The latter refers to the situation 
where there is the possibility that one or both of the head words can be either mass or
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Figure 6-11: Mass/Count heuristic ROC curve
count. As there are only two cut-off points, it is not instructive to give a graph of this 
heuristic’s performance.
At the cut-off of unequivocal agreement, this heuristic has precision of 59.7% and 
recall of 63.5%. This precision is 5.4 percentage points above the baseline. F-measure 
of 59.9% is achieved. This is 4.1 percentage points above the f-measure baseline.
At the cut-off of equivocal agreement, this heuristic has precision of 53.1% and recall 
of 95.2%. This precision is 1.2 percentage points below the baseline. F-measure of 54.5% 
is achieved. This is 1.3 percentage points below the f-measure baseline.
Evaluation
The performance of this heuristic shows that unequivocal agreement, with regard to 
nouns being mass or count, has some power at predicting innocuous coordination ambi­
guities.
The ROC curve for this heuristic is shown in Figure 6-11. The area under the ROC 
curve is 56.7%. This gives 6.7 percentage points over a test with no predictive power. 
This indicates that mass/count agreement for nouns is a valid diagnostic test, albeit not
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Heuristic
(CV =  cross-validation exercise)
Recall
(%)
Prec­
ision
(%)
Precision 
Percentage 
Points over 
Baseline
F-Mea-
sure
0=0.25
(%)
F-Measure 
Percentage 
Points over 
Baseline
ROC Curve 
Percentage 
Points over 
Baseline
Baselines 100 54.3 - 55.8 - -
Coordination Matching 40.0 75.0 20.7 71.3 15.5 12.2
Distributional Similarity 20.0 75.0 20.7 64.6 8.8 9.4
Collocation Frequency 18.7 60.9 6.6 53.7 -2.1 6.0
Morphology 2.7 100 45.7 31.8 -24.0 -0.4
Phrase Length 21.3 57.1 2.8 52.0 -3.8 -0.8
Noun Number 85.7 54.0 -0.3 55.2 -0.6 1.0
Mass/Count 63.5 59.7 5.4 59.9 4.1 6.7
Combined Heuristics (pre CV) 58.7 71.0 16.7 70.1 14.3
Combined Heuristics (post CV) 56.3 62.2 7.9 61.6 5.8
Table 6.4: Performance of our Heuristics using Weighted Method
a particularly reliable one, for innocuous ambiguity in coordinations. However, this still 
indicates that the hypothesis upon which this heuristic is based has some validity. It 
demonstrates that if the head nouns of conjuncts are either both mass or both count, 
then they will more likely be read coordination first. If that likelihood is sufficiently 
strong, the ambiguity will be innocuous.
The ROC curve is always above the baseline. This indicates that the heuristic is 
consistently a good predictor, albeit not a strong one, of innocuous ambiguity.
6.2.8 Com bined H euristics U sing W eighted M ethod
To combine our heuristics using the Weighted Method, we use a simple disjunction 
approach. This states says that if any of the heuristics predicts an ambiguity to be in­
nocuous, then that ambiguity is innocuous. This is an appropriate way of combining the 
heuristics as we hypothesise that they all predict something different and we have endeav­
oured, using the Weighted Method, to maximise this predictive power. To use majority 
voting, whereby several of the heuristics must agree, would therefore be inappropriate. 
For the same reason, and to an even greater extent, it would be inappropriate to use a 
conjunctive approach, whereby the heuristics must be unanimous to give a prediction of 
innocuous ambiguity. For instance, the collocation frequency heuristic attempts predic­
tion of coordination-last readings whereas the others predict coordination-first readings:
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if the former was successful, it would never agree with the others. The results of the 
combined heuristics are presented at the foot of Table 6.4, both before and after the 
cross-validation exercise.
The results of the individual heuristics are also presented in Table 6.4. These are 
given without having been subject to cross-validation, and at the cut-off that is most 
commonly used when maximising the combined heuristics’ performance. The areas under 
ROC curves are also given in Table 6.4, to aid comparison of the heuristics in terms of 
the validity of their underlying hypotheses.
6.2.9 D iscussion
As can be seen from Table 6.4, nearly all the individual heuristics can achieve higher 
precision than the baseline. In some cases they considerably exceed what a test with 
no ability at predicting innocuous ambiguity would achieve. The precision baseline is 
calculated by assuming that all the coordinations are innocuous, but this is an assump­
tion that we in no way want to make. It would allow many nocuous ambiguities to pass 
unnoticed. We wish precision to exceed the baseline as much as possible. It is therefore 
appropriate that we have sought to maximise precision of the individual heuristics at 
the expense of low recall.
Combining the heuristics increases the recall considerably. This indicates that their 
coverage of innocuous ambiguities is to some extent complementary. However, the pre­
cision of the combined heuristics is less than the precision of most of the heuristics. This 
indicates that the intersection of the coverages of the individual heuristics contains true 
positives. In other words, some sentences are judged to be innocuous by more than one 
heuristic. This is only to be expected. For instance, the words in a coordination found 
commonly in BNC may also have strong distributional similarity. The potential overlap 
between collocation frequencies and distributional similarity has already been discussed
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Recall
(%)
Recall
Standard
Deviation
Prec­
ision
(%)
Prec­
ision
Standard
Deviation
F-Measure 
(3 =  0.25 
(%)
F-Measure
Standard
Deviation
Combined Heuristics 
after Cross-Validation 56.3 20.0 62.2 25.5 61.6 24.7
Table 6.5: Standard Deviations of Combined Heuristics after Cross-Validation
in Section 6.2.3 on page 157. Such factors decrease the contribution of true positive 
predictions to the combined heuristics’ predictive capability. However, the combined 
heuristics achieve an f-measure score of 70.1% before implementation of cross-validation. 
This is 14.3 percentage points above the baseline. We use the same weighting for this 
f-measure as for the individual heuristics. We believe that this performance is still ac­
ceptable. It is almost as good as the best heuristic but it represents much higher recall.
In the last row of Table 6.4 are the results of the combined heuristics after application 
of 10-fold cross-validation. During this exercise, ^  of the dataset has been used as 
training data to determine optimal cut-offs. The heuristics are then run, using these 
cut-offs, on the remaining which is the test data. This process is iterated 10 times, 
so all data is used as test data. Because of this, heuristics are run on test data using 
cut-offs which are often sub-optimal for that data. This inevitably reduces performance. 
The f-measure drops to 61.6, which is 5.8 points above the baseline. The recall, however, 
is still much higher than for any of the individual heuristics. This performance shows 
that we have partly achieved what we set out to do: improving recall by combining 
our heuristics. However, the decreased precision makes the overall f-measure result 
disappointing.
For the performance figures obtained after the cross-validation exercise has been 
performed, we analyse the variance of the performance over the 10 folds. This is presented 
in Table 6.5. We use standard deviations to represent the variance of the performances 
in terms of percentages. The means from which the standard deviations deviate are the 
(averaged) performance figures, which are re-presented there. It can be seen that there
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is great variance between the folds, for recall and, even more markedly, for precision and 
f-measure. Considering precision, the interval between one standard deviation below the 
mean (36.7%) and one standard deviation above the mean (87.8%) is more than half the 
entire range of possible values. This represents a significant variance. It reflects the fact 
that the collections of fines contained in the folds can be very different from each other: 
the sub-datasets in the folds are highly heterogeneous. This is partly due to the small size 
of the dataset, resulting in small fold sizes. A less thorough cross-validation technique — 
using fewer folds — might give lower standard deviations, but might be less reliable as a 
technique for avoiding bias. Our 10-fold cross-validation randomizes the data so that a 
variation in a certain subset of the data (a fold) does not gain prominence in the overall 
analysis. Therefore, although the standard deviations are statistically significant, we do 
not consider this heterogeneity to be a problem.
The Weighted Method used here tends to weight unacknowledged ambiguities more 
heavily than acknowledged ambiguities. Nocuous ambiguity is therefore more likely to 
result from the former than from the latter. The method implements the idea that 
unacknowledged ambiguities are the ultimate cause of nocuous ambiguity. They are 
therefore more immediately dangerous than acknowledged ambiguities. The weighting 
we use means that each nocuous ambiguity has higher than average unacknowledged 
ambiguity. Such ambiguities can therefore be considered to be of immediate concern. 
They may result in misunderstandings, and therefore in incorrect implementation of re­
quirements. We have published work using this method (Chantree, Nuseibeh, de Roeck, 
and Willis 2006), where it has received the approval of RE practitioners.
6.3 Predictions Using Flexible M ethod
Here we present the performance of our combined heuristics at predicting consensus hu­
man judgements obtained using the Flexible Method. To reiterate, this method treats
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unacknowledged and acknowledged ambiguity equally when determining whether an am­
biguity is nocuous or innocuous. We implement ambiguity thresholds as a part of this 
process, which allows us to show the impact of heuristics at difference levels of intolerance 
to ambiguity.
We present the performance of the seven heuristics used only in combination. (The 
individual heuristics are introduced in Section 6.2. Their individual performances at a 
fixed threshold are discussed there as an demonstration of their effectiveness.) For all the 
results presented here, we fit our data to a logistic regression model. The WEKA machine 
learning package is used for this. We do not give worked examples as this software does 
not require user interaction or offer the necessary transparency. We use the software 
to determine performance in terms of the accuracy of predicting both innocuous and 
nocuous ambiguities, as explained in Section 5.7. This is done as an alternative to our 
approach so far with the Weighted Method in Section 6.2. The aim there was validate 
the heuristics, and the hypotheses that they are based on, by trying to predict innocuous 
ambiguity. The aim here is to show how nocuous ambiguity can be distinguished from 
innocuous ambiguity. The prediction of both types is therefore relevant.
We first introduce the baselines used for this exercise. Then we discuss the heuristics’ 
performance in relation to these baselines. This is followed by a discussion of this exercise 
and of the implications of using ambiguity thresholds.
6.3.1 Baselines
Baselines (or lower bounds) are most relevant for classification tasks such as ours where 
the evaluation measure is accuracy (Manning and Schiitze 1999). We use two baselines 
when evaluating the accuracy of our combined heuristics in this exercise, as shown in 
Figure 6-12. The baselines represent the performance of the simplest possible algorithms. 
These are the assignment of one of the two possible outcomes to all instances. One is
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Figure 6-12: Baselines for Combined Heuristics’ Accuracy at Discriminating Nocuous 
from Innocuous Ambiguity
found by determining the number of innocuous ambiguities correctly predicted if all 
ambiguities are considered innocuous. The other is found by determining the number of 
nocuous ambiguities correctly predicted if all ambiguities are considered nocuous. Both 
baselines are needed because we are measuring accuracy of classifying both nocuous and 
innocuous ambiguities. We target improvement against the higher of the two baselines 
at any given threshold.
It can be seen that the baselines tend towards 0% and 100% at the extreme right 
of Figure 6-12. At ambiguity thresholds approaching 100% (complete intolerance) there 
are a vanishingly small number of innocuous ambiguities. Let us suppose we are im­
plementing a threshold of 90%. If only 2 of our 17 judges disagree with the majority 
non-ambiguous (i.e. coordination-first or coordination-last) opinion, then the ambiguity 
will still be classed as nocuous (15/17 =  88.2%). At the extreme left of the graph the 
baselines also tend towards 0% and 100%. Here there is a vanishingly small number of 
nocuous ambiguities, as tolerance to ambiguity tends towards being complete. Let us 
suppose we are implementing a threshold of 20%. Only 4 out of 17 judgements need to
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be in favour of one of the non-ambiguous opinions (coordination-first or coordination- 
last) for that ambiguity to be classed as innocuous (4/17 =  23.5%). Remember that 
acknowledged ambiguity judgements and minority non-ambiguous judgements are con­
sidered on a par. In the latter scenario, 3 could be minority non-ambiguous judgements 
and 10 could be acknowledged ambiguity judgements.
In the centre of Figure 6-12, the baselines cross each other when the accuracy of 
distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambiguity is approximately 50%. This figure 
is the lowest baseline available. It is therefore the one we most wish to target, as 
distinguishing between nocuous and innocuous ambiguity is most difficult to achieve 
in this region. Indeed, prediction at very high or very low tolerance levels are easily 
accommodated by simpler methods, as reflected by the baselines there. The threshold 
giving the minimum baselines for our dataset is approximately 57%. At least 10 out 
of 17 judgements need to be in favour of the majority non-ambiguous opinion for an 
ambiguity to be classed innocuous (10/17 =  58.8%).
6.3.2 Perform ance o f Com bined H euristics
The performance of the combined heuristics, along with the baselines, is presented in 
Figure 6-13. Only a range of thresholds covering where the former deviate from the 
latter is presented. The combined heuristics’ performance is the same as the higher 
performing baseline at all ambiguity thresholds beyond this range. It is recognised that 
it can be hard to outperform high baselines (Manning and Schutze 1999). The last few 
percentage points are notoriously hard to achieve when performance at over 90%, for 
instance, is already achievable. This is the case with our baselines at extreme ambiguity 
thresholds. The combined heuristics’ performance in relation to the baselines is therefore 
not so surprising at these thresholds.
However, Figure 6-13 shows that our combined heuristics can satisfactorily outper-
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Figure 6-13: Combined Heuristics’ Accuracy at Discriminating Nocuous from Innocuous 
Ambiguity using Logistic Regression
form the baselines in the middle region. They perform best between ambiguity thresholds 
of 50% and 60%, with their maximum improvement in performance where the baselines 
intersect. This can be expressed alternatively as 14 percentage points above the baselines 
or as 28% improvement on the baselines — the result presented in the abstract of this 
thesis . Between ambiguity thresholds of 60% and 75% the performance is less marked 
but still noteworthy. The average improvement in performance in this range can be ex­
pressed alternatively as 2.7 percentage points above the baseline, or 4.1% improvement 
on the baseline. Between the thresholds of 40% and 50%, no increase in performance 
above the baselines is witnessed.
6.3.3 D iscussion
The performance of the combined heuristics between 50% and 60% shows they can 
have significant ability at distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambiguities at a range 
of ambiguity thresholds appropriate for some tasks. We anticipate that this middle 
range of thresholds will in fact be useful for most tasks: the need to identify as many
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nocuous ambiguities as possible is balanced with the desire to avoid wasting effort by also 
identifying innocuous ones. At a threshold of 50%, it is true that ambiguities likely to lead 
to misunderstandings may be counted as innocuous. This may be the case if the number 
of judges concurring with the majority non-ambiguous verdict is only one more than 
the number who do not. However, in our experience, it is unlikely that all of the latter 
will concur with the minority non-ambiguous option. Instead, we find that the majority 
of these dissenters exercise caution. In our dataset, an average of only 18.7% judges 
assign the minority non-ambiguous judgement. The other 81.3% assign the “ambiguous” 
judgement. The average deviation from the former average is 14.3%. In only 4 cases do 
the numbers of judgements in favour of the minority non-ambiguous option exceed those 
in favour of the “ambiguous” option. This indicates that caution is generally exercised, 
with readers expressing any doubts they have by acknowledging ambiguity. Ambiguity 
thresholds of 50% and 60% are therefore more appropriate than they would be if they 
represented more of the (more dangerous) unacknowledged ambiguity.
The performance of the combined heuristics at thresholds higher than 60% is less 
conclusive. The improvements over the baselines show that the combined heuristics do 
have some ability at distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambiguity at these levels. 
The fact that this is witnessed over a range of thresholds gives credence to this trend. 
However, it is harder to outperform the baselines here than at lower thresholds. We 
would wish the performance over the baselines to be higher at these thresholds. This 
wish is made stronger by that fact that thresholds in this range are appropriate for more 
safety-critical tasks. We desire high accuracy for such tasks to prove the worth of our 
techniques.
The combined heuristics show no ability at distinguishing nocuous from innocuous 
ambiguities at thresholds below 50%. However, this is not of major concern to us. It 
is unlikely that such thresholds would be used, as they can allow highly nocuous ambi-
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Figure 6-14: Proportions of Coordination-First and Coordination-Last Interpretations 
at Different Ambiguity Thresholds
guities to be passed as innocuous. At these low thresholds, significant unacknowledged 
ambiguity may be observed for ambiguities that are judged as innocuous. The afore­
mentioned caution shown by dissenters mitigates against this somewhat, but this effect 
will be diluted at these lower thresholds. For example, an ambiguity judged by 8 people 
to be coordination-first, by 7 to be coordination-last and by 2 to be ambiguous has a 
certainty of 47.1%. It will therefore be considered innocuous if the ambiguity threshold 
is set at any percentage lower than this. This is despite the fact that it is an ambiguity 
that is unacknowledged by a lot of people, and so clearly may lead to misunderstandings.
Figure 6-14 shows the percentages of coordination-first and coordination-last inter­
pretations at different ambiguity thresholds. These constitute innocuous ambiguity for 
our test case ambiguity. They are compared against the percentages of nocuous ambigu­
ities, using the Flexible Method, at these thresholds. This figure indicates the difficulty 
of differentiating innocuous from nocuous ambiguity at the extremes of ambiguity tol­
erance, as there are very few instances of one type. At these extremes, any incorrect 
predictions will have a large influence on accuracy in relation to the number of correct 
predictions (which can never be large). Figure 6-14 also demonstrates that the numbers
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Figure 6-15: Proportions of Nocuous and Innocuous Ambiguities at Different Ambiguity 
Thresholds
of coordination-first and coordination-last interpretations are in a roughly equal ratio 
at any given ambiguity threshold. This indicates that ambiguities normally given either 
of these two types of interpretation are approximately equally susceptible to becoming 
nocuous with increased intolerance to ambiguity. The judgements dissenting from one 
interpretation (either acknowledging ambiguity or choosing the other non-ambiguous 
interpretation) become significant at an equally increasing rate.
In terms of our model of ambiguity, we wish to analyse specifically the relationship 
between the ambiguity threshold and the distribution of nocuous and innocuous ambigui­
ties. Figure 6-15 is a simplification of Figure 6-14. It shows more clearly the relationship 
between the ambiguity threshold and the proportions of nocuous and innocuous am­
biguities in our dataset (using the Flexible Method). In the middle of the graph, this 
relationship is approximately linear. As discussed previously, these are ambiguity thresh­
olds in which we are most interested. For this range, then, the consensus about whether 
an ambiguity is nocuous varies approximately linearly with relation to ambiguity intoler­
ance. This confirms the relationship, discussed above in regard to Figure 6-14, between 
nocuous ambiguities and those with a preferred interpretation.
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This middle range of Figure 6-15 shows consistent increase of sensitivity to ambiguity 
among our judges. They have different levels of sensitivity (or intolerance), but these 
appear to be distributed along a continuum represented by this range. We may surmise 
from this that random (or rogue) judgements are not having a great effect over this 
range. (They will, however, have a greater effect at extreme ambiguity thresholds where 
judgements on one type are more sparse.) This says something about the ease with 
which our heuristics are able to be predict nocuous ambiguities using middle-ranging 
ambiguity thresholds. The data appears to be relatively trustworthy over this useful 
range. More trust can therefore be placed in the heuristics’ performance here.
6.4 Unacknowledged Ambiguities
Here we present and discuss the performance of the seven combined heuristics when 
distinguishing unacknowledged ambiguities from innocuous ones. The former replace the 
nocuous ambiguities we have tried to find using the Weighted and Flexible Methods. 
Here we are trying to distinguish only those ambiguities that are of immediate con­
cern, according to our judges. In this method, all acknowledged ambiguity judgements 
are ignored. Only minority non-ambiguous judgements count towards establishing un­
acknowledged ambiguity. We wish to determine what proportions of unacknowledged 
ambiguity are in evidence with different intolerances to ambiguity. We therefore experi­
ment with a range of ambiguity thresholds, as with the Flexible Method in Section 6.3. 
Also, for the same reasons given in that section, we employ a logistic regression model 
and measure the accuracy of distinguishing the two types of ambiguity.
We first discuss the baselines used for this exercise. Then we present the heuristics’ 
performance in relation to these baselines. (The individual heuristics are introduced in 
Section 6.2). This is followed by a discussion of this exercise and of the problems of 
predicting solely unacknowledged ambiguity.
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Figure 6-16: Baselines for Combined Heuristics’ Accuracy at Discriminating Unacknowl­
edged from Innocuous Ambiguity
6.4.1 Baselines
The two baselines for this exercise are shown in Figure 6-16. As when predicting nocuous 
ambiguity, they tend towards 0% and 100% at both extremes of the graph. However, their 
shape is decidedly different. At the right side of the graph unacknowledged ambiguity 
tends towards being non-existent. Here there are a vanishing small number of minority 
non-ambiguous judgements on the sentences but many sentences with very few of these 
judgements. In fact, at threshold as high as 90%, approximately half the ambiguities 
are shown to be innocuous. This represents the fact that many sentences have only a 
single minority non-ambiguous judgement or none at all. On the left side of the graph, 
there are a very few unacknowledged ambiguities at a threshold of 50%. Here there 
are equal numbers of coordination-first and coordination-last readings on a sentence. 
At lower ambiguity thresholds, however, nocuousness cannot increase. This is because 
the number of minority judgements can never be greater than the number of majority 
judgements. The range of thresholds below 50% is therefore not of interest to us.
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Figure 6-17: Combined Heuristics’ Accuracy at Discriminating Unacknowledged from 
Innocuous Ambiguity using Logistic Regression
6.4.2 Perform ance o f Com bined H euristics
The performance of the combined heuristics is presented in Figure 6-17, along with the 
baselines. This shows their accuracy at distinguishing unacknowledged from innocuous 
ambiguity using our logistic regression model. This is shown over the range of ambi­
guity thresholds that is meaningful for unacknowledged ambiguity. The only significant 
increase in accuracy of the heuristics above the baselines is at an ambiguity threshold of 
90%. This is where the baselines intersect. The increase can be expressed alternatively 
as 10.2 percentage points above the baselines or as 20.1% improvement on the baselines. 
At no other threshold do the combined heuristics perform significantly better than the 
baselines, and they sometimes perform fractionally worse.
6.4.3 D iscussion
The accuracy of the combined heuristics at a 90% threshold shows they can have signifi­
cant ability at distinguishing unacknowledged from innocuous ambiguities. This thresh­
old represents an intolerance to ambiguity which may be appropriate for some types of 
requirements. Such requirements include, for instance, those specifying safety-critical
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Figure 6-18: Proportions of Coordination-First and Coordination-Last Interpretations 
at Different Ambiguity Thresholds
systems. These requirements can tolerate the possibility of only very occasional minor­
ity non-ambiguous judgements. However, the combined heuristics’ lack of accuracy at 
other thresholds is not encouraging. In Section 6.3, we demonstrated that significant 
performance can be achieved over a low baseline. But that exercise also showed that the 
combined heuristics give some improvement over the baselines for a range of ambiguity 
thresholds. When looking solely at unacknowledged ambiguity, we are unable to improve 
on thresholds with baselines other than the lowest possible. We have not been able to 
predict unacknowledged ambiguity over a range of useful thresholds with any confidence.
Figure 6-18 shows the proportions of coordination-first and coordination-last inter­
pretations at different ambiguity thresholds. Much of the observations made for Fig­
ure 6-14 on page 177 are also true for this figure. Similarities include the difficulties 
of differentiation at extreme ambiguity thresholds and the ratios of the two types of 
interpretation. However, the two graphs are somewhat differently shaped. This is more 
easily discussed by looking only at unacknowledged and innocuous ambiguities.
Figure 6-19 simplifies Figure 6-18 by plotting only unacknowledged and innocuous 
ambiguity. Compared to Figure 6-15 on page 178, this relationship has a more con-
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Figure 6-19: Proportions of Unacknowledged and Innocuous Ambiguities at Different 
Ambiguity Thresholds
cave curve. This indicates that the number of unacknowledged ambiguities increases 
less rapidly than nocuous ambiguity when intolerance to ambiguity increases. This 
demonstrates that unacknowledged ambiguity tends not to be encountered as frequently 
as nocuous ambiguity. Unacknowledged ambiguity is therefore less in evidence than 
nocuous ambiguity regardless of one’s intolerance to ambiguity. It also means that un­
acknowledged ambiguity is harder to characterise than nocuous ambiguity. The fewer 
unacknowledged ambiguities there are, signified by the judgements in our dataset, the 
more they are more subject to random errors by our judges. It can therefore be harder 
to predict unacknowledged ambiguities using our heuristics.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have discussed our dataset and the performance of our heuristics 
on this dataset. The former discussion involved characterising the corpus from which 
our dataset was derived. We then summarised the sentences presented to our judges 
and the judgements they gave on these sentences. Results were presented for each of 
our methods of distinguishing nocuous from innocuous ambiguity. During the presen­
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tation of the Weighted Method, each individual heuristic was discussed in terms of its 
implementation and its overall efficacy. Some worked examples were presented here to 
aid understanding of nocuous, unacknowledged and acknowledged ambiguity. Both the 
Flexible and Purely Unacknowledged Methods used our heuristics only in combination. 
These interpretation methods were implemented using ambiguity thresholds, to demon­
strate our fundamental concern that intolerance to ambiguity should be flexible. The 
discussion of all these methods has revealed that nocuous ambiguity is easier to charac­
terise and predict than unacknowledged ambiguity. The individual heuristics have very 
variable prediction capabilities, but work more effectively in combination. Nocuous am­
biguity can be predicted at several ambiguity thresholds, including the one implicit in 
our weighted method, which are useful for RE practitioners.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
The main aims of this research have been to present and test a novel model that classifies 
ambiguities as being either nocuous or innocuous. Notification must be made of the 
former as they are likely to lead to misunderstandings, whereas the latter are likely to be 
easily interpreted and so no notification need take place. We have used human perception 
as the gold standard of how ambiguities are experienced, and thereby classified, and we 
have predicted this using a variety of heuristics.
From our use of human perception as a criterion for classification, we have seen that 
significant degrees of both acknowledged and unacknowledged ambiguity can be wit­
nessed. We conclude that this should be of concern where misunderstandings resulting 
from language must be kept to a minimum, particularly in a domain such as RE where 
they can lead to costly mistakes. The extent of nocuous ambiguity resulting from the 
judgements we collected is affected somewhat by the fact that we were not able to pro­
vide the judges with much disambiguating context for the sentences. Almost certainly, 
more ambiguities have been judged as nocuous than would be the case if all the context 
was provided: our judges have more easily reached differing conclusions about the inter­
pretation of the examples, or have more readily judged them to be ambiguous. However, 
even accounting for this, we believe that we have discovered sufficient differences of opin­
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ion to warrant our research. Also, a lower ambiguity threshold than might normally be 
preferred can be used to account for the increased numbers of nocuous ambiguities.
We draw various conclusions from our three methods of distinguishing ambiguities. 
Firstly, the Weighted Method of interpretation, allowing for no flexible intolerance to 
ambiguity, has shown that prioritising unacknowledged ambiguity is an effective and 
acceptable solution for real-world RE ambiguities. Using such a weighting captures the 
fact that unacknowledged ambiguity is a more immediate source of nocuousness than 
acknowledged ambiguity. Using this method we have also demonstrated the validity of 
the hypotheses underlying some of our heuristics. This is evidence that adds to the 
literature of disambiguation of coordinations.
Secondly, using the Flexible Method has shown that thresholds, representing a level 
of intolerance to ambiguity, can be used effectively in the classification of ambiguities 
as being either nocuous or innocuous. Significant improvements over simpler methods 
to discriminate between nocuous and innocuous ambiguity cannot be observed at all 
thresholds. However, the performance of our combined heuristics is considerably in 
excess of the baselines for some critical thresholds. It less conclusively exceeds the 
baselines for the other thresholds that we consider useful, but the performance there is 
still significant and encouraging.
Our third method is concerned only with unacknowledged ambiguities. They prove 
harder to classify than nocuous ambiguities (which may be acknowledged to a large 
extent). Comparing this method of interpretation with the others we have used, we 
believe that it is our definition of nocuous ambiguity that is more suitable for practical 
purposes.
The performance of our individual heuristics gives some valuable insights into how 
the data they utilise can be used to address the problem of ambiguity in text. A surpris­
ing number of coordinations and collocations in our specialised corpus were also found
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in the BNC, suggesting that generic language information, from a large enough source, 
can provide effective and readily-available solutions. It is also interesting that the mor­
phology heuristic was effective at predicting preferred readings of ambiguities, at some 
cut-off points, and we believe that this is an aspect of language that might be further 
investigated as a disambiguation technique.
We conclude that our results axe generalisable to a certain extent. Our use of a 
generic corpus (the BNC) means that the external linguistic data we use is applicable 
to a wide range of application domains. However, if a suitable specialised corpus were 
available to us, this might improve the performance of our heuristics by supplying data 
about some specialised words used in requirements. Coordination ambiguity is generic 
to language and so will be found in all types of documents. The process of coordination 
is similar across many languages, so the heuristics we use (or at least the hypotheses 
they are founded on) will also be applicable in these languages. However, our heuristics 
are specifically created for tackling coordination ambiguity, and others would have to 
be found for other types of ambiguity. Our dataset has necessarily been of restricted 
size. A larger number of examples would ensure that cross-validation would have a less 
detrimental effort of the heuristics’ performance: the heuristics would be operating less 
sub-optimaily on unseen data.
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Chapter 8
Future Work
Here we present some ideas for future work that are logical extensions of the research 
presented in this thesis. We firstly discuss other aspects of coordination ambiguity that 
might be investigated, and other heuristics that might be tried to distinguish nocuous 
from innocuous coordination ambiguity. Secondly we look at how our approach might be 
applied to other types of ambiguity. Thirdly we look at an alternative way of validating 
the results achieved using our approach. Fourthly we discuss the idea of using our 
approach to ambiguity in the form of a wizard.
8.1 Further Analysis of Coordinations
Here we discuss an interesting aspect of coordination, the application of De Morgan’s 
rules, that might merit future attention using the techniques that we have developed in 
our research. Then we discuss other heuristics we could evaluate for use in our analysis 
of coordination ambiguities.
8.1.1 D e M organ’s rules
The semantic characteristics of coordinations change in the presence a negation and De 
Morgan’s rules can be applied:
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-i( a and b ) =  ~>a or ->b 
-i( a or b ) = -ia and ->b
The coordinating conjunctions and and or swap meanings with each other. This can 
cause serious misunderstandings, and has been recognised as a potential problem in 
requirements (Kamsties, Berry, and Paech 2001). The outcome of important court cases 
have hinged upon whether these rules apply to instances of coordinations in legal statutes 
(Solan 1993).
The presence (or otherwise) of this effect would of course only be an issue with 
constructions which were read coordination-first. This is represented by the left-hand 
side of the equations above, where the negation is (or is part of) the external modifier. 
One of the main concerns in such cases is which words with a negative connotation are 
actual negations, thereby triggering De Morgan’s rules. It would be instructive to collect 
examples of coordination ambiguity where such words are (or form part of) the modifier 
attaching to one or both of the conjuncts, and use judges to determine the preferred 
reading of the ambiguity. Where nocuousness was witnessed, it might indicate that the 
word with negative connotation was more likely to be an actual negation, because the 
potential for triggering De Morgan’s rules was a cause of misunderstanding.
8.1.2 Possib le H euristics
Here we discuss two ideas for heuristics that could be tried in addition to the ones we 
have presented in this thesis.
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Derivational Morphology
The simple technique that we have used in this thesis for capturing inflectional morphol­
ogy encourages us to believe that morphology may be a fertile area of research. It would 
be interesting to determine whether more evidence can be found that similar morphology 
of the head words of conjuncts indicates that they tend to be read coordination-first. 
To this end, we would wish to consider more profoundly the derivational morphology 
of the words, as opposed to just comparing their trailing letters. This would entail a 
detailed analysis of the internal structure of the words, and utilisation of morphology 
classification schemes, particularly for nouns. Morphology is highly language-specific, so 
a separate treatment of it would be needed for any language that this approach was used 
on.
Semantic/Distributional Hybrid
A hybrid measure of similarity can be developed using distributional information, such as 
that supplied by Sketch Engine, and semantic information, such as that obtained using 
recent facilities available in WordNet. Such a hybrid arrangement has shown promise 
when used to predict predominant word senses (McCarthy et al. 2004).
8.2 Extension to Other Forms of Ambiguity
The main thrust of our research — introducing the key distinction between nocuous 
and innocuous ambiguity, and the fact that disambiguation is not always appropriate — 
is applicable to all forms of ambiguity. Some of the techniques that we use to predict 
human judgements about our test case coordination ambiguity appear quite specific to 
that type of ambiguity, due to the fact that we are testing types of linguistic similarity. 
But, as we explain below, many may have wider usage, most obviously when applied to 
other forms of structural ambiguity but also when applied to semantic and contextual
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ambiguities
8.2.1 O ther Structural A m biguities
Prepositional phrase attachment is the most obvious structural ambiguity to tackle next, 
because it is widespread and proven to cause misunderstandings. It also can be ap­
proached using collocation analysis. The Sketch Engine is able to supply highly suitable 
information for this. Also, its thesaurus could be used to determine similarity between 
the head noun in a prepositional phrase and the head nouns of each of the candidate 
phrases to which it might attach. It would be interesting to see, particularly for certain 
prepositions such as with and by which have a conjunctive aspect, whether preferred 
readings can be predicted using differences in these similarities.
8.2.2 N on-Structural A m biguities
Many types of ambiguities which do not depend on differences in syntactic structure can 
be approached using the prediction techniques we have presented here. One interesting 
project would be to test whether similarity between an ambiguous word and any words 
of the same part of speech that occur in its context has any bearing upon how nocuous 
it is. A lack of similarity might indicate that an unusual meaning of the ambiguous word 
is intended, and therefore not only that the word has more than one meaning but also 
that one of the alternatives might be chosen by a reader less familiar with the language 
used.
8.3 Validation
It would be interesting to test our techniques against a widely-available benchmark 
dataset. The Penn Treebank might be suitable in this regard, as it is annotated and is in 
a mature stage of development. Firstly, it would be interesting to compare the diversity
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of our judges’ interpretations with those of the coders who annotated the Treebank. Less 
account of the diversity of human perception is incorporated in the latter. We might be 
able to show that some Treebank annotations are too idiosyncratic, and may be minority 
judgements when compared to those of our judges. This would validate the notion in our 
ambiguity model that multiple reading ambiguities are dangerous. Then our heuristics 
could be run on Treebank data to determine whether they predict the structure there. 
This would validate the efficacy of the heuristics on generic data. This might produce an 
overall better performance than running them on a specialised dataset as we have done.
8.4 W izard
Ultimately we would like to implement our approach in the form of a wizard, operating 
in conjunction with a word processor. This would be an animation that appears on a 
computer screen to inform authors of how nocuous an ambiguity is deemed to be. For 
this to be a worthwhile exercise, we would need to extend our techniques to cover, and 
prove them to be effective on, other types of ambiguity. Other proven techniques could 
be used to supplement the ones that we have described in this thesis, in order to widen 
our coverage of ambiguities. High reliability would be required to give people faith in 
the system.
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Appendix A: Ambiguity 
Questionnaire Instructions
Surprise Prizes for those who com plete this Disambiguation  
Task!!!
Introduction
As you may (or may not) know, I am carrying out disambiguation tests on some real-life 
requirements texts. In this test I am looking at “coordination ambiguity”. I would be 
very very grateful if you could help me by completing this small task, and returning it 
to me as soon as you are able. Here are the instructions, (preceded by an explanation 
of what coordination ambiguity is).
Coordination A m biguity
Coordination ambiguity arises when the reader is unsure about the meaning of a sentence 
due to the presence of a coordinator. A coordinator, for our purposes here, is “AND”, 
“OR” or “AND/OR”. Uncertainty can arise if it is not clear whether the coordination 
of words (or phrases) should take priority over the effect of other words that surround 
those phrases. For instance, in the sentence:
“I  like green beans and sausages”
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the word “green” almost certainly applies only to the beans. So the coordination does 
not take priority. It coordinates the phrases to its left and right after the effect of the 
adjective ’’green” has taken place.
The Evaluation Task
In this study, we have decided to give you many different types of sentence. The modifier 
can be an adjective, as in the example above, or it might be an adverb, a prepositional 
phrase, a relative clause etc etc. However, you don’t need to worry unduly about this, 
as the sentences are presented in the form:
“I  like preen [[beans] and sausages]”
The modifier is underlined, and the two possible chunks of text to which it might be 
applied are represented by square bracketings.
You must decide whether or not you feel that a genuine coordination ambiguity exists: i.e. 
whether or not the sentence might be misunderstood because of that type of ambiguity. 
In the sentence above, because we are (reasonably) certain that one bracketing is the 
obvious one, we say that coordination ambiguity is not found.
Ignore any other types of ambiguity that you might encounter.
The lines of text are taken from actual documents which are often highly specialised and 
technical, so they can sound a little strange! Also, some of them are titles or asides, 
and so are not formed as proper sentences. An effort has been taken to reduce the 
original text to the simplest utterance that conveys all the meanings relevant to this
disambiguation task. Words in round brackets represent my simplifications; .....  refers
to an elision of irrelevant text.
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I'd like green [fbeansjand sausages]
Your O utput
At the beginning of each line, please write an “A” if you feel that a coordination am­
biguity is present. Otherwise, circle the bracketing which you feel is the correct one in 
each case, as shown in Figure 8.4.
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Appendix B: Examples in Dataset
Survey 1
( I t ) m anages coordinate [ [ systems ] and other related objects ]
( I t ) must be configured with the proper \ [ item ] and system components ]
( I t ) cannot function with the proper f [ installation ] and configuration ]
( I t ) shall display categorized [ [ instructions ] and documentation ]
The original [ [ meeting date ] or location ] may then need to be changed 
( It is ) useful in determining a best [ [ meeting date ] and location ]
Best [ [ meeting dates ] and locations ] should be determined
admission information, medication, equipments, daily f [ record ] and history ]
build vehicles from mass-produced [ [ parts ] and subassemblies ]
( They are ) assembled in to  vehicle models for model-based f [ design ] and development ]
It also lists applicable [ [ design constraints ] and system attributes ]
Create candidate assemblies from the architectural f [ description ] and component characterizations ] 
There are several [ [ assumptions ] and dependencies ]
The system will p arse  scalar [ [ input ] and output ports ]
( It is ) describing the size of vector-based f [ inputs ] and outputs ]
For vector-based [ [ input ] and output ], the system will provide a complete characterization 
The user may define architectural [ [ components ] and connectors ]
Non-Functional User’s [ [ guide ] and help documentation ]
Signal [ [ units ] and data transfer protocol ] must match
Survey 2
Revamp the current [ [ hardware ] and software ]
Take care of business [ [ rules ] and transactions ]
Involving [ election and/or [ geopolitics ] ] entities
Keep track of any [ modification or [ access ] ] to the database 
( I t ) might be automatically [ [ rejected ] or flagged ]
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Initialization [ [ rules ] or pre-conditions ]
Termination [ [ rules ] or post-conditions ]
Activity lik e  [ verification or [ printing ] ] of voters’ lists
( It might be ) [ rejected or [ flagged ] ] for further processing 
Display categorized [ [ instructions ] and documentation ]
Minimize the [ time span and [ human resources ] ] of regular inspection 
Facilitate the [ scheduling and [ performing ] ] of works 
Connectivity of ail [ control flow and [ data flow signals ] ] between sub-models 
This should lead to reduced [ [ cycle times ] and costs ] for automotive manufactures 
Patients conditions are [ inspected and [ recorded ] ] automatically
[ Constraints and [ dependencies ] ] that apply to the product
[ Assumptions and [ dependencies ] ] that are of importance
It i s  very [ [ common ] and ubiquitous ]
( I t ) targeted the [ project and [ election ] ] managers 
Contributing to the [ recording and [ accuracy ] ] of the data 
Proceed to [ enter and [ verify ] ] the data 
( He ) has the ability to [ generate and [ print ] ] pre-defined reports 
[ Reliability and [ security ] ] considerations
Risk greatly increased by the lack of [ [ funding ] and local resources ]
[ Operating and [ performance ] ] reguirements
Taken with respect to the [ quantity and [ type ] ] of data 
Used for [ verification and [ clean-up ] ] purposes
( I t ) will be [ implemented and [ executed ] ] on th e  platform
[ Memory or [ hard disk ] ] space 
[ Requirements or [ data ] ] storing 
[ Communication and [ performance ] ] reguirements 
[ Assumptions and [ dependencies ] ] that apply to the product 
[ Vandalism or [ act ] ] of God
Survey 3
project aims to [ develop and [ demonstrate ] ] methods 
the predicted [ [ coverage ] and interference ]
[ mode and [ hot spot ] ] location 
freguencv [ [ bands ] and polarisations ]
[ network and [ phone ] ] services 
( I t ) is a [ store and [ forward ] ] function
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functions for [ [ receiving ] and transmitting ]
[ free-space propagation and [ powerful field prediction ] ] tools 
the commonly used [ [ Cell Identity ] and Timing Advance ]
[ developed and [ proposed ] ] to the industry 
[ free bands and [ possible applications ] ] in other systems 
Definition of electrical [ [ characteristics ] and interfaces ]
Mounting [ [ configurations ] and hardware ] 
network [ [ monitoring ] and dedicated field ] 
zero [ [ mean values ] and standard deviation ]
[ processed and [ stored ] ] in database 
[ capacity and [ coverage ] ] relationship 
[ user and [ Node B ] ] identifications 
traffic [ [ conditions ] and variations ]
[ capacity and [ network resources ] ] required 
[ Capacity and [ Coverage ] ] Planning 
more sophisticated [ [ Capacity ] and Coverage ]
[ power control and [ Radio Resource Management ] ] parameters 
[ Planning and [ Localization ] ] Information 
network [ [ planning ] and management ]
[ set and [ control ] ] separately
the different [ [ importance ] and use ]
a typical modern [ [ XXX PC ] or YYY workstation ]
No need for [ control or [ supply ] ] cable 
Without any [ time or [ frequency ] ] division 
[ coverage and [ interference ] ] areas 
[ Cell Identity and [ Timing Advance ] ] parameters 
[ monitoring and [ dedicated field ] ] measurements 
[ Capacity and [ Coverage ] ] planning procedure 
[ importance and [ use ] ] of localisation information
Survey 4
Deficiencies in construction [ [ plans ] and specifications ]
[ Project client and [ project occupant ] ] representatives 
[ Interfaces and [ qualification ] ] provisions will be described 
Software [ [ Development] and Documentation ]
System Design [ [ Analysis ] and Description ]
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[ Constructibility and [ Design ] ] Reviews 
Required [ [ States ] and Modes ]
Project [ [ name ] and identification number]
Project [ [ manager ] and designer ]
The [ start and [ finish ] ] date
The specific set of [ [ plans ] and specifications ]
Depending on the [ size and [ scope ] ] of the project 
The [ plans and [ specifications ] ] being reviewed
Identity of the author will be [ captured and [ included ] ] with each comment
Check [ [ boxes ] and radio buttons ] will be provided
The ability to [ cut and [ paste ] ] comments
Delete all associated [ [ comments ] and evaluations ]
Phone [ [ number] and e-mail address ]
[ Materials and [ key ] ] words 
Manual [ [ input ] and selection ]
( I t ) will be further [ [ evaluated ] and included in XX X  ]
N ative  [ [ system forms ] and input widgets ]
Transmitted for [ use and [ evaluation ] ] by others
Descriptions will be [ compiled and [ included ] ] in XXX
The [ costs and [ benefits ] ] of using XXX
Improved [ [ design quality ] and decreased construction ]
Evaluation will be [ conducted and [ documented ] ] under XXX
Data shall be [ captured and [ maintained ] ] in  files
[ Security and [ Privacy ] ] Requirements
Sets of approved [ [ lessons learned ] and reference sources ]
Access t o  [ Comment and [ Evaluation ] ] Data
[ Design and [ Implementation ] ] Constraints
S m all [ [ firms ] and construction offices ]
[ Precedence and [ Criticaiity ] ] of Requirements 
Design [ [ Review ] and Checking System ]
[ Research and [ Development ] ] Management Information System 
Object-Oriented [ [ Modeling ] and Design ]
Users [ [ registration ] and access ]
[ Plans and [ specifications ] ] distributed for that review 
Building [ [ materials ] and key words ]
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[ Input and [ selection ] ] of options
( I t ) will b e  [ evaluated and [ included ] ] in XXX
[ Forms and [ input ] ] widgets
Decreased [ [ construction ] and operations cost ]
The set of approved [ [ lessons learned ] and existing reference sources ]
[ Review and [ Checking ] ] System
Comments may not be individually [ [ modified ] or deleted ]
Using a n y  [ evaluator or [ lessons learned ] ] function
Delete [ projects or [ reviews ] ] within a project
Identify each participant as a project \ [ manager ] and/or reviewer]
Operations [ [ cost ] and time ]
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